Riggins v. Goodman

Decision Date10 July 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-1034.,08-1034.
Citation572 F.3d 1101
PartiesJerry RIGGINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bruce GOODMAN, Julie Boyd, and William A. Simmons, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

John R. Mann (Kevin P. Perez with him on the briefs) Kennedy Childs & Fogg, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendants-Appellants.

Joseph A. Salazar, The Salazar Consultant Group, LLC, Thornton, CO, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

This case arises out of Jerry Riggins's termination from employment as a police sergeant in Louisville, Colorado. Riggins asserted federal civil rights claims against the City and several of its employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending he was discharged without adequate procedural safeguards after he suffered from a psychiatric episode that caused him to take administrative leave for eight months. Riggins also brought a disability rights claim that is pending below and not the subject of this appeal.

The municipal defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the due process claim, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, and the defendants appealed. We conclude that the City's three-step appeals process provided adequate pretermination due process for Riggins to challenge the City officials' decision, and that the decision was not otherwise the result of a biased process.

Accordingly, we REVERSE.

I. Background

Riggins was employed as a police officer with the Louisville, Colorado Police Department. In May 2004, he experienced a psychiatric episode in which he complained that someone was after him, his hotel room was bugged, and there was a computer chip implanted in his head. His wife reported the incident, and he was taken to a hospital and placed on mental health hold. As a result, Riggins was placed on administrative leave and relieved of his duties with the police department.

In September 2004, the City received from Riggins's psychiatrist a report that Riggins appeared to be able to return to work, but that he would recommend a separate fitness for duty exam. In a later report, the doctor also indicated that he anticipated Riggins taking medications for at least another six months. He stated that if a patient discontinued his medications prematurely, he might risk a recurrence of his previous delusional symptoms.

The City referred Riggins to a psychologist for a fitness for duty determination. In November 2004, the psychologist examined Riggins and opined that he was psychologically fit to return to duty as a police officer. The psychologist cautioned, though, that "the public safety factors associated with [Riggins's] position require that his return be done in a carefully planned program with close supervision in order to monitor and assess his abilities to function safely and effectively as an officer." Aplt.App. at 162. Additionally, the City sought the opinion of a psychiatrist who advised caution in the resumption of duties for employees taking antipsychotic or antidepressant medications. That doctor submitted a report on January 6, 2005 questioning whether Riggins was ready to return to duty as a law enforcement officer.

After reviewing the various reports, Police Chief Bruce Goodman determined that Riggins was unable to resume his duties, and began proceedings to terminate Riggins. The City's policies provided that a department director "may impose dismissal upon the prior approval of the Human Resources Officer and City Administrator." Aplt.App. at 96. Accordingly, Goodman sent a memo on January 11, 2005 to the Human Resources Director and City Manager explaining his reasons for recommending Riggins's termination. His memo concluded: that there were "several observations by [the examining doctors] that cause[d him] to believe that we do not know if Jerry no longer presents a threat to himself or others," Aplt.App. at 154; that the compulsory continued use of medications to prevent delusional symptoms indicates that Riggins's delusions remain possible if not probable; that "uncertainty is a very serious concern because we and his doctors will not know if he discontinues taking the medications"; and that despite Riggins having been a trustworthy and loyal employee for years, the unresolved public safety issues do not permit him to continue work as a police officer. Id. On January 20, 2005, the City Manager, William Simmons, and acting Human Resources Director, Julie Boyd, provided the requisite approval.

On January 26, 2005, Goodman sent Riggins a letter stating "[t]his letter is to advise you of the City's decision to terminate your position ... effective ... February 7, 2005." Aplt.App. at 86. "Your administrative leave without pay continues until the final outcome of any hearings you may request." Id. The letter also explained the administrative process available to contest the decision, including the opportunity for a hearing and the right to object to the "proposed termination" before a "final decision" would be made:

As explained in Section Seven of your Employee Handbook, a department head may impose dismissal upon the approval of the Human Resources Officer and the City Manager. On January 11, 2005, I recommended that action, and on January 20, 2005, the City Manager and Human Resources Officer approved your dismissal. However, prior to a final decision regarding your employment, you may request a hearing with me, and you have the right to appeal my decision. If you want to request a hearing, please submit that request to me in writing within five working days of the date you receive this letter.... At the hearing you will have the opportunity to explain or rebut the information presented, and to otherwise respond to the reasons for the proposed termination.

Aplt.App. at 86 (emphasis added). The letter further explained that following the hearing before Goodman—if one was requested—Goodman would make his "final decision"; that decision then would be subject to an appeal of right through the City's human resources department:

Following the hearing, I will make my final decision. You may appeal my decision to the City's Human Resources Officer through the appeal procedure outlined in Section Seven of your Handbook.

Id.

Goodman's letter outlined five reasons for Riggins's termination: (1) the lack of an unconditional, unqualified medical fitness for duty release; (2) the adverse and unknown effect of the prescribed medications on Riggins's ability to perform as a police officer; (3) the City's rejection of a therapist's opinion that Riggins was fit for duty based on that therapist's lack of expertise to make such a judgment; (4) the police department's inability to create and administer the "carefully planned program" recommended by the psychologist; and (5) "[n]one of the doctors know what caused the delusional episode or what may cause it to reoccur." Id. at 87-88. The letter continued, "[f]rom a public safety standpoint, we can not endorse your being a police officer with the Department." Id. at 88. Goodman concluded: "this is the toughest personnel decision I have ever made." Id.

Goodman's letter triggered the City's three-step appeal process. Step one allows an employee to present his appeal to the department director (Goodman). If the grievance is not settled in step one, an employee has five working days, pursuant to step two, to forward the written grievance to the Human Resources Officer (Boyd), who will then meet with him. Finally, step three involves an appeal to the City Administrator (Simmons). The decision of the City Administrator is final and binding on the parties.

Step One. After receiving the letter, Riggins took advantage of the three-step appeals process by requesting an initial meeting with Goodman. Given this, his effective termination date was postponed pending the resolution of that process. The meeting with Goodman took place on February 8, 2005. At that meeting, Riggins, represented by counsel, offered evidence and an explanation in response to Goodman's January 26 letter. Among other things, Riggins claimed that he was ready to go back to work; he was not a threat to anyone; he had made great improvements; the "past is the past"; he had done everything he was asked to do; and with one exception, the doctors he had seen had cleared him for return to work. Riggins's attorney argued that the City would have less physiological testing data on a new recruit than on Riggins. He suggested flexibility in Riggins's assignments, and phasing Riggins back into the organization. Riggins's counsel also contended that the City accommodates officers with diabetes, for example, and it should accommodate Riggins too.

After the meeting, Goodman decided his original recommendation should stand because Riggins provided insufficient information to mitigate the basis for termination.

Step Two. Riggins then pursued step two of the process by appealing Goodman's decision to the acting Human Resources Manager. Boyd conducted a hearing on April 22, 2005, again with Riggins represented by counsel. Riggins's counsel contended Riggins's regimen of medications had been successful, and Riggins was now able to perform his job. He also argued the City perceived a disability that was not present. Boyd inquired into whether Riggins had any indication of problems prior to the psychiatric episode, and Riggins informed her that he was not sure, and that he had been having trouble sleeping before the incident. Riggins indicated he was ready to return to work, and his counsel analogized Riggins's situation to that of an officer with diabetes whose chemical imbalance was resolved by medication.

After the hearing, Boyd recommended upholding Goodman's decision, based on her "concern for public safety." Aplt.App. at 118. She concluded "the stakes are too high and the risk too great for a tragedy to occur if Mr. Riggins is working as a police sergeant in...

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