Riley v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Tippecanoe Cnty.

• Decision Date: 21 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 4:14-CV-063-JD,4:14-CV-063-JD
• Citation: Riley v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Tippecanoe Cnty., No. 4:14-CV-063-JD (N.D. Ind. Sep 21, 2017)
• Parties: CHARLES M. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TIPPECANOE COUNTY, and THE TIPPECANOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

CHARLES M. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF TIPPECANOE COUNTY,and THE TIPPECANOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendants.

No. 4:14-CV-063-JD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

September 21, 2017

OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Riley ("Plaintiff") claims that two Tippecanoe Sherriff's Department deputies barred him from entering the Tippecanoe County Courthouse with his alleged service dog in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiff initially asserted these claims (among others) in a September 3, 2014, complaint, but the Court dismissed them, finding that Plaintiff had not adequately alleged that his dog was a service animal, which foreclosed his claims. [DE 12] Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on June 15, 2015. [DE 14] As with the first complaint, Defendants moved to dismiss, this time unsuccessfully. [DE 20]

Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [DE 35] The motion has been fully briefed by the parties and is ripe for review. Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Strike a portion of Plaintiff's affidavit submitted in support of his opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. [DE 44] Plaintiff never responded to the Motion to Strike, and the permissible time in which to do so has long passed.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and subsequently deny the Motion to Strike as moot.¹

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A "material" fact is one identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine issue" exists with respect to any material fact when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Where a factual record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial, and summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, this Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in that party's favor. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); King v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 166 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1999).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The record before the Court is thin. On or about July 14, 2014, Plaintiff went to the Tippecanoe County Courthouse to deliver a victim impact statement in connection with a criminal matter in which he was the victim. [DE 42-1 ¶ 12] Plaintiff brought with him his purported service dog, Bella, and sought to enter the courthouse with her. [DE 35-1 ¶ 4] Bellawas wearing a vest that was labeled with "NSAR Service Animal Certified."² Id. ¶ 4, Exh. 2. Plaintiff received this vest when he registered Bella as an Emotional Support Animal ("ESA") with the NSAR. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. There is some disagreement as to who said what next, but suffice it to say that while he was attempting to enter the courthouse with Bella, Plaintiff produced a photo identification card for her that listed her service type as "ESA." Id. ¶¶ 5-6, Exh. 1. In relevant part, the back of the card states:

ESAs are animals that are necessary for the normal, day-to-day functioning of their emotionally or psychologically disabled handler, facilitating a normalