Ridlington v. Contreras

• Decision Date: 18 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. S-1-SC-38328,S-1-SC-38328
• Citation: 501 P.3d 444
• Parties: Linda Contreras RIDLINGTON as Conservator of the Estate of Alvino Contreras, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Bobby CONTRERAS, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

501 P.3d 444

Linda Contreras RIDLINGTON as Conservator of the Estate of Alvino Contreras, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.Bobby CONTRERAS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. S-1-SC-38328

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: October 18, 2021

Law Office of Richmond L. Neely, Richmond L. Neely, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner

Rose L. Brand & Associates, P.C., Eraina Marie Edwards, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondent

THOMSON, Justice

{1} In 2015, Alvino Contreras (Father) signed twenty-six quitclaim deeds conveying nearly 1900 acres of property to Bobby Contreras (Son). A year later, Linda Contreras Ridlington (Daughter) filed suit to void the deeds, alleging in part that they were obtained through undue influence. Son filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on the presumption that a duly executed conveyance is valid and arguing that Daughter's claim of undue influence therefore required dismissal. We must now determine whether a party seeking to defeat an undue influence claim establishes a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law by arguing that the contested deeds are presumptively valid.

{2} The district court found for Son on his motion for summary judgment. It concluded that Son met his prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on Daughter's undue influence claim in part because "[he] met his burden of proving the execution of the deeds is valid." The district court also determined that by the simple act of producing deeds that met all statutory requirements, the burden to present evidence contradicting the deeds’ presumed validity shifted to Daughter, and that Daughter failed to meet that burden. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a split decision, reasoning that statutorily proper deeds are presumptively valid and that the evidentiary burden had therefore shifted to Daughter to rebut the presumption of validity. Ridlington v. Contreras , A-1-CA-37029, mem. op. ¶ 14, 2020 WL 2096186 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) (non-precedential).

{3} The Court of Appeals dissent reasoned that the presumption of the deeds’ validity did not negate Daughter's claims of undue influence and that there were sufficient "issues of material fact" in the record to defeat summary judgment and proceed to trial. Id. ¶¶ 26-27 (Duffy, J., dissenting). We agree with the dissent's analysis and conclude that the presumption of the deeds’ validity on its own did not negate Daughter's claims of undue influence. We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals opinion and remand the case to the district court for a trial on the merits. As such, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Daughter's motion for reconsideration.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} In November 2016, a year after Father executed twenty-six quitclaim deeds conveying title to the properties in Son, Daughter filed a short complaint to quiet title to the properties in Father. The complaint alleges that the deeds are void because Father's signatures were obtained through duress and coercion,¹ the commission of the notary public who witnessed the signatures had expired prior to the signing, and Father lacked the mental capacity at the time of signing for the deeds to be valid. Attached to the complaint to quiet title was a durable power of attorney (POA) executed by Father to Daughter in 1997. The POA was not recorded until 2016. Also attached were descriptions of the quitclaim deeds. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the district court declared Father legally incapacitated and appointed Daughter as his guardian and as conservator for his estate. Upon motion of Daughter, in her capacity as conservator, the district court substituted Daughter as sole plaintiff in this case.

{5} Son appeared pro se and filed a short answer to the complaint, denying the allegations and stating that the real estate was "given to [Son] without any coercion or duress as claimed. [Father] requested that [Son] prepare documents in order to transfer ownership." Son then filed another answer after retaining counsel. In it, he raised several affirmative defenses. Son also asserted that Father "was competent and capable of entering into the transactions at the time the transactions occurred"; denied that the properties were obtained through undue influence; and stated that "[Son] and ... [F]ather have all their lives had close and open relationship, and lived next door to one another until [Daughter] ... removed ... [F]ather from his home a few months ago due to failing health."

