Riggs v State

• Decision Date: 04 November 1999
• Docket Number: 98-1281
• Citation: 3 S.W.3d 305
• Parties: Christina Marie RIGGS v. STATE of Arkansas CR 98-1281 ___ S.W.2d ___ Opinion delivered
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Christina Marie RIGGS v STATE of Arkansas

CR 98-1281 ___ S.W.2d ___

Opinion delivered November 4, 1999

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, First and Fourth Divisions; Marion Humphrey, Judge and John Langston, Judge; affirmed.

1. Criminal law -- Miranda warnings -- when required. -- The safeguards prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest; custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of action in any significant way; Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect; in resolving the question of whether a suspect was "in custody" at a particular time, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation; the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being interrogated.

2. Criminal law -- objective circumstances of interrogation reviewed -- appellant in custody. -- Viewing the objective circumstances, a reasonable person in appellant's shoes would have believed she was in custody; first, she was under a police guard at the hospital, she was strapped to her bed, and her family was prevented from seeing her; second, the police officers had found her dead children and had reasonable cause to believe that she had killed them based on the suicide notes found at her house; and third, she was read her Miranda rights by the police detectives, which indicated that she was more than a mere suspect.

3. Constitutional law -- confessions -- determining voluntariness. -- Statements made while in police custody are presumed to be involuntary; the burden rests on the State to prove their voluntariness and a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence; in determining voluntariness, the supreme court looks to whether the statement and waiver were the result of free and deliberate choice rather than coercion, intimidation, and deception; on appeal, the supreme court makes an independent determination of the voluntariness of a confession, but in doing so, it reviews the totality of the circumstances and will reverse only when the trial court's finding of voluntariness is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

4. Constitutional law -- statement not freely made -- may not be used against accused. -- Where it is apparent from the record that a statement is not the product of an accused's free and rational choice and where the undisputed evidence makes clear that the accused did not want to talk to police detectives, due process of law requires that the resulting statement not be used against the accused.

5. Witnesses -- extent of party's impairment -- trial court resolves. -- Conflicts in the testimony and the extent of a party's impairment are for the trial court to resolve.

6. Witnesses -- credibility in suppression matters -- deference given to trial court. -- The supreme court defers to the trial court in its determination of credibility of witnesses in suppression matters.

7. Constitutional law -- statement voluntary -- no error found. -- Where, according to the testimony of two witnesses, both of whom were in contact with appellant the morning of her statement, she was alert and responsive before she gave her statement; the statement itself further portrayed an ability to answer questions and describe events that physical evidence already in the hands of police confirmed; and appellant never requested that the interview stop so that she could retain counsel, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that appellant's statement was voluntarily given; rational response to questioning is a legitimate factor for the trial court to consider.

8. Constitutional law -- confession by accused -- failure to inform accused that counsel has been retained not enough to invalidate. -- Failure by police officers to inform an accused that counsel has been retained by the accused's family is not enough to invalidate the confession; events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right; the Constitution does not require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.

9. Constitutional law -- appellant not informed about retention of attorney -- waiver of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights still valid. -- Even if the police department deliberately withheld information from appellant regarding retention of an attorney, that did not invalidate her waiver of her Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights; those rights are personal to the accused, and she clearly waived them.

10. Constitutional law -- harmless error -- what constitutes. -- To conclude that a constitutional error is harmless and does not mandate reversal, the supreme court must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict; the United States Supreme Court has held that the admission of an "involuntary confession" is subject to a harmless-error analysis.

11. Constitutional law -- admission of appellant's statement harmless error -- cumulative evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. -- Where the jury heard abundant evidence that appellant committed the murders, even after the evidence of appellant's statement was excised, the testimony from appellant's suicide letters and witnesses for both the State and defense was rife with statements that appellant admitted she killed her children, there was physical evidence found by police officers at appellant's residence, and there was also the testimony of the medical examiner that there was evidence that the two children had been suffocated, this cumulative evidence of appellant's confessed guilt and physical evidence established her guilt for capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt even without her statement to the police detectives.

12. Jury -- instructions -- evidence of mental disease or defect -- not considered by jury at time it considers criminal intent as element of murder. -- Evidence of mental disease or defect should not be considered by the jury at the time it considers criminal intent as an element of the crime of murder.

13. Constitutional law -- jury instructions did not deprive appellant of due process -- trial court's ruling affirmed. -- The instructions that, first, advised the jury that the State had the burden of proving every element of the criminal offense (including all elements of the lesser included offenses) beyond a reasonable doubt and, second, stated that she could prove her defense that she suffered from mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence, did not prejudice appellant or deprive her of due process of law; the trial court's ruling was affirmed.

14. Trial -- opening statement -- new trial not warranted. -- While theatrical, the prosecutor's opening statement was not of such moment as to warrant a new trial; the supreme court declined to reverse the trial court's exercise of discretion on this point.

15. Evidence -- photographs -- admission of. -- The admission of photographs is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court; when photographs are helpful to explain testimony, they are ordinarily admissible; absent an abuse of discretion, the supreme court will not reverse a trial court for admitting photographs into evidence.

16. Evidence -- photographs allowed -- no abuse of discretion found. -- There was no abuse of discretion in allowing the photographs into evidence; the two autopsy photographs assisted the medical examiner in explaining cause of death; one was a closeup of the puncture wound made by the needle in the male child's neck, and the other was a closeup picture of the two victims in appellant's bed taken at a different angle; the two photographs could have aided the jury in understanding the crime scene and the condition of one child's body when police officers found the victims.

17. Appeal & error -- trial court will not be reversed for notdoing what it was never asked to do. -- The supreme court will not reverse a trial court for failing to do what it was never asked to do; it was incumbent on defense counsel to request a probative-prejudicial weighing with respect to the photographs if it considered such to be important or legally required; there was no abuse of discretion on this point.

18. Criminal procedure -- Franz hearing -- not warranted. --Appellant's decision to appeal her conviction on two counts of capital murder but not to raise issues related to her death sentence did not constitute a partial waiver of appeal and a choice of death such as to necessitate a hearing under Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988); appellant mounted a significant appeal relating to the guilt phase of her trial, thus, she has appealed the judgment against her, although she chose not to raise issues associated with her death sentence, just as she did not at the trial level; affirmed.

John Wesley Hall, Jr., for appellant.

Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Robert L. Brown, Justice.

Appellant Christina Marie Riggs appeals her judgment of conviction for the capital murder of her two children, Justin Thomas (age 5) and Shelby Riggs (age 2). She raises four points on appeal relating to the guilt phase of her trial: (1) that her statement to police was involuntary and her waiver of Miranda rights was also involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligently...