Riggs v. State, 49S02-0406-CR-246.

Decision Date03 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 49S02-0406-CR-246.,49S02-0406-CR-246.
PartiesSterling RIGGS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Timothy J. O'Connor, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

BOEHM, Justice.

The removal of a juror after deliberations have begun requires a record establishing that the deliberations of the other jurors were not prejudiced by the removal and that cause existed for removal without depriving the defendant of his right to a jury trial. In this case a juror was removed without establishing the need to do so, and without taking precautions to prevent the rest of the jury from being improperly influenced. We remand this case for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1985, fifteen-year-old T.P. was an eighth grader attending school in Indianapolis. T.P. left her aunt's home on April 7, Easter Sunday morning, saying she would be back to go to church. She never returned, and a week later her body was found floating in Fall Creek. An autopsy determined that T.P. had drowned, and been in the water approximately forty-eight hours or slightly longer. T.P. was naked, and bound by articles of clothing around her ankles, neck and wrists. Both vaginal and rectal swabs revealed spermatozoa.

No suspects emerged in 1985, and the investigation was dormant until 2000, when the lead detective initiated a comparison of DNA samples from T.P.'s body with a statewide DNA database. A match was found with a sample from Sterling Riggs, who had lived behind T.P.'s aunt at the time of T.P.'s death. The State charged Riggs with murder, felony murder, Class A criminal deviate conduct, and rape. The trial occurred in October 2001, and the jury found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal deviate conduct, but not guilty of rape and felony murder. Riggs was sentenced to consecutive sentences of sixty-five years for murder and fifty years for criminal deviate conduct. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum decision, affirmed the convictions for murder and criminal deviate conduct but reduced the latter to a Class B felony. Riggs seeks transfer.

Riggs contends that: 1) the trial court erred when it replaced a sitting juror, 2) the evidence is insufficient to support the murder conviction, 3) the evidence is insufficient to support the criminal deviate conduct conviction, 4) the convictions violate Indiana's Double Jeopardy Clause, and 5) a sentence of sixty-five years for a murder committed in 1985 is erroneous. We now grant transfer and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals as to issues 2, 3, 4, and 5. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).

Replacing a Juror After Deliberations Begin

Approximately four hours after the jury began deliberating the trial court received a note from the foreman. After consulting with counsel for both Riggs and the State, the trial court engaged in the following dialogue with the foreman outside the presence of the other jurors:

THE COURT: Okay. I've received a note from you that indicates "We have a juror that's become belligerent, not willing to discuss the issues onhand [sic] pertaining to the case. Do we have any recourse?" Is that your note to me?
FOREMAN: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: Okay. I have to be—I can only ask you very limited questions, so I'm going to be very careful at this point and then I'll excuse you and you can go back to the jury room. Would you be kind enough in our discussion not to identify the person or their sex? Also would you be kind enough not to disclose the state of the deliberations of the jury, what the vote is, anything of that nature, or the leanings of this juror, okay, sir?
FOREMAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I appreciate it. Has this person, male or female, participated in any deliberations at all?
FOREMAN: Marginally.
THE COURT: Marginally?
FOREMAN: Very marginally.
THE COURT: Okay. So my understanding is that we sent you back to deliberate at 1:40 today and it is now 6:15 ...
FOREMAN: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: ... when you say "belligerent" are there—is there any physical conduct going on ...
FOREMAN: No.
THE COURT: ... in the jury room?
FOREMAN: No, it didn't get to that point.
THE COURT: Okay. Is it likely to get to that point or ...
FOREMAN: I felt that it was, that's...
THE COURT: Okay.
FOREMAN: ... why I went and stood by the individual.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you think—and this is kind of tentatively to help me understand—has this person—in your opinion as the foreperson of the jury, has this person fairly participated in the deliberations this far?
FOREMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. So if this person has fairly participated in deliberations is it just that the person has reached an opinion and refuses now to budge from that?
FOREMAN: That's correct.

After the judge excused the foreman, Riggs's attorney requested that the court ask the foreman if he believed further deliberations would yield a unanimous verdict. If the answer was no, Riggs asked that the court declare a hung jury and grant a mistrial. The State responded by asking for removal of the juror who was the subject of the foreman's concern. The trial court recalled the foreman and the following occurred:

THE COURT: Have a seat again. Has—when was the last time there's been any deliberations, it's now six—you came in at 6:15, did there come a point where deliberations stopped altogether?
FOREMAN: It pretty much stopped at five o'clock.
THE COURT: At five o'clock. And if—had they continued, would there have been violence?
FOREMAN: I would think so. But beginning, that's why I wasn't sure how to handle it.
THE COURT: Is there—is the conduct of this juror such as to cause fear to other jurors?
FOREMAN: Yes. Fear of violence? Yeah.
THE COURT: All jurors have to be able to deliberate without fear to their person and what I'm concerned about, is there—is that attitude or atmosphere in the jury room?
FOREMAN: I don't think any of the jurors are physically fearing, fearing that juror, I mean most of the jurors are not willing to work with that juror because of the way they feel. As well as it goes the other way.
THE COURT: Pardon me?
FOREMAN: As well as the jurors not wanting to have ...
THE COURT: Not willing to work with the other ...
FOREMAN: ... work with anybody else in that room.
RIGGS'S ATTORNEY: I'm sorry, I didn't hear that answer.
FOREMAN: That particular juror is not willing to work with any of the other jurors to talk out the various different charges.

The State then reiterated its request that the juror be replaced, and Riggs responded that the record was not sufficiently clear to warrant the removal of a juror. After a brief recess, the trial judge was handed a note from the jury foreman asking for the court to "... please bring us the official statute regarding ... criminal deviate conduct. Thanks." The jury was informed that the "official statute" was contained in the instructions and the court directed that deliberations continue. The State had no problem with the trial court's response, but Riggs's attorney expressed concern that the jury had continued deliberating, "without the juror who caused the problem." We assume, but are not certain, that this was based on the foreman's reports that little progress had been made since 5:00 p.m., and the assumption that the still unnamed juror, though present, was not engaged in the deliberations.

Sometime between 6:15 and 7:30 the foreman sent the following note to the trial court, "The juror, Marcus Wallace, needs to see the Judge, ASAP." The parties agreed that the court should interview Wallace and the following examination took place:

THE COURT: I got a note from the jury foreman that says you need to see me.
WALLACE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Why do you need to see me?
WALLACE: I've been accusing [sic] of trying to defend the defendant by the head juror. Not—I'm not going to take that. The head juror accused me of trying to defend the defendant and I'm not going to take that.
THE COURT: What do you mean "you're not going to take that"?
WALLACE: I don't have to because I'm trying to give a fair and impartial determination to this evidence and to this Court.
THE COURT: Well what do you intend to do about that?
WALLACE: I just asked to see the Judge. I want to see what statute you want me to do. I asked to see the Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir, would you step outside the door with the bailiff ...
WALLACE: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: ... for just a minute?

The State then reiterated its desire to have Wallace replaced by an alternate, and Riggs disagreed, arguing the juror should continue and failure to do so would be a violation of Riggs's constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. The trial court denied the defense's request to poll the jury as to whether they could reach a verdict. The trial court then made the following statement: "First of all the Court did in fact observe the demeanor of the juror and listened to his words to the point that the Court is troubled if it sends this juror back to deliberate ... I am fearful of the events that would occur back there.... The Court will also ... allow any party to examine the witnesses ... including the baliff ... [that] delivered this note and appeared to be in somewhat of a panic, that they were screaming at each other." At 7:30 p.m. court reconvened and the judge dismissed the juror.

The trial court then reconvened the jury and told them it had released Wallace from the panel. It then placed an alternate juror on the jury. It then asked each juror, in the presence of the others, if the removal of the juror would interfere with their ability to render "a fair and impartial verdict," to which each responded "no." At 10:25 p.m. the jury reported it had reached a verdict. After Riggs unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, the jury reported its verdict of guilty as to the murder and...

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