Right v. A.W. Chesterton Inc. Boc Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-1634.,09-1634.
• Citation: 620 F.3d 392
• Parties: Gloria Gail KURNS, Executrix of The Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased; Freida E. Jung Corson, Widow In Her Own Right v. A.W. CHESTERTON INC., et al.; BOC Inc., Airco Welders Supply Inc.; Railroad Friction Products Corporation; Viad Corp. Gloria Gail Kurns; Freida E. Jung Corson, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

620 F.3d 392

Gloria Gail KURNS, Executrix of The Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased; Freida E. Jung Corson, Widow In Her Own Right

v.A.W. CHESTERTON INC., et al.; BOC Inc., Airco Welders Supply Inc.; Railroad Friction Products Corporation; Viad Corp.

Gloria Gail Kurns; Freida E. Jung Corson, Appellants.

No. 09-1634.

United States Court of Appeals,Third Circuit.

Argued Jan. 11, 2010.

Filed Sept. 9, 2010.

Robert E. Paul (argued), Richard P. Myers, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

W. Thomas McGough, Jr. (argued), Robert H. Owen, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee Railroad Friction Products Corporation.

Daniel Markewich (argued), Ellen G. Margolis, Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass, New York, NY, David P. Helwig, Marks, O'Neill, O'Brien & Courteney, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee Viad Corporation.

Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. While the suit was filed in state court, the matter was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the appellees Viad Corporation and Railroad Friction Products Corporation's motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were all preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701, et seq. (“LIA”). The plaintiffs appeal from the District Court's entry of summary judgment on behalf of the appellees and argue that their claims are not preempted by federal law. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.

I.

From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson (the “decedent”) worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives. The plaintiffs claim that throughout this time period, the decedent was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, the decedent was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both his widow and the executor of his estate.

The plaintiffs sued the two appellees, as well as a number of other defendants (fifty-nine defendants in all), in Pennsylvania state court, seeking to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the harmful effects to the decedent's health resulting from his exposure to asbestos. The plaintiffs alleged that the decedent installed brake pads containing asbestos that were manufactured and sold by Railroad Friction Products Corporation (“RFPC”). They further alleged that Viad was a successor in interest to a different company that manufactured and sold engine valves, also containing asbestos, which the decedent installed. Viad moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by federal law, but the state court denied that motion. All of the defendants then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence linking their products to the decedent's exposure to asbestos. The state court granted these motions with regard to all of the defendants except Viad and RFPC.

The plaintiffs brought this case in state court because one of the other original defendants defeated diversity jurisdiction, but when the state court granted that defendant's motion for summary judgment and that party was released from the case, there was complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. At that point, Viad and RFPC removed the case to the District Court. Once in federal court, the defendants again filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by federal law.

On February 5, 2009, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of RFPC and Viad, holding that the plaintiffs' state law product liability tort claims were preempted by federal law, namely the LIA. ¹ The District Court held that the LIA occupies the field of regulating locomotives and locomotive parts used in interstate commerce based on the Supreme Court's decision in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432 (1926), in which the court explained that the LIA occupies the field of locomotive equipment. ² The District Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that federal law only preempted state regulations involving locomotives which were “in use” at the time, and that since their case involved the actual installation, repair, and removal of locomotive parts, federal preemption did not apply. The Court held that there was no indication in the law that Congress intended to make such a distinction. Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”) materially abrogated the scope of federal preemption of the entire field of railroad parts. The Court held that the FRSA had not changed the scope of LIA preemption to such an extent that it would no longer preempt the plaintiffs' claims.

The plaintiffs filed a timely appeal from the District Court's order.

II.

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court's order granting summary judgment under a plenary standard of review. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact. Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir.2008).

III.

On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that state law design defect and failure to warn product liability claims are not preempted by the LIA. The plaintiffs urge that the LIA preempts the regulation of locomotive equipment, but does not preempt “railroad workers' personal injury claims under state tort law for failure to warn about hazardous substances released during the repair of locomotives which [are] not in service.” Plaintiffs' Br. at 19. We disagree and hold that the plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the LIA.

A.

We first turn to the plaintiffs' contention that the LIA does not preempt a state law or regulation related to working conditions in a facility that manufactures, installs, repairs, or removes locomotive parts and appurtenances.

The doctrine of preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI. Under that clause, “any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.” Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962). In cases like the present one, courts are called upon to determine whether an act of Congress preempts state law. See Deweese v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 590 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.2009).

There are three distinct types of federal preemption: express preemption, implied conflict preemption, and field preemption. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 238-39 (3d Cir.2009). Express preemption occurs when a federal law contains express language providing for the preemption of any conflicting state law. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541, 121 S.Ct. 2404, 150 L.Ed.2d 532 (2001). Implied conflict preemption occurs when it is either “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (citation omitted)). The final type of preemption, which is relevant to this case, is field preemption, which arises when a state law or regulation intrudes upon a “field reserved for federal regulation.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000).

When determining whether a federal law or laws serve to preempt an entire field, “[o]ur inquiry into the scope of a statute's pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’ ” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)); see also Deweese, 590 F.3d at 246. In doing so, we consider the intended purpose of the federal regulatory scheme, and what impact any state regulation would have on that scheme. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). The Supreme Court has recognized that there is a presumption against field preemption unless congressional intent to preempt is clear and manifest. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992).

The LIA ³ was originally passed in 1911, and was amended in 1915 and 1924. In pertinent part, it provides that “[a] railroad carrier...