Rigsby v. Civil Service Com.

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: JEFFERSON; FILES, P.J., and KINGSLEY
• Citation: Rigsby v. Civil Service Com., 39 Cal.App.3d 696, 115 Cal.Rptr. 490 (Cal. App. 1974)
• Decision Date: 05 June 1974
• Parties: William T. RIGSBY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Civ. 42174.

Page 490

115 Cal.Rptr. 490

39 Cal.App.3d 696

William T. RIGSBY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

Civ. 42174.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

June 5, 1974.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1974.

Hearing Denied Aug. 7, 1974.

Norman W. DeCarteret, Sherman Oaks, for petitioner and appellant.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Petitioner William T. Rigsby sought a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) to compel the respondent Civil Service Commission of Los Angeles County to reinstate him as a county employee and pay him accumulated back salary of $2,000. The trial court denied the writ and petitioner has appealed the judgment, which, for reasons hereinafter set forth, we reverse.

The record discloses that petitioner was first employed as a deputy in the Sheriff's Department on October 28, 1967. Thereafter he attained permanent status. In December 1969, he was assigned to the Malibu Station of the Sheriff's Department. There, and during the course of his previous assignment, he had received citations for his work as a deputy. His immediate superior at Malibu was deputy Le Roy, a training supervisor. ¹

On December 17, 1969, at Le Roy's invitation, the petitioner accompanied him and two other deputies to Decker Canyon at approximately 2:00 a.m.; petitioner was off duty at the time. Resting at the bottom of a 300-foot drop in Decker Canyon were a number of vehicles which had, at various times in the past, plunged off the road above the canyon. Access to the vehicles was impossible from the road above; the four deputies hiked into the area. The particular object of interest to Le Roy and the others was a Volkswagen automobile which had very recently been involved in an accident which had caused the death of its driver and three passengers.

When the men arrived at the scene of the wreck, petitioner observed the others removing parts from the Volkswagen, knowing that they intended to keep the parts for their own purposes. Petitioner also knew that none of the deputies had obtained prior permission from their superiors in the Sheriff's Department or from the car's owner to strip the car. Petitioner assisted in the operation by holding a flashlight and, on one occasion, removing a wheel. Petitioner returned to the scene on December 18, 1969, at night while off duty, to assist Le Roy in carrying the car's engine out of the canyon. Petitioner had no interest in the parts, and acquired none for his own use.

Petitioner's visits to Decker Canyon resulted in his discharge by the Sheriff's Department on February 16, 1970. At petitioner's request, a hearing officer was appointed by the respondent Civil Service Commission, and an inquiry into his discharge was conducted on July 3, 1970. At the hearing, petitioner was allowed to present written statements from the owner of the Volkswagen and from a representative of the insurance company which had insured the vehicle, dated July 2, 1970, indicating that they regarded the vehicle as a total loss and had no intention of removing it or its parts from Decker Canyon.

The hearing officer affirmed petitioner's discharge on the ground that he had violated policies set forth in the Sheriff's Department Manual, specifically sections 3120.01 and 3120.07. ²

He made findings of fact and conclusions of law; these were adopted by the Commission in upholding petitioner's dismissal on September 10, 1970. Petitioner then sought a review of the administrative decision in the trial court. The trial court affirmed the dismissal, specifically determining that there was substantially evidence to support the finding that petitioner's conduct had discredited the Sheriff's Department and himself as a deputy sheriff.

At the time of these proceedings, the scope of appellate review of the decision of a local board or agency such as the respondent Commission, exercising quasijudicial powers, was limited to a determination of whether there was substantive evidence to support the decision in the light of the whole record made at the administrative hearing. The prevailing case law indicated that the trial court was not empowered to conduct de novo review. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5(c); Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal.App.2d 313, 321, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550; Thompson v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal.2d 235, 239--240, 259 P.2d 649; Damiani v. Albert, 48 Cal.2d 15, 306 P.2d 780; Keithley v. Civil Service Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 443, 448, 89 Cal.Rptr. 809; Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, 7 Cal.3d 64, 101 Cal.Rptr. 768, 496 P.2d 840.)

However, after the entry of the judgment in the trial court, and while the case was pending in this court, the Supreme Court reviewed the rule setting forth the standard to be used by a trial court in a case of administrative mandate involving the action of a local agency. In Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44--45, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 816, 520 P.2d 29, 30, the court laid down a new standard in the following terms:

'We therefore hold that in all such cases (review of local agencies), if the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the court, in determining under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. If, on the other hand, the order or decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, the trial court's inquiry will be limited to a determination of whether or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.'

In an order modifying the original Strumsky opinion, the Supreme Court inserted, immediately after the language above quoted, the following sentence:

"So that there will be no misunderstanding, we emphasize that this rule shall apply to all pending and future proceedings in trial courts and all pending and future appeals." (11 Cal.3d at p. 45, 112 Cal.Rptr. at p. 816, 520 P.2d at p. 40.)

Since Rigsby's case involves a vested and fundamental right, it follows that the standard which the trial court should have applied was that of an independent judgment and not that of substantial evidence which its formal findings utilized. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case for the making of new...