Riebel v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 30 January 1941
• Docket Number: 202-1940,201-1940
• Parties: Riebel et al. v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., Appellant. Unger et al. v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

17 A.2d 742

143 Pa.Super. 136

Riebel et al. v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., Appellant.

Unger et al. v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., Appellant

Nos. 201-1940, 202-1940

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

January 30, 1941

Argued October 14, 1940.

Appeals from judgments of M. C. Phila Co., May T., 1939, No 300, in case of Robert Riebel, Jr., et al. v. Land Title Bank & Trust Company and Ronald Unger et al. v. Same.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before Tumolillo, J., without a jury.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

Verdicts for minor plaintiff, Riebel, in sum of $ 100, and for minor plaintiff, Unger, in sum of $ 200, and judgments thereon. Defendant appealed, in each case.

Error assigned, in each case, among others, was refusal of judgment n. o. v.

Judgment reversed.

Michael A. Foley, with him Henry I. Koplin, for appellant.

Franklin G. Banks, for appellees.

Before Keller, P. J. Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Parker, Rhodes and Hirt, JJ.

OPINION

Parker, J.:

This action in trespass is one of those frequently recurring cases where plaintiffs seek to impose a liability on an owner of land for bodily harm to young children, while trespassing on the land, caused by an artificial condition maintained thereon. The case was tried before a judge without a jury and small judgments were entered in favor of the minor plaintiffs. We are all of the opinion that the judgments should be reversed.

The defendant, on September 11, 1938, was in possession of a lot in the City of Philadelphia on which there was a vacant brick dwelling. The portion of the lot fronting on North 8th Street was wholly occupied by the building and there was a vacant space in the rear. Access to the open space, which was littered with rubbish, was had from an alley, a fence at that point having been broken down. The two minor plaintiffs, eight or nine years of age, were playing "tiger", which we understand is a game of tag, and were running on the premises when some part of the rear wall of the building collapsed and bricks fell upon the boys causing comparatively light injuries, the total damages awarded plaintiffs being $ 300.

The substance of plaintiffs' claim as set forth in their statement is that the land was in possession of defendant, that it maintained the premises "in a dangerous and defective condition for a long period of time", and that while the plaintiff children were playing in the yard a section of the rear wall collapsed and the boys were injured by falling bricks. Both pleadings and evidence were unusually meager and the witnesses dealt with generalities and conclusions rather than facts.

The proofs covered a somewhat broader field than the pleadings. An examination of the evidence, all of which was produced by the plaintiffs, shows that the plaintiffs relied for a right to recover upon the claim that they had established by their testimony that defendant's premises were used with "sufficient frequency and continuity by children to warrant regarding said premises as a playground." The statement of question involved and the argument suggest no other theory which could support their claim than that the premises were and had been a playground.

In all actions such as this, before the possessor of land may be held liable for injuries to trespassing children, it must appear that he has negligently maintained the condition which caused the injury, even though the land be a playground. Such negligence is not to be inferred merely because an accident has occurred. As we have indicated, the evidence is exceedingly meager as to the condition of the wall prior to the accident and as to what caused it to fall. The boys were running on the premises, some portion of the rear wall fell, and some bricks were thrown on the boys. Robert Riebel, the father of one of the boys, testified that he passed through the alley at the rear of the lot frequently. He testified: "In the back of the house were all open windows, the windows out of the back .... You could look in the window and see clear down in the cellar where there was no floor. The flooring was out .... I don't recollect much about the back wall, but it seems there was a window there that was out, out altogether; there was no sash and no framework, the sash and framework were out. On the second floor there was a bay window and the windows were out in that. They had either been broken out or taken out."

Mrs. May Sheeron, a nearby neighbor, testified as follows: "All the insides of the building were almost out, the windows were out and the back of it was half down." The court took a hand in the examination and attempted to find out what the condition of the wall was, with the following result: "Q. That is the conclusion, what was the condition of the wall? A. It was half falling down. Q. What do you mean by that? A. It was almost falling down, almost down." Later she stated that part of the back of the house fell down and bricks were thrown on the boys. The witness was pressed by counsel and the court for a statement that would show the condition of the wall and what occurred, and she was unable to give any specific facts as to the prior condition of the wall, saying that she could not explain any more than she had.

Unless the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the condition of the wall was such that it was likely to fall and injure one in the vicinity, he is not liable. There is not a suggestion of actual notice to the possessor of the land that the wall was in a dangerous condition. Plaintiffs rely entirely upon inference to charge the defendant with notice. The fact that the wall fell is not of itself sufficient Kehres v. Stuempfle, 288 Pa. 534, 539, 540, 136 A. 794; Bechtel v. Franklin Trust Co., 120 Pa.Super. 587, 182 A. 800. Walls of abandoned buildings have been known to stand not only for years but for centuries. It was incumbent on plaintiffs to show some condition existing before the accident that would lead a person exercising reasonable and ordinary care to believe that the wall was...