Riggs v. Wright

• Decision Date: 07 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. W2015-00677-COA-R3-CV,W2015-00677-COA-R3-CV
• Citation: Riggs v. Wright, No. W2015-00677-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. Jul 07, 2016)
• Parties: ALLEN RIGGS v. RICHARD B. WRIGHT, ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

ALLEN RIGGS v. RICHARD B. WRIGHT, ET AL.

No. W2015-00677-COA-R3-CV

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON

June 21, 2016 Session

July 7, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT00445014

Felicia Corbin Johnson, Judge

The plaintiff filed this case against an adult defendant and his parents, after the adult defendant allegedly attacked the plaintiff. The trial court granted parents' motion to dismiss, concluding that no special relationship existed between the adult defendant and his parents that would confer a duty on parents to control the adult defendant, a guest in parents' home. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

C. Wesley Fowler and Jonathan O. Richardson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Allen Riggs.

Bradford D. Box and J. Caleb Meriwether, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellees, Larry F. Wright, Sr., and Marianne D. Wright.

OPINION

Background

On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff/Appellant Allen Riggs filed a complaint for damages against Defendant Richard B. Wright ("Mr. Wright") and Defendants/Appellees Larry F. Wright, Sr., and Marianne D. Wright (together, "Appellees"). According to the complaint, on August 9, 2014, Mr. Wright attacked Mr. Riggs on the street outside his home causing Mr. Riggs injuries that resulted in "surgical intervention." At the time, Mr. Wright, the adult son of Appellees, was residing in Appellees' home next door to Mr. Riggs's home. The complaint alleged that because Mr. Wright had a history of violence that was known to Appellees, Appellees had a "duty to exercise reasonable supervision and care to control" Mr. Wright. Mr. Riggs contended that in allowing Mr. Wright to attack him, Appellees breached their duty of care and were, therefore, negligent. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief, against Mr. Wright and Appellees.

Mr. Wright filed an answer to the complaint on December 10, 2014, alleging that the incident was the result of Mr. Riggs's own actions and that Mr. Wright was acting in self-defense. Mr. Wright also alleged that he

suffers from an illness that may cause him to perceive things differently from others. This illness may prevent him from determining whether a threat exists or not; and further, may cause Mr. Wright to have a heightened perception of a threat. This difficulty may prevent Mr. Wright from distinguishing right and wrong.

Mr. Wright denied, however, that he had a history of violence.

On January 8, 2015, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In their motion and accompanying memorandum, Appellees argued that they could not be held liable for the alleged intentional acts of their adult child, citing Nichols v. Atnip, 844 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Mr. Riggs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on February 4, 2015, arguing that because Appellees knew of Mr. Wright's propensity toward violence, a special relationship existed which created "an affirmative duty [on the part of the Appellees] to act for the protection of another party."

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on February 13, 2015. The trial court orally ruled in favor of Appellees and, thereafter, both parties submitted proposed orders to the trial court. On March 11, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of Appellees. The trial court specifically ruled that no special relationship existed between Appellees and Mr. Wright. Because the parent-adult child relationship did not give rise to liability of parents for the intentional acts of their children, the trial court determined that Appellees owed no duty to protect Mr. Riggs from Mr. Wright. Finding that there was no just reason for delay, the trial court designated its ruling as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Riggs thereafter filed this appeal.¹

Issue Presented

Mr. Riggs raises one issue, which is taken from his appellate brief:

Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Appellant's claims against Appellees pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) based solely on the trial court's determination that Appellees owed no duty to Appellant, despite allegations in the Complaint that Appellees had actual knowledge of the danger presented by their mentally unstable houseguest and that his violent actions were reasonably foreseeable to Appellees.

Standard of Review

As our supreme court explained:

A Rule 12.02(6) motion challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff's proof or evidence. Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn. 2009); Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2003); Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999); Sanders v. Vinson, 558 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. 1977). The resolution of a 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is determined by an examination of the pleadings alone. Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tenn. 2010); Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002); Cook ex rel. Uithoven v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994); Cornpropstv. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn. 1975) (overruled on other grounds by McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899-900 (Tenn. 1996)). A defendant who files a motion to dismiss "'admits the truth of all of the relevant and material allegations contained in the complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of action.'" Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn. 2005)); see Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tenn. 2007); White v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn. 2000); Holloway v. Putnam Cnty., 534 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tenn. 1976).

In considering a motion to dismiss, courts "'must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.'" Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 696); see Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 92-93 (Tenn. 2004); Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997); Bellar v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 559 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn. 1978); see also City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that courts "must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by . . . giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts"). A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss "only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn. 2002); see Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. 2007); Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1984); Fuerst v. Methodist Hosp. S., 566 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tenn. 1978); Ladd v. Roane Hosiery, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Tenn. 1977). We review the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of the complaint de novo. Brown, 328 S.W.3d at 855; Stein, 945 S.W.2d at 716.

Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011).

Discussion

In order to determine whether the trial court correctly dismissed the claim against Appellees, it is first important to note what claims are not raised in this case. First, we note that Mr. Riggs does not raise a claim for negligent entrustment, presumably because the facts of this case do not involve the entrustment of a chattel to Mr. Wright. See Nichols v. Atnip, 844 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "an entrustment of a chattel" is an essential element of negligent entrustment claim). Mr. Riggs has also not alleged an action against the Appellees under a premises liability theory, as Mr. Riggs's injury did not occur on Appellees' property. See Parker v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 341, 350 (Tenn. 2014) (requiring that the injury be caused by a "dangerous condition on the premises"). Instead, Mr. Riggs's claim involves only general negligence—he asserts Appellees breached a duty "to exercise reasonable supervision and care to control" Mr. Wright that resulted in Mr. Riggs's injuries.²

A claim for negligence cannot succeed in the absence of any of the following elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct falling below the applicable standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause. Green v. Roberts, 398 S.W.3d 172, 176-77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993)). Duty, the first element of the claim, is the legal obligation a defendant owes to a plaintiff to conform to the reasonable person standard of care in order to protect against unreasonable risks of harm. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995). Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff in any given situation is a question of law for the court. Bradshaw, 854 S.W.2d at 869.

The trial court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss the claims against them after determining that the facts, even if taken as true, did not give rise to a duty on the part of Appellees. "Duty is a legal obligation to conform to a reasonable person standard of care in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm." Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., ...