Rilea v. Iowa Dep't of Transp.

Decision Date19 October 2018
Docket NumberNo. 17-1803,17-1803
Citation919 N.W.2d 380
Parties Rickie RILEA and Timothy Riley, Appellees, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, David S. Gorham, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Robin G. Formaker and Richard E. Mull, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant Iowa Department of Transportation.

Brandon Brown and Gina Messamer of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellees Rickie Rilea and Timothy Riley.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

I. Introduction.

This appeal requires us to decide whether, before May 11, 2017, Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) Motor Vehicle Enforcement (MVE) officers could issue traffic citations unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. Two motorists were separately cited by MVE officers in 2016 for speeding in a construction zone. They sought declaratory orders that MVE officers lacked authority to stop vehicles and issue these citations. In the declaratory order proceedings, the IDOT concluded that its officers possessed this authority. However, on petition for judicial review, the district court found otherwise and reversed.

On appeal, we conclude that MVE officers lacked authority during the relevant time period to stop vehicles and issue speeding tickets or other traffic citations that did not relate to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. Neither Iowa Code chapter 321 nor Iowa Code chapter 804, the two fonts of authority cited by the IDOT, provided the necessary legal grounding for the MVE officers’ actions.

More specifically, Iowa Code section 321.477, at the time, authorized IDOT peace officers "to make arrests for violations of the motor vehicle laws relating to ... operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load." Iowa Code § 321.477 (2016).1 However, it did not provide authority for arrests relating to other traffic violations. Meanwhile, Iowa Code section 804.9 empowers a "private person" to make an arrest "[f]or a public offense committed or attempted in the person’s presence." Id. § 804.9. Yet, section 804.9 does not extend to individuals who are not private persons, and in any event, it does not confer authority on individuals to issue citations in lieu of arrest. Only peace officers may issue citations in lieu of arrest. See id. § 805.1(1). For these reasons and others discussed in the body of this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

II. Facts and Procedural Background.

At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 12, 2016, Rickie Rilea was traveling southbound on Interstate 35 in Warren County when he was stopped by an IDOT MVE officer. Rilea received a citation for going sixty-six miles per hour in a roadwork zone with a fifty-five miles-per-hour speed limit. See id. § 321.285.

At approximately 8:30 a.m. on September 27, Timothy Riley was proceeding on Interstate 35 in Warren County when he was stopped by an IDOT MVE officer. Riley was cited by the officer for traveling seventy-eight miles per hour in a fifty-five miles-per-hour roadwork zone. See id.

On March 23, 2017, Rilea and Riley separately sought declaratory orders from the IDOT determining that the IDOT’s authority was limited to that set forth in Iowa Code section 321.477 and that the IDOT could not stop drivers and issue citations for violations unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. Their petitions for declaratory orders alleged that between August 19, 2014, and August 19, 2016, MVE employees wrote over 12,840 citations unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load for motorists driving noncommercial vehicles and that the IDOT maintained an internal policy whereby MVE officers were directed to stop any motorist observed violating any Iowa law and issue an appropriate citation.2 To detect these violations, MVE employees used state-issued radar detectors. MVE employees also used official MVE vehicles with overhead flashing lights and sirens to effectuate these traffic stops. MVE employees did not take these motorists before a magistrate or deliver them to a peace officer. During the same time period, MVE employees wrote a lesser number of citations—9,400—relating to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load.

On April 26, the IDOT issued a declaratory order in each proceeding. The orders recognized the "limiting nature of Iowa Code § 341.477" and instead relied on section 804.9(1), holding,

[S]o long as an offense is committed or attempted in the officer’s presence, DOT MVE peace officers while acting in the performance of their regular duties may make an arrest for the offense, and the arrest is lawful because of the citizen arrest powers in Iowa Code section 804.9.

