Right Printing Company, Inc. v. Roland E. Stevens
| Citation | 179 A. 209,107 Vt. 359 |
| Parties | RIGHT PRINTING COMPANY, INC. v. ROLAND E. STEVENS |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1935 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
February Term, 1935.
Trial by Court---Credibility of Witnesses and Weight To Be Given Testimony---Sufficiency of Evidence To Support Finding as to Reliance of Plaintiff upon Defendant's Credit for Printing Done by Former---Attorney and Client---Harmless Error---Principal and Agent---General Rule as to Liability of Principal When Agent Contracting Reveals Principal---Liability of Agent under Certain Circumstances---Contracts, Construction of---Sufficiency of Evidence To Be Susceptible of Construction That Printer in Printing Briefs Relied on Credit of Attorney---Insufficiency of Findings To Support Judgment.
1. In ACTION OF CONTRACT by printer for printing briefs in case in which defendant was attorney, tried by court, where evidence was conflicting, it was for court to pass upon credibility of witnesses and to determine weight to be given their testimony.
2. In such action, where plaintiff had printed briefs at request of defendant, but latter claimed that printing was done for his client, finding that plaintiff had at all times relied upon defendant's credit for pay for such printing job and no one else, held supported by evidence, as against claim that finding was unsupported by evidence and against evidence.
3. In such action, refusal of court to find as requested by defendant that latter was agent and attorney for certain person and his wife at time defendant ordered printing of briefs by plaintiff, and that plaintiff knew that defendant was such agent and attorney when order for printing briefs was given and executed, held error, but harmless, because Supreme Court, in considering trial court's refusal to comply with another request of defendant, to effect that defendant did not expressly contract for printing of such briefs in his own name, assumed that at all times material plaintiff knew that defendant was agent and attorney of such persons.
4. General rule is that when one person contracts as agent of another, and fact of his agency is known to person with whom he contracts, principal alone, and not agent, is responsible, but such knowledge is not conclusive as to liability, for even where principal is disclosed contract may be made by an agent with third person in such terms that agent is personally liable for its fulfillment.
5. Whether one contracting as agent of another, where fact of his agency is known to person with whom he contracts, may be held personally liable for fulfillment of contract, contrary to general rule that principal alone is liable, is largely question of intention, to be determined by language of contract, with reference to its subject-matter and contemporaneous circumstances.
6. Language and acts of party to contract are to receive such construction as at time he supposed other party would give to them, or such construction as other party was fairly justified in giving to them, and he will not, at later time be permitted to give them different operation in consequence of some mental reservation.
7. In ACTION OF CONTRACT by printer for printing briefs in case in which defendant was attorney, held that, viewing evidence most favorable to plaintiff on exception to court's refusal to find that defendant did not expressly contract for printing of such briefs in his own name, language attributed to defendant when ordering printing of briefs was susceptible of construction that printing was to be done for himself that credit of his client was not pledged, and that plaintiff accepted order upon credit of defendant, defendant's failure to protest when bill was presented to him for payment on several occasions, and other actions of defendant, also tending strongly to show that he understood he was personally liable for printing bill.
8. In such action, where trial court found that defendant ordered briefs to be printed and at all times thereafter plaintiff understood that defendant was personally liable for printing bill, but there was no finding that defendant understood he was personally liable, or that in circumstances he knew or ought to have known that plaintiff understood that he was personally liable, held that, in absence of such finding, or findings from which that fact could be inferred, judgment was not supported by findings, and defendant's exception on that ground must be sustained.
ACTION OF CONTRACT by printer for printing briefs in case in which defendant was attorney. Plea, general denial. Trial by Hartford municipal court, Arthur G. Whitham, Municipal Judge presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case. Reversed and remanded.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
Paul Gilioli for the defendant.
Raymond Trainor and Henry F. Black for the plaintiff.
Present: POWERS, C. J., MOULTON, THOMPSON, and SHERBURNE, JJ.
This is an action of contract brought to Hartford municipal court in which the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant for the printing of certain briefs in the case of Sargent v. Robertson et ux., which was then pending in this Court, and in which the defendant was the attorney of the defendants in that case. There was a trial by court. A finding of facts was made, and there was a judgment for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the printing business at White River Junction. Alfred T. Wright is the manager of the plaintiff. In all the conversations he had with the defendant hereinafter referred to, and in all other things that he did in connection with the matters involved in this case, he was acting for and in behalf of the plaintiff.
In the first line of the first paragraph of the findings where the court uses the word "plaintiff" it refers to Mr. Wright.
The court found as follows:
The defendant excepted to the last paragraph of the findings as unsupported by the evidence, against the evidence, and insufficient in law to support a judgment.
Two briefs were printed by the plaintiff, a main brief and a supplemental brief. The defendant admits that he ordered the briefs to be printed. He testified that when he ordered the main brief to be printed he told Mr. Wright that he was acting as attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Robertson, and that he was not personally responsible for the payment for printing that brief; that later, when he ordered the printing of the supplemental brief, nothing was said about the payment for printing that brief.
The following facts appear from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff:
In late December, 1931, the defendant went to the plaintiff's place of business and inquired of Mr. Wright about the printing of a brief and the price for the same. Later in the same day, after further conversation with Mr. Wright on the subject, the price for printing the brief was agreed on, and the defendant ordered it to be printed. Mr. Wright took the order, and the bookkeeper made out a job ticket. Some time later, the defendant ordered the printing of a supplemental brief in the same case. Mr. Wright and the bookkeeper were both present at that time, and the latter made out a job ticket for that work. Both job tickets were made out in the name of and as being for R. E. Stevens.
When the briefs were printed the bookkeeper charged the work on the plaintiff's ledger in the name of "Stevens Roland E." A bill for the work was then sent to the defendant and monthly statements were thereafter sent to him in his own name. Three or four weeks after the first bill was sent to the defendant he went to the plaintiff's office and asked Mr. Wright if he...
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Elsie Clifford Verfenstein v. Louise Deiglmayr
... ... facts. Right Printing Co., Inc., v ... Stevens, 107 Vt. 359, ... ...