Riggs v. Riggs, No. 25598.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Citation: 578 S.E.2d 3,353 S.C. 230
• Docket Number: No. 25598.
• Decision Date: 24 February 2003
• Parties: Jo Ann RIGGS, Respondent, v. Dennis RIGGS, Appellant.

353 S.C. 230
578 S.E.2d 3

Jo Ann RIGGS, Respondent,
v.
Dennis RIGGS, Appellant

No. 25598.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 9, 2003.

Decided February 24, 2003.

Rehearing Denied April 2, 2003.

353 S.C. 232

Robert M. Rosenfeld, of Porter & Rosenfeld, of Greenville, and David A. Wilson, of Horton, Drawdy, Ward & Black, P.A., of Greenville, for appellant

D. Michael Henthorne, of McNair Law Firm, of Myrtle Beach, for respondent.

Justice MOORE:

This appeal is from a family court order requiring appellant (Husband) to pay child support for his adult disabled child and refusing to terminate his alimony payments to respondent (Wife). We affirm.

FACTS

Husband and Wife divorced in 1985. By consent, a modification order was entered in 1987 setting Husband's periodic alimony payments at $400 per month and child support at $800 per month for their three minor children. As each child

353 S.C. 233

reached eighteen, Husband reduced his child support payment proportionately. Finally, in 1995, the youngest child reached eighteen and Husband ceased paying child support altogether

Wife commenced this action in 1998 seeking an increase in alimony or, in the alternative, child support for Nancy, the parties' middle child, who turned eighteen in 1993 but still lives with Wife. Nancy is disabled from Leigh's Syndrome, a degenerative metabolic disease with which she was diagnosed in 1995. Nancy first started experiencing problems related to her condition sometime in 1993, the year she turned eighteen. Nancy functions on the level of an eight- to ten-year-old and has eye and muscle mobility problems. She also suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder and is afraid of strangers. She insists on sleeping in Wife's bed and cannot be alone for any significant amount of time. Wife assists Nancy with her daily care including meals, bathing, and dressing.

In response to Wife's complaint, Husband counterclaimed for a termination or reduction of alimony. He contested child support on the ground Nancy was over eighteen years of age.

After a hearing, the family court reduced Husband's alimony payment to $150 per month but ordered him to pay child support for Nancy in the amount of $553.14 per month, reduced by the amount of his monthly health insurance premium for Nancy. Child support was ordered retroactive to the date of filing of Wife's complaint.

ISSUES

1. Does the family court have jurisdiction under § 20-7-420(17) to order child support for an adult disabled child who has never been emancipated?

2. Does this section violate equal protection?

3. Did the family court abuse its discretion in refusing to terminate alimony?

DISCUSSION

1. Continuation of child support

The family court's jurisdiction to order child support in this case derives from S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-420(17) (Supp. 2002) which provides:

353 S.C. 234

The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction:

(17) To make all orders of support run until further order of the court, except that orders for child support run until the child is eighteen years of age or until the child is married or becomes self-supporting, as determined by the court, whichever occurs first or to provide for child support past the age of eighteen years if the child is in high school and is making satisfactory progress toward completion of high school, not to exceed the nineteenth birthday unless exceptional circumstances are found to exist or unless there is a pre-existing agreement or order to provide for child support past the age of eighteen years; and in the discretion of the court, to provide for child support past age eighteen where there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or other exceptional circumstances that warrant the continuation of child support beyond age eighteen for as long as the physical or mental disabilities or exceptional circumstances continue.

(emphasis added).

Husband contends the family court could not order child support in this case because § 20-7-420(17) provides only for the "continuation" of child support past eighteen. Husband claims since Nancy's disability was not diagnosed before she reached eighteen and child support for Nancy had already terminated, the family court's order was not a "continuation" of support within the terms of the statute.

First, medical testimony in the record indicates Nancy's condition is "a genetic error of metabolism." Although this condition was not definitively diagnosed until she was past eighteen, the fact that it is of genetic origin indicates Nancy's disability was not caused by some event that occurred after she reached majority. It is uncontested that Nancy has never been emancipated. Further, Husband's child support...