Riester v. Kendall
Decision Date | 10 February 1947 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 5223. |
Citation | 159 F.2d 732,34 CCPA 859 |
Parties | RIESTER v. KENDALL. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Richard K. Stevens, of Washington, D. C. (E. P. Gilheany, of New York City, and E. H. Mosher, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellant.
Lynn B. Morris, of Washingon, D. C., (C. H. Biesterfeld, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellee.
Before GARRETT, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, JACKSON, and O'CONNELL, Associate Judges.
This is an appeal in an interference proceeding from the decision of the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office awarding priority of invention of the subject matter defined by the counts in issue (Nos. 1 to 4, inclusive) to appellee Kendall.
The interference is between appellant's application, Serial No. 237,474, filed October 28, 1938, which has an alleged "German convention date" of November 8, 1937; and appellee's application, Serial No. 174,693, filed November 13, 1937, which has an alleged "British convention date" of November 14, 1936.
The interference when instituted involved the application, Serial No. 316,002, filed by a third party, Brooker, who conceded priority to appellee. Thereupon the proceeding was terminated as to that particular party.
No testimony was taken by either party. In lieu thereof, each party filed a certified copy of his foreign application and relies upon that application for constructive reduction to practice.
Appellant is the junior party and the burden was upon him to establish priority of invention by a preponderance of the evidence.
The sole question for determination is whether appellee's British application discloses the process and the dyestuffs defined by the counts in issue.
The answer to that question depends upon whether the subject matter of the counts is sufficiently disclosed in appellee's British application in view of the concededly initial error in that application in the recital of the structural formulæ for the dyes obtained as a result of carrying out the process therein defined.
In its decision the board made the following statement:
In awarding priority of invention to appellee, the board held that appellee's failure to give the correct structural formulae for the products disclosed by his British application was not controlling since products corresponding to the structural formulae of the counts are formed as a matter of fact in carrying out the steps of the process disclosed by the three working examples of the British application, irrespective of the structural formulae given therein.
The board also held that appellee's British application disclosed not only the complete process for preparing the dye-stuffs but also the dyestuffs themselves and the means for identifying them that are called for by the counts, although "the counts designate this dyestuff and process in a language that was not fully understood by Kendall at the time he filed his provisional specification."
The board stated that that portion of the disclosure in the Kendall British provisional application which gave the formulae and equations was ...
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Shu-Hui Chen v. Bouchard
...they apparently also do not disclose any analytical data or other characteristics of such derivatives. In Riester v. Kendall, 34 C.C.P.A. 859, 159 F.2d 732 (1947), the court affirmed a Board decision that a party to an interference was entitled to a prior filing date even though it had disc......
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Application of Fisher
...cited several cases in support of the proposition that inherent disclosure is sufficient under 35 U.S.C. § 112, including Riester v. Kendall, 159 F.2d 732, 34 CC PA 859 (1947), and In re Nathan, 328 F.2d 1005, 51 CCPA 1059 (1964). The board did not dispute the correctness of this propositio......
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APPLICATION OF SULKOWSKI, Patent Appeal No. 9038.
...obviousness of the error in the structure has been the criteria in determining inherency issues. In support, she cited Riester v. Kendall, 159 F.2d 732, 34 CCPA 859 (1947), which states that a disclosure "will not be held to be insufficient for constructive reduction to practice by reason o......
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Application of Nathan
...or a change in an original disclosure does not necessarily make that original disclosure fatally defective. This court in Riester v. Kendall, 159 F.2d 732, 34 CCPA 859, dealt with an interference in which a count was directed to certain dyestuffs. Appellee relied on a British provisional sp......