On May 23, Rilea and Riley filed separate petitions for judicial review with the Polk County District Court. See id. § 17A.19(10). The petitions were later consolidated. Each petition alleged that "IDOT employees do not have authority to stop motorists or issue citations for violations unrelated to operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load."

On October 24, after hearing argument, the district court reversed the IDOT’s declaratory orders. The court reasoned,

IDOT admits it lacks authority under Section 321.477 to issue citations for matters other than operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load, yet it argues its officers have citizen arrest authority to do so for violations which occur in their presence. The citizen’s arrest statute applies to "private persons." The record shows that IDOT has 100 uniformed officers, who drive marked cars with lights and sirens, and who possess radar guns to catch speeders. They have issued thousands of citations for matters other than operating authority, registration, size, weight, and load. They are not acting as private persons, but as state actors. In addition, they do not take people into custody for a formal arrest. Under the plain language of Section 804.9 and the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in ... Merchants Motor Freight [, Inc. v. State Highway Commission , 239 Iowa 888, 32 N.W.2d 773 (1948),] ... the citizen’s arrest statute does not give them authority to do so.

The IDOT appealed, and we retained the appeal.

III. Standard of Review.

We examine district court reviews of agency decisions to determine whether the court applied the law correctly. Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd. , 847 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2014). We apply the standards set forth in Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) and "determine whether our application of those standards produce[s] the same result as reached by the district court." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div. , 679 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Iowa 2004) ).

The level of deference owed to an agency’s interpretation of a statute turns on whether the legislature vested the agency with the interpretive authority. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c ) ; Hawkeye Land Co. , 847 N.W.2d at 207. The legislature did not expressly grant interpretive authority to the IDOT in chapter 321. Although the legislature gave the IDOT the authority to "administer and enforce the provisions" of Iowa Code chapter 321 "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law," Iowa Code § 321.2(1), this is not the same as interpretive authority, see Watson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp. , 829 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 2013) (determining that the IDOT was not vested with the authority to interpret Iowa Code section 321.208 ). Moreover, the language at issue does not involve "substantive term[s] within the special expertise of the agency." Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n , 784 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 2010). Additionally, much of this case involves chapter 804, which is not part of the IDOT’s domain. See id. (noting that interpretive power has not been vested with the agency when "the provisions to be interpreted are found in a statute other than the statute the agency has been tasked with enforcing"). Because there is no clear indication that the legislature vested the IDOT with authority to interpret Iowa Code sections 321.477 and 804.9, "we review for erroneous interpretations of law." Hawkeye Land Co. , 847 N.W.2d at 207 (quoting Iowa Dental Ass’n v. Iowa Ins. Div. , 831 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 2013) ); see Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c ).

IV. Analysis.

A. IDOT Authority Under Chapter 321. We first consider whether IDOT MVE officers had authority based on chapter 321 to issue tickets for traffic violations. To do so, we begin by tracing the IDOT’s statutory authority under that chapter.

In 1913, the general assembly enacted legislation to establish the Iowa State Highway Commission, the predecessor to the IDOT. 1913 Iowa Acts ch. 122, title. In 1941, the legislature conferred authority on the highway commission to stop motor vehicles or trailers "on the highways for the purposes of weighing and inspection, to weigh and inspect the same and to enforce the provisions of the motor vehicle laws relating to the size, weight and load of motor vehicles and trailers." 1941 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 321.476 (1946) ). Additionally, the highway commission received authority to designate certain employees as peace officers "to control, direct, and weigh traffic on the highways, and to make arrests for violations of the motor vehicle laws relating to the size, weight and load of motor vehicles and trailers." 1941 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 321.477 (1946) ).

Sixteen years later, in 1957, the general assembly amended Iowa Code section 321.477 to expand the highway commission’s authority so that it included violations relating to registration. 1957 Iowa Acts ch. 160, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 321.477 (1958) ).

Then, in 1974, the general assembly established the IDOT. 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1180, preamble. At that time, "the duties and responsibilities of the state highway commission [...

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