Rigney v. Edgar
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | McNAMARA; WHITE, P.J., and RIZZI |
| Citation | Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill.App.3d 893, 482 N.E.2d 367, 90 Ill. Dec. 548 (Ill. App. 1985) |
| Decision Date | 31 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1278,84-1278 |
| Parties | , 90 Ill.Dec. 548 Thomas A. RIGNEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jim EDGAR, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant. |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, (Thomas P. Marnell, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Jenner & Block, Chicago (Russell J. Hoover, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Plaintiff, Thomas Rigney, brought this action for administrative review of a decision by defendant, Secretary of State, which denied plaintiff's petition to rescind the suspension of his driver's license. The trial court set aside defendant's decision and ordered him to rescind the suspension order. On appeal, defendant contends that acceptance of plaintiff's plea of nolo contendere by a Georgia court to a charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is grounds for the suspension of plaintiff's Illinois driver's license.
Plaintiff, an Illinois licensed driver, was charged in the State of Georgia with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol on May 7, 1982. The Georgia traffic citation reported that plaintiff's breath test resulted in a finding of .13% of blood alcohol content. Plaintiff was advised by his Georgia attorney that Georgia allowed first offenders in DUI cases to offer a plea of nolo contendere. Plaintiff was further informed that acceptance of such a plea under the circumstances would not result in a conviction on the charge nor a suspension or revocation of his driver's license, and did not constitute an admission of guilt under Georgia law. On July 20, 1982, plaintiff entered his nolo contendere plea, and the plea was accepted by the municipal court of Peachtree, Georgia. Plaintiff was fined $400 and given a 60 day suspended jail term. Subsequently, Georgia notified defendant of plaintiff's offense and the court disposition, pursuant to the Driver License Compact. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-702.
On August 28, 1982, plaintiff received a notice of suspension from defendant, which advised plaintiff that his Illinois driver's license would be suspended for one year, effective September 1, 1982. The suspension order was based on plaintiff's "having been convicted outside the State of Illinois for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant." Plaintiff made a timely request for a hearing to rescind defendant's order of suspension, and also filed a complaint for administrative review and other relief in the trial court. On September 2, 1982, the trial court stayed the suspension order pending a final order by defendant in an administrative hearing.
The hearing was conducted before defendant's hearing officer on October 27, 1982. Defendant offered in evidence plaintiff's request for a hearing, the notice setting the hearing, and defendant's abstract of plaintiff's driving record. Plaintiff introduced the affidavit of his Georgia attorney regarding the advice about the effect of a nolo contendere plea. Plaintiff also introduced the affidavit of a Georgia municipal court judge stating that under Georgia law an accepted plea of nolo contendere did not constitute a conviction and would not result in suspension or revocation of a first offender's driver's license.
On November 17, 1982, plaintiff's petition to rescind defendant's order of suspension was denied. Defendant's hearing officer found that "petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol by the State of Georgia and such conviction was reported by the State of Georgia and properly entered by the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois on the petitioner's Illinois driving record."
Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the trial court alleging that defendant failed to support his findings with evidence presented at the hearing and failed to prove a "conviction" warranting the license suspension. As an answer, defendant submitted a certified copy of the administrative hearing file. Included within the file was a copy of the Georgia traffic citation and court disposition which was not introduced into evidence. On April 23, 1984, the trial court set aside defendant's order denying plaintiff's petition to rescind the order of suspension. The trial court also reinstated plaintiff's driving privileges.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was convicted in Georgia of driving while under the influence of alcohol and that such conviction is grounds for suspending plaintiff's Illinois driver's license, pursuant to the Illinois Driver Licensing Law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-100 et seq.) Section 6-206(a)(6) of the Illinois Driver Licensing Law provides:
In Illinois, conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol results in mandatory one-year revocation of the offender's license. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-205(a)(2).) For the purposes of the Act, conviction means "a final adjudication of guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction either after a bench trial, trial by jury, plea of guilty, order of forfeiture, or default." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-100.
The Act is also subject to the Driver License Compact, Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-700 to 6-708, which requires the state's licensing authority to report each conviction of a person from another state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the licensee's home state. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-702.) Pursuant to section 6-703, the effect of an out-of-state conviction is as follows:
"The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported * * * as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:
* * *
* * *
(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-703(a)(2).
