Riggle v. Marshall Cnty. Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 26 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:15CV169 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JENNIFER KAY RIGGLE and BRITTNI ANN RICE, Plaintiffs, v. THE MARSHALL COUNTY COAL COMPANY, TRUSTEES OF THE UMWA RETIREMENT FUND and BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD PPO PROGRAM, MURRAY AMERICAN ENERGY, INC. PLAN 107, Defendants. |
(STAMP)
The plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia. Plaintiff Jennifer Kay Riggle ("Riggle") is an employee of defendant The Marshall County Coal Company ("MCCC"). Plaintiff Riggle seeks benefits for both herself and her same-sex spouse, plaintiff Brittni Ann Rice ("Rice"), as a dependent spouse under MCCC's employee benefit plan. According to the complaint, MCCC has refused to enroll plaintiff Rice as a dependent spouse. The plaintiffs allege that defendants Blue Cross Blue Shield PPO Program, Murray American Energy, Inc. Plan 107 ("Blue Cross") and the Trustees of the UMWA Retirement Fund ("Trustees") administer the benefit plan at issue.
After removing this civil action, the Trustees filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay. ECF No. 11. In that motion, defendant Trustees argues that the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). Therefore, the Trustees request that their motion be granted, or alternatively, that the action be stayed while the parties pursue the Resolution of Dispute ("ROD") process found under the CBA. Blue Cross and MCCC filed motions to join in the Trustees' motion to dismiss, which this Court granted. ECF Nos. 13 and 14.
The plaintiffs then filed a response to the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 18. The plaintiffs contend that plaintiff Riggle received inadequate notice as to the ROD process. The plaintiffs believe that the exhaustion requirement under the benefit plan has been waived, and that arbitration in this case would require more time than normal litigation. Finally, the plaintiffs assert that arbitration would be futile, and that the process is unconscionable. Finally, MCCC filed a reply. ECF No. 23. MCCC contends that the resolution of dispute process is "neither futile nor unfair and, at all relevant times, provided plaintiff Riggle with sufficient notice of the process at issue."
After the parties fully briefed the motion to dismiss, they filed a joint motion to stay the civil action so that the parties could pursue the ROD process. ECF No. 22. This Court granted thatmotion. ECF No. 24. Ninety days later, the Trustees filed a notice regarding the status of the ROD process. ECF No. 25. In that notice, the Trustees stated that the arbitrator determined that "the Employer is required to offer spousal health benefits to the same-sex spouses of [Employer Benefit] [P]lan participants." See id. Ex. A. This Court then lifted the stay in this action, and permitted the plaintiffs to file a response to the Trustees' notice. ECF No. 27. The plaintiffs filed a response to the notice. ECF No. 28. The plaintiffs stated that the defendants had not tendered "an official statement" that they will follow the arbitrator's decision. They further sought full payment under the benefit plan and requested attorney's fees and costs. The Trustees then filed a reply. ECF No. 29. In that reply, the Trustees pointed out that they administer health benefits to retired coal mineworkers and their eligible spouses. As to active mineworkers, which is the case here, the mineworker's signatory employer would administer such benefits.
On July 6, 2016, the parties appeared before this Court for a hearing regarding the Trustees' pending motion to dismiss as joined by the other defendants. At that hearing, counsel for the plaintiffs withdrew their claims in their complaint as to defendant Highmark, Inc., which the parties note was incorrectly named in the complaint as Blue Cross ("Highmark/Blue Cross"). The parties did not object to such withdrawal. This Court approved the withdrawalof the plaintiffs' claims against Highmark/Blue Cross, and the motion to dismiss by Highmark/Blue Cross and its motion to join in the motion to dismiss or motion to stay by the Trustees was granted as to defendant Highmark/Blue Cross. MCCC's motion to join in the motion to dismiss or stay by the Trustees (ECF No. 14) also was granted. After the hearing, the plaintiffs filed a notice of no opposition to the dismissal of the Trustees, which this Court accepted. ECF No. 42.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss remains pending only as to MCCC. For the reasons set forth below, MCCC's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED. The plaintiffs are hereby DIRECTED to file a formal motion for costs and reasonable attorney's fees by August 10, 2016. The defendants may file a response in opposition by August 24, 2016, and the plaintiffs may then file a reply in support by August 31, 2016.
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as true. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes." Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949(2009)). This Court also declines to consider "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest about the facts or the merits of the case. 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed. 1998). The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the party making the claim and essentially the court's inquiry is directed to whether the allegations constitute a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed "if it does not allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.'" Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Facial plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint 'allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that thedefendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
As indicated earlier, the plaintiffs sought the following under their complaint:
[A]n order of this Court requiring Defendants to admit [plaintiff Rice] as a spouse, and to cease their policy of refusing to provide her benefits, and to provide other benefits, including but not limited to bereavement leave, related to same-sex, related to same-sex spouses, as well as other damages, both legal and equitable, such as disgorgement of any profits made from its policy and repayment of bills that would otherwise have been paid by the Plans, as the court or jury may deem appropriate. Plaintiffs also seek their fees and costs associated with this action.
ECF No. 1 Ex. A *5. At the time of filing the complaint, the parties had not fully engaged in the ROD process, as set forth in the CBA. On February 4, 2016, which was over one month after the defendants removed the action, the parties filed a joint motion to stay this civil action. ECF No. 22. This Court granted that motion. ECF No. 24. The ROD process concluded on May 18, 2016, at which time the arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiffs. In particular, the arbitrator concluded that MCCC "is required tooffer spousal health benefits to the same-sex spouses of plan participants." ECF No. 25 Ex. B. The defendants filed a notice of the result of the ROD process.
This Court lifted the stay and directed the parties to respond and reply to the notice, to which the parties complied. ECF Nos. 27, 28, 29, 35 (respectively). Moreover, this Court conducted a hearing as to the pending motions to dismiss. At that hearing, the parties did not appear to dispute whether the plaintiffs received the benefits they sought under the complaint. Rather, it appears that the arbitrator's ruling has been complied with by MCCC, which was the relief sought under the complaint. Therefore, it appears that the plaintiffs' claim against MCCC is now moot. See Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2007) () (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)); Otter Point Development Corp. V. United States Army Corps. of Engineers, Baltimore Dist., 116 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (D. Md. 2000) () (citing Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983)). The parties do not point to any facts to the contrary....
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