Rigor v. Frye

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCOTT
• Citation: Rigor v. Frye, 62 Ill. 507, 1872 WL 8080 (Ill. 1872)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1872
• Parties: LEONARD RIGORv.JAMES H. FRYE et al.

62 Ill. 507

1872 WL 8080 (Ill.)

LEONARD RIGOR

v.JAMES H. FRYE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1872.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Brown County; the Hon. C. L. HIGBEE, Judge, presiding.

This was an action of ejectment for the recovery of a tract of land in Brown County. After the defendant below had closed his case, the court, on motion, excluded from the jury all the oral evidence of defendant's possession and payment of taxes, to which defendant excepted. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff below had made out a legal title to the premises, and that the defendant had failed to show any claim and color of title, as required by the statute, and that they should find for the plaintiff. Verdict accordingly. Mr. W. L. VANDEVENTER and Mr. J. C. THOMPSON, for the appellant.

Mr. J. S. IRWIN, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is admitted, by a stipulation in the record, that the appellees have shown a prima facic title to the premises in controversy sufficient to authorize a judgment in their favor, unless the appellant, by his proof, has brought himself within the protection of the eighth section chapter twenty-four R. S. 1845.

The single inquiry involved in the case is, whether a bond for a deed upon condition of a compliance with its terms in futuro will constitute “claim and color of title” within the meaning of that section of the conveyance act.

It is not controverted that the appellant was in possession of the premises seven successive years, and paid all the taxes legally assessed thereon during that period.

It is conceded also, that the appellant had no deed purporting to convey the title to the premises during the first four years of his possession. During that period he only claimed to have a bond for a deed from one Edward M. Clark. The only title claimed by Clark himself to the land, was a certificate of purchase at a tax sale. He did not claim any title to the land through any one who claimed to own it under a deed purporting to convey the title.

We do not understand that any distinction can be taken as to what constitutes ““color of title,” under sections eight and nine of the conveyance act. Hence, the definitions given as to what constitutes “color of title” in the former decisions of this court under one section, may apply with equal exactness to the other.

It was held in Bride v. Wall, 23 Ill. 507, that a certificate of purchase at a tax sale did not constitute color of title under the ninth section of the conveyance act. The decision proceeds on the ground that it is not paper title, within the meaning of the statute, and does not...