For purposes of the Driver License Compact, "conviction" is defined as "conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle which is prohibited by state law * * * or a forfeiture of bail, bond, or other security * * *, and which conviction or forfeiture is required to be reported to the licensing authority." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-700(c).
Plaintiff maintains that an accepted plea of nolo contendere in Georgia does not constitute a conviction and does not warrant the suspension of his Illinois driver's license. The relevant Georgia statute provides that for a first offender "an accepted plea of nolo contendere to a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall not constitute a conviction." (Ga. Code Ann. (1982), § 40-5-63.) Generally, Georgia law provides that a plea of nolo contendere shall not be used against the defendant for any purpose including any "civil disqualification imposed upon a person convicted of any offense under the laws of this state." (Ga. Code Ann. (1982), § 17-7-95; Fortson v. Hopper (1978), 242 Ga. 81, 247 S.E.2d 875.) The issue is whether the Georgia plea and resulting judgment constitute a conviction for the purpose of the relevant Illinois statutes, where Illinois makes no reference to the effect of a nolo contendere plea in another jurisdiction.
In construing statutory provisions, this court is required to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Budka v. Board of Public Safety Comm'rs (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 348, 75 Ill.Dec. 958, 458 N.E.2d 126.) Legislative intent is to be ascertained not only from the language used but also from the reasons for the enactment and the purposes to be attained (Board of Trustees v. Taylor (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 318, 70 Ill.Dec. 170, 448 N.E.2d 1171), as well as the probable consequences of a proposed construction. Miceli v. Lavelle (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 311, 70 Ill.Dec. 111, 448 N.E.2d 989.
The Driver License Compact clearly expresses the legislative intent to discipline Illinois licensed drivers for conduct occurring in another state. It is this state's policy to enforce over-all compliance with motor vehicle laws to promote public safety. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-701(a), (b).) The Driver License Compact gives defendant authority to treat the out of state conduct of an Illinois licensed driver as if it occurred in Illinois. Although plaintiff was able to plead nolo contendere and thereby avail himself of first offender treatment under Georgia law, the effect of the Georgia plea does not transfer to Illinois. Georgia does not regulate Illinois licensed drivers. The Illinois statute entrusts defendant with exclusive authority to regulate driver's licenses of Illinois residents. Furthermore, Georgia authorities administratively processed plaintiff's judgment upon a nolo contendere plea as a conviction. (See 1982 Att'y Gen. Ga. Op. 82-64.) Georgia also reported plaintiff's conviction of the traffic violation to defendant as it would report any other conviction. Once the conviction was reported, defendant properly gave the "same effect to the conduct reported * * * as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state [Illinois]." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-703(a).
Upon determination of the legislative intent to regulate the conduct of Illinois licensed drivers, we find that the Georgia judgment upon a plea of nolo contendere to a DUI charge constitutes a conviction...
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People v. Williams
...this court is required to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Rigney v. Edgar (1st Dist.1985), 135 Ill.App.3d 893, 897, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 551, 482 N.E.2d 367, 370.) While the language of a statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning (People v. Brown (1982)......
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...51 Ala.App. 456, 286 So.2d 860 (1973); Carter v. Dept. of Public Safety, 290 A.2d 652 (Del.Super.1972); Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill.App.3d 893, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 482 N.E.2d 367 (1985); State v. Peterson, 347 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1984); State ex rel. Landon v. Macek, 208 Mont. 172, 676 P.2d 228 (198......
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...be supported by substantial proof, and an agency may not consider a matter that is not in the record. Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill.App.3d 893, 899, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 482 N.E.2d 367 (1985). Upon administrative review, the function of both the trial court and the appellate court is limited to dete......
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... ... does not require a state to subordinate public policy within its borders to the laws of another state ... " Bourdeev, 755 A.2d at 62 quoting Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill. App.3d 893, 898, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 482 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1985); Hession 767 A.2d at 1138 n. 4; accord Breen, 771 A.2d at 881 ... ...
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Interstate implications of drunk driving convictions
...plea is to be determined by the law of the home state even where it is not a conviction in the offense state. See Rigney v. Edgar , 135 Ill.App.3d 893 (1985). It has also been held that entering into a diversion alcohol program which is considered an admission of guilt for the purposes of a......
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Interstate implications of drunk driving convictions
...of a nolo plea is to be determined by the law of the home state even where it is not a conviction in the offense state. See Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill.App.3d 893 (1985). It has also been held that entering into a diversion alcohol program which is considered an admission of guilt for the purp......