{6} In advance of trial, Son filed a motion for summary judgment. Of the six "undisputed facts" provided in support of the motion, only one bears on the outcome of this case. It reads, "The properties were transferred in writing, with the property sufficiently described, consideration noted, signed by the grantor, and witnessed by a neutral third party."² This "undisputed fact" forms the basis of Son's main argument on appeal that, "[a]s a matter of law, [Daughter's] complaint fails due to the statutory requirements of conveyance of title having been met by [Father] in properly conveying land to ... [S]on." After procedural delays, Daughter filed a response that largely addressed challenges to her standing and did not attach any evidence to counter Son's proffered legal presumptions.

{7} The hearing on Son's motion focused on the parties’ respective evidentiary burdens in advancing and defending the factual and legal arguments raised. Son maintained that Daughter had a duty to rebut the motion for summary judgment by attaching evidence to the response, arguing that "all [Daughter has] done is restate the complaint." Daughter responded that asserting a presumption of the deeds’ validity alone is not sufficient to prevail on summary judgment. On rebuttal, Son returned to his contention that the deeds all facially complied with the statutory requirements for a valid conveyance and that without contrary evidence, the motion for summary judgment must be granted.³

{8} The district court judge granted Son's motion for summary judgment, stating, "As reluctant as I am to grant a motion for summary judgment ... in this particular case, I don't see that [Daughter] has met [the] burden to overcome the motion for summary judgment." Before the court's issuance of a written order, Daughter filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that "there is a question of fact whether the deeds were in fact validly executed" due to "suspicious circumstances." These included the facts that "[t]he deeds were discussed and prepared in secret," Son "drafted and recorded them," and Son is "a licensed realtor." Daughter attached five exhibits in support of her motion.⁴ The district court judge entered a formal order granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of Son and denied Daughter's motion for reconsideration and Daughter appealed.

{9} The Court of Appeals considered seven issues, but "[i]n light of the volume and overlapping nature of [Daughter]’s arguments," chose to "address them collectively in the context of the two district court orders appealed," the order granting summary judgment and the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Ridlington , A-1-CA-37029, mem. op. ¶¶ 3-4. With regard to the order granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeals concluded that Son met "the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment," id. ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), because his motion relied on the presumption that "statutorily proper" deeds are valid. Id. ¶ 14.

{10} The Court of Appeals further concluded that the burden to present evidence to rebut these presumptions shifted to Daughter and that she failed to meet her burden. See id. The Court reasoned that "mere allegations of coercion or duress" in Daughter's complaint were "insufficient to overcome presumptions of law made applicable by the nature of the evidence in this case." Id. ¶ 14. Because Daughter did not present evidence to rebut these presumptions, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the district court did not err in finding that [Son] met his burden of proving that the execution of the deeds was proper by relying on the presumptive validity of the conveyances." Id. ¶ 15. This Court granted certiorari to address whether Son on summary judgment satisfied his prima facie showing on Daughter's undue influence claim by asserting the presumption that a duly executed conveyance is valid.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

{11} We review a district court's granting or denying of summary judgment de novo. Cahn v. Berryman , 2018-NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 408 P.3d 1012 ; see Rule 1-056 NMRA. Rule 1-056(C) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[,] and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "Where reasonable minds will not differ as to an issue of material fact, a court may properly grant summary judgment." City of Albuquerque v. SMP Props., LLC , 2021-NMSC-011, ¶ 14, 483 P.3d 566 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

{12} Ultimately, a nonmoving party does not need to "establish all elements of the claim" in order to prevail on summary judgment. Bartlett v. Mirabal , 2000-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 3, 17, 39, 128 N.M. 830, 999 P.2d 1062⁵ (holding that the United States Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), had not been adopted by New Mexico courts and declining to adopt Anderson ’s higher evidentiary burden of proof). All that is required is that the nonmoving party presents evidence "sufficient to give rise to several issues of fact." Bartlett , 2000-NMCA-036, ¶ 17, 128 N.M. 830, 999 P.2d 1062 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Summary judgment should not be granted...