Rigopoulos v. State

• Decision Date: 14 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 85887,85887
• Citation: Rigopoulos v. State, 608 N.Y.S.2d 378, 159 Misc.2d 1109 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1994)
• Parties: Dimitrios RIGOPOULOS and Victoria Rigopoulos, Individually and as Husband and Wife, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 378

608 N.Y.S.2d 378

159 Misc.2d 1109

Dimitrios RIGOPOULOS and Victoria Rigopoulos, Individually and as Husband and Wife, Claimants, v.The STATE of New York, Defendant.

No. 85887.

Court of Claims of New York.

Jan. 14, 1994.

Michael Likoudis, Buffalo, for claimants.

G. Oliver Koppell, Atty. Gen. by Ahmuty, Demers & McManus, Albertson, for defendant.

LEONARD SILVERMAN, Judge.

On September 15, 1991Dimitrios Rigopoulos(hereafter "claimant") was employed by a contractor engaged in the painting of the Robert Moses Causeway Bridge.Claimant performed his work by standing on a barge floating in the Great South Bay and tied to a bridge pier.Claimant climbed onto the bridge from an unopened five foot "A" frame aluminum stepladder.The base of the ladder was on the barge.The top was resting against the bridge pier.The barge was not owned, maintained or operated by the State.Claimant was injured while descending the ladder when he fell backward from the ladder and landed on the barge.

Both sides seek summary judgment.Defendant seeks to dismiss the claim on the ground that this claim is preempted by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act and jurisdiction lies exclusively in the federal courts.

Claimants' motion, limited to the issues of liability, is predicated upon the absolute liability imposed upon an owner pursuant to Labor Law § 240.As it applies here § 240 mandates that all owners and contractors furnish or erect scaffolding or other safety devices to give proper protection to a person employed in the construction or repair of a building or structure.

The threshold question we must resolve is whether the claim is governed by admiralty or maritime law, in which event we would lack jurisdiction due to the inapplicability of the Labor Law(Torres v. City of New York, 177 A.D.2d 97, 581 N.Y.S.2d 194).

In order for maritime jurisdiction to exist the wrong must have occurred in navigable waters and must have some relationship to traditional maritime activities (Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454).The locality test is satisfied in this case by virtue of the fact that the barge was afloat on the Great South Bay.That bay, is without doubt, a navigable water.

Having met the locality requirement we must next determine if there is a maritime nexus, i.e., a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity (Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300).An analysis of this question requires a review of four factors: the functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved; the causation and type of injury; and the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law (Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520).

To determine the function of the partieswe must go beyond the fact that an accident occurred on navigable waters and determine if the tasks being performed had any inherent relationship to maritime activity (Dean v. State of Louisiana, 542 So.2d 742).

In the claim before us, claimant's job was not unique to maritime commerce.Claimant's task was connected to maritime activity merely because a barge was used as a platform in lieu of scaffolding suspended from the bridge.Not only was claimant's job unrelated to maritime commerce, but it does not appear that claimant's employer was involved in maritime commerce.From the foregoing we find this factor weighs against a finding of a maritime connection.

The next factor involves the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved.The barge is clearly a vessel used primarily in maritime commerce.The ladder, however, is not unique to maritime activity.The focus of this claim will be upon the ladder, not the barge.In this instance the instrumentality is more significant than the vehicle and we find this factor weighs against finding a significant nexus.

The third factor pertains to the causation and type of injury.Claimant's injury was caused by the positioning or collapse of the ladder.It does not appear that the fall was attributable to a maritime activity or was otherwise caused by the fact that the barge was on navigable waters.The allegations in the claim are that defendant failed to provide proper safety devices for the painting of the bridge.Although the injury occurred on navigable waters, the injury is not of a uniquely maritime character to sustain a relationship to maritime commerce or navigation.For these reasons, the third factor operates against finding a maritime nexus.

The fourth and final factor, the traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law can best be analyzed by determining the impact of the event on maritime shipping; the desirability of a uniform national rule to apply to such matters and the need for admiralty expertise in the trial (Molett v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419).

There is no indication that this accident had any impact on maritime shipping or commerce.We also do not see how the exercise of federal maritime law over this claim would advance the policies of federal admiralty law.Those policies have been developed to handle problems related to vessels on waterways.This includes matters pertaining to navigational rules, collisions, seaworthiness, cargo claims and salvage claims.These traditional concerns do not involve claimants' allegations of improper safety devices.This claim is a traditional tort claim which does not require a uniform law or expertise in admiralty.

Therefore, this factor also weighs against a finding of a maritime nexus.

From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that there is not a sufficient relationship to maritime activities so that this claim would be governed by admiralty law.Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

Having disposed of the jurisdictional question in favor of claimants, we must next resolve their motion for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1).

Claimant submits an affidavit (Exhibit C) which indicates that at the direction of his employer he climbed onto a bridge pier from a barge tied to the pier by ascending a five foot stepladder.He states that the aluminum "A" frame ladder was unopened and leaning against the pier.The top of the ladder was not secured to the pier and the bottom...