Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Clarkstown

Decision Date14 October 1982
Citation441 N.E.2d 1076,455 N.Y.S.2d 558,57 N.Y.2d 206
Parties, 441 N.E.2d 1076 RIEGERT APARTMENTS CORP., Appellant, v. PLANNING BOARD OF the TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

Although the Town Law accords towns broad powers to regulate the development of both subdivisions and individual sites, the authority for approving subdivision plats is discrete from that for approving individual site plans. Thus, although a town may require that, before approving a plat, either land or money-in-lieu-of-land be delivered to the municipality for developing parks, no such conditions may be imposed on the approval of a site plan.

Raymond and Nanette Riegert, petitioner's predecessors in title, owned a 7.40-acre tract in the Town of Clarkstown, Rockland County. In May, 1974, the Riegerts sought an amendment to the town's zoning ordinance so as to alter the entire tract's classification from single-family homes to multifamily garden apartments. In December, 1974, the town board made the requested amendment, but subject to certain conditions: (1) no more than 40 one-bedroom units were to be constructed on the premises; (2) a 20-foot road-widening strip was to be conveyed to either the county or the town; (3) a 20-foot buffer strip of trees and shrubbery was to be installed; and (4) the owners were to carry the cost of maintaining all required ponding areas, flood plains, or drainage ways.

Later, the Riegerts sought a further modification to allow a maximum of 56 one-bedroom units on the property. This application was approved in November, 1976, subject to the Riegert's conveying for flood control purposes about four acres that lay in a 100-year flood plain. The Riegerts satisfied every condition imposed by the town.

Petitioner subsequently purchased the remaining acreage from the Riegerts. In October, 1978, petitioner submitted to the Planning Board of the Town of Clarkstown a site plan showing the proposed construction. On December 5, 1978, the planning board approved the plan on the condition that petitioner deposit $16,800 with the town as "money-in-lieu-of-land" for the purchase and development of parkland. Petitioner contested the legality of this action at the public meeting where the board announced its decision, but eventually paid the entire sum under protest.

Petitioner commenced this proceeding to recover the moneys paid. The kernel of its argument is that sections 276 and 277 of the Town Law concededly authorize planning board review of subdivision plats, including the imposition of land or money-in-lieu-of-land conditions for park development, but site plan approval is subject only to section 274-a of the Town Law, which does not authorize imposing such a condition. Special Term, 105 Misc.2d 298, 432 N.Y.S.2d 43, ruled in favor of respondents Town of Clarkstown and its planning board. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, 78 A.D.2d 595, 432 N.Y.S.2d 40, without opinion, and this court granted petitioner leave to appeal. The order below should be reversed and judgment entered for petitioner.

The question presented is one solely of statutory interpretation. It is noted that a town and other municipalities derive no power to regulate land use other than through legislative grant (see Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 369-370, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291). The task, therefore, is to construe the pertinent statutes, as written, according to the ordinary meaning of their language, seeking to harmonize the whole and to avoid rendering any part surplusage (see Zaldin v. Concord Hotel, 48 N.Y.2d 107, 113, 421 N.Y.S.2d 858, 397 N.E.2d 370; Matter of Albano v. Kirby, 36 N.Y.2d 526, 529-531, 369 N.Y.S.2d 655, 330 N.E.2d 615; Matter of Smathers, 309 N.Y. 487, 494, 131 N.E.2d 896).

Section 276 of the Town Law, originally enacted in 1932 (L.1932, ch. 634, § 276), is entitled "Approval of plats; development of filed plats." Designed to empower local governments to plan and regulate land development, subdivision 1 of section 276, as amended, states that "the town board may by resolution, authorize and empower the planning board to approve plats showing lots, blocks, or sit with or without streets or highways, and to approve preliminary plats". The remainder of section 276 sets forth pertinent definitions and prescribes the procedural steps to be followed in approving plats.

Section 277 of the Town Law was originally adopted in the same bill as section 276 (L. 1934, ch. 634, § 277). Entitled "Approval of plats; additional requisites," section 277 sets forth substantive matters to be considered by a planning board when approving "a plat showing lots, blocks or sites, with or without streets or highways". In particular, the section mentions that the existence of park facilities within the plat be weighed in granting or withholding approval (Town Law, § 277, subd. 1). The statute specifically authorizes the board to require the inclusion of adequate parks, or, if a suitable park cannot be included within the plat, to require a payment to the town to be held in trust for the purchase of parkland elsewhere (id.).

Section 274-a of the Town Law, first added in 1976 (L. 1976, ch. 272, § 2), authorizes planning boards to review and approve site plans, while expressly excluding from such review plats subject to approval under sections 276 and 277. 1 When it enacted section 274-a, the Legislature repealed (L. 1976, ch. 272, §§ 4-7) several laws that had granted such approval powers to a few municipalities on a piecemeal basis, including a grant to the Town of Clarkstown, respondent here (L. 1974, ch. 787).

Initially, it is noted that the terms in section 274-a vary from those in sections 276 and 277. The former specifies "site plans" while the latter refers to "plats". This distinction comports with the general usage of these terms: "A site plan is not a subdivision plat. A site plan usually evidences the proposed development of a single lot, whether for one principal building and permitted accessory buildings, or for a group of buildings (such as a group residenti development or an industrial park), intended to remain in one ownership. A subdivision plat contemplates division of one tract into a number of smaller lots with eventual separate ownership of each such lot. The authority which may be conferred upon planning boards with respect to subdivision plats, and the collateral powers of the board and consequences of its determination with respect thereto, are set forth specifically in the planning enabling acts. Site plans are not even mentioned in such acts. A site plan is a plan required to be submitted by the builder, showing the proposed location of the buildings, parking areas, and other installations on the plot, and their relation to existing conditions, such as roads, neighboring land uses, natural features, public facilities, ingress and egress roads, interior roads, and similar features" (2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning § 30.04pp. 30-13--30-14 ).

By their very language, the statutes can be seen to intend the continuation of this distinction. The laws are drafted to refer specifically to "site plans" and "plats" without any interchange between the two terms. Indeed, section 274-a (subd. 1, par. a) carefully excludes plats from its purview. Respondents' emphasis on the use of "sites" in sections 276 and 277 is a spurious attempt to bring site plans within the scope of those laws; "sites" is used there merely to describe "a plat showing lots, blocks, or sites" and does not refer to site plans per se. Whatever...

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