Riehle v. Moore

• Decision Date: 20 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 79A05-9105-CV-146,79A05-9105-CV-146
• Citation: 601 N.E.2d 365
• Parties: Robert G. RIEHLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. Larry K. MOORE and Patsy R. Moore, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 365

601 N.E.2d 365

Robert G. RIEHLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. Larry K. MOORE and Patsy R. Moore, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 79A05-9105-CV-146.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fifth District.

Oct. 20, 1992.

Transfer Denied Dec. 14, 1992.

Richard T. Heide, Heide Sandy Deets Kennedy Schrader & Antalis, Lafayette, for appellant-defendant.

John J. Fuhs, Petri & Fuhs, Spencer, for appellees-plaintiffs.

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge.

Defendant Robert Riehle appeals the adverse judgment of the Tippecanoe Circuit Court which awarded compensatory damages of $11,158.23 to plaintiffs Larry and Patsy Moore. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

On appeal, Riehle raises six issues, which we have consolidated and restated as follows:

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it included within its findings of fact two which were not supported by evidence in the record?

2. Did the trial court properly admit into evidence the Moores' exhibit 1?

3. Was Riehle entitled to a reduction in the amount of damages owed because the Moores reached a settlement with an alleged joint tort-feasor?

4. Were the trial court's findings on the issues of liability and damages supported by sufficient evidence?

5. Did the trial court award the Moores types of damages to which they were not legally entitled?

The following are the facts most favorable to the judgment. The Moores lived in Spencer. In 1980, Larry Moore learned that his job would require him to move to Lafayette. Around Thanksgiving, Larry discussed with Riehle the Moores' desire to buy a house in the Lafayette area. Riehle told Larry of a house that Riehle believed might interest the Moores. The Moores viewed the house in early December of 1980.

After the Moores viewed the house, Larry Moore spoke with attorney John Fuhs. Fuhs advised Larry to make sure that there was title insurance on the property. After this conversation, Larry Moore continued negotiations with Riehle. During these negotiations, Larry asked Riehle about title insurance. Riehle responded that there would be no problem with insurance.

On December 22, the Moores had another meeting with Riehle. At this meeting, they again requested title insurance. Riehle assured them that he would provide title insurance and told them that they should go forward and bid on the house. The Moores bid on the house, and negotiations between the parties culminated in a final purchase agreement which identified James Bailey as the Moores' agent and which was admitted into evidence at trial as plaintiffs' exhibit 2. ¹ An earlier version of the purchase agreement, which was admitted into evidence as plaintiffs' exhibit 1, identified Riehle as the Moores' agent. The purchase agreement provided that the Moores would buy the property on a land sale contract for a price of $41,000.00, with a down payment of $14,000.00 and monthly payments of $324.05 for a period of 15 years. The agreement also provided that the seller was to provide evidence of title to the Moores before the closing.

Some time before the closing, the Moores asked Riehle if they should have an attorney present at the closing. Riehle told them that retaining an attorney would be a waste of money because Riehle would take care of everything necessary to make the sale legal.

When the Moores sold their house in Spencer, they contacted Riehle and informed him that they had sold the house. They also requested that Riehle set a closing date and obtain the title insurance. Riehle told them that they would be supplied with the insurance before the closing date which was set for May 21, 1981.

Riehle and the Moores had additional discussions before the closing date. During these discussions, the Moores repeated their request to be supplied with title insurance.

On the day of closing, Larry Moore repeated the request to be shown the title insurance and stated that his attorney had told him that it was important that he see the insurance before closing on the house. Riehle told Larry that the insurance policy had not been completely typed up yet, but that Riehle had seen the insurance and that title was free and clear. Riehle also told Larry that the insurance would be ready the next day. The Moores did not actually receive a copy of the title insurance until March of 1985.

The Moores took possession of the house and kept up with the monthly payments to the seller until March of 1985. That month, the Moores received a letter from an attorney representing the Lafayette Bank & Trust Co. informing them that the seller was in default on a loan secured by a mortgage on their house. The letter also stated that they were named defendants in an action which the bank had filed to foreclose the mortgage.

The Moores retained counsel to defend their interest in the house. However, when it became clear that the mortgage was superior to their interest, the Moores entered into an agreed summary judgment under which the court foreclosed the mortgage. The Moores were forced to buy back their home at the sheriff's sale for a price of $34,750.00 at a time when they would have owed approximately $28,000.00 under the land sale contract. In order to finance this repurchase, the Moores secured a loan from Purdue National Bank. They incurred various expenses in securing this loan.

Riehle first challenges two of the trial court's findings of fact. The first of the challenged findings, finding number four, states:

"That a copy of the listing agreement [between the seller and Hoot Grieves Realty] was admitted into evidence at the trial and was in full force and effect at all relevant times herein."

The court's finding number thirty-five states:

"That the real estate listing contract between [the seller] and Grieves Real Estate did not identify any mortgage even though there was a blank on the listing contract concerning the existence of a mortgage."

Riehle asserts that these findings are erroneous because the listing agreement was excluded from evidence at trial pursuant to his objection. He further asserts that these erroneous findings are sufficient grounds for reversal.

When we review a trial court's judgment based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will reverse only if the findings and conclusions drawn therefrom are clearly erroneous. A judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings and conclusions. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the record fails to disclose any facts in evidence or any reasonable inferences from the evidence in support of the findings. Donavan v. Ivy Knoll Apartments (1989), Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 47, 50. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we will affirm the trial court unless the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment, points uncontrovertibly to an opposite conclusion. Donavan, 537 N.E.2d at 50-51.

When it makes special findings of fact, the trial court need not recite the evidence in detail, but must only make findings as to those ultimate facts necessary to support the judgment. Salk v. Weinraub (1979), 271 Ind. 115, 118, 390 N.E.2d 995, 997-998. It is true that this court is to disregard any special finding that is based on facts not proper or competent to be considered, and it is also true that such a finding cannot form the basis for a conclusion of law. Gentry v. Gentry (en Banc 1953), 123 Ind.App. 270, 275, 110 N.E.2d 509, 511. However, we may reverse a trial court's judgment only if its findings constitute prejudicial error. Vorhees-Jontz Lumber Co. v. Bezek (1965), 137 Ind.App. 382, 389, 209 N.E.2d 380, 383-384. A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion of law adverse to him. Id.; Baker v. Johnson (1923), 79 Ind.App. 413, 418, 138 N.E. 780, 782.

In this case, the trial court's special findings four and thirty-five were clearly erroneous because they were not based on evidence admitted at trial. Because they are clearly in error, findings four and thirty-five would be cause for reversal if they were the sole support for any conclusion of law necessary to sustain the judgment of the court. After examining the entire judgment, however, we have determined that the erroneous findings do not constitute the sole support for any conclusion of law necessary to the judgment.

The Moores' complaint alleged the classic elements of fraud: 1) that Riehle made a misrepresentation of past or existing fact; 2) that was false; 3) that Riehle knew to be false; 4) that the Moores relied on the misrepresentation; and 5) that they suffered harm because of the misrepresentation. Scott v. Bodor, Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 571 N.E.2d 313, 319; Captain & Co. v. Stenberg (1987), Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 88, 96. In order to find in their favor, the trial court was required to find facts sufficient to support each of these elements. In this case, the disputed findings could only be relevant to the elements of falsity and knowledge of falsity; certainly the existence and contents of the listing agreement between Grieves Realty and the seller has no bearing on whether Riehle made any misrepresentations of past or existing fact, whether the Moores relied on the misrepresentations, or whether they were harmed by the misrepresentations. Thus, the fact that the court made the erroneous findings does not affect these elements in any way.

Disregarding the erroneous findings, we find that the remainder of the trial court's findings, which were supported by evidence on the record, provided ample support for the two remaining elements necessary to sustain the fraud judgment. The elements of falsity and knowledge were supported by the court's findings numbered twenty-seven, thirty, thirty-one, and thirty-six which in essence found that there was a mortgage on the property, that Riehle knew of the mortgage because he helped the seller obtain the loan secured by the mortgage, but that Riehle told the Moores that the property was free and clear of title problems. Because there is evidence...