Riggs v. Louisiana
| Decision Date | 04 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-0080 SECTION P |
| Parties | CLAY LANDIS RIGGS v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Plaintiff Clay Landis Riggs, a prisoner at Jackson Parish Correctional Center Phase I ("JPCC") proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed the instant proceeding on approximately January 16, 2020, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following defendants: State of Louisiana, Jackson Parish Sheriff's Department, Chief of Police Bobby Dillion, Officer Jimmy Dickson, Sheriff Andy Brown, Judge Jimmy C. Teat, Warden Timothy Ducote, Stacy Treadway, District Attorney Yumeaka Washington, and Judge Jennifer W. Clason.1 For reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff claims that, on August 9, 2019, the Chief of the North Hodge Police Department, Bobby Dillion,2 and Officer Jimmy Dickson unlawfully detained and arrested him for willfully and unlawfully operating an ATV (a "four-wheeler") on a public roadway, fleeing from an officer, and resisting an officer. [doc. # 1, p. 2]. Plaintiff maintains that the detention and arrest were unlawful because he is a "sovereign free man of flesh and blood," because he has notprivately "contracted with the corporate State of Louisiana through the Department of Motor Vehicles," and because "statutes and codes only apply to government corporate members and not the sovereign people . . . ." Id. at 1, 2, 4. He alleges further: "citizens are the legal fiction a straw man as defined in the Black Law Dictionary 6th edition, also known as a illegally compelled public office associated with the government issued 'public office,' social security card number or tax identification number . . . [sic]." Id. at 2.
Plaintiff claims that Stacy Treadway illegally towed and impounded his four-wheeler following the arrest. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff claims that the Jackson Parish Sheriff's Department: "has illegally used [his] private property under the color of law that is illegally used without the written consent of the secured party any use is also theft by fraud . . . [sic]." Id. at 5.
Plaintiff claims that, on approximately October 6, 2019, District Judge Jimmy C. Teat erroneously denied Plaintiff's "affidavit of denial of corporate existence." Id. at 5-6. He maintains that Judge Teat lacked jurisdiction to disregard or deny his affidavit. Id. He also faults Judge Teat for overruling his objection to the state court's jurisdiction and for denying his motion to compel the production of certain documents. Id.
Plaintiff claims that District Judge Jennifer W. Clason failed to hold an "ad hoc hearing" to establish jurisdiction, tried him without jurisdiction, held him in contempt for invoking his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment, sentenced him to a $500.00 fine payable in counterfeit currency, and ordered the clerk of court to withhold his "affidavit for rights to travel" until the day after trial. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that District Attorney Yumeaka Washington "willfully and with malice prosecuted" him "without jurisdiction." Id.
Plaintiff claims that, at JPCC, Warden Timmy Ducote refuses to "provide any pretrial detainee access to the [JPCC] law library to allow the detainees to effectively prepare their litigation for the higher courts to review." Id. at 9.
Plaintiff claims that Warden Ducote "refuses to answer any administrative remedy . . . ." Id.
Plaintiff claims that, on approximately December 10, 2019, he was forced to "strip completely naked in front of a video surveillance camera at the front of J Dorm that records to a system DVR . . . ." Id. at 10. He was then forced to "turn around on video camera," bend, spread his buttocks, and cough. Id. He was humiliated. Id. at 11.
Plaintiff claims that the hot box from which he receives food is contaminated because it is used "when the medical department quarantines an ICE detainee." Id. at 12. Plaintiff allegedly risks infection because the hot box is not disinfected. Id.
Plaintiff claims that, while employees receive a vaccine "to prevent them from contracting illnesses from ICE detainees," the "American People" at JPCC do not receive the vaccine. Id. at 12-13. He alleges, therefore, that the American People are at risk of illness. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff seeks $1,800,000.00 for his allegedly illegal detention, $10,000,000.00 for mental anguish, and $10,000.00 to repair or replace his four-wheeler and the property in the four-wheeler. Id. at 14. He also asks for protection from retaliation for filing this proceeding, as well as an unspecified permanent restraining order against "a federal or state employee[] or any and all federal or state officials." Id.
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.3 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id.
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff's factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. "[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim." City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts are "not free to speculate that the plaintiff 'might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner's civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).
"To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation wascommitted by a person acting under color of state law." Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a "[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional conclusions." Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a successful civil rights action that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiff's conviction or sentence must be dismissed unless the plaintiff first shows that the conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Courts assess "whether a claim is temporally and conceptually distinct from the related conviction and sentence." Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (). Courts "ask whether the claims are necessarily inconsistent with the conviction, or whether they can coexist with the conviction or sentence without calling [it] into question." Id.
Here, Plaintiff claims that the Chief of the North Hodge Police Department, Bobby Dillion, and Officer Jimmy Dickson unlawfully detained and arrested him for willfully and unlawfully operating a four-wheeler on a public roadway, fleeing from an officer, and resisting an officer. [doc. # 1, p. 2]. Plaintiff also claims that Stacy Treadway illegally towed and impounded his four-wheeler following his arrest. Id. at 4. Plaint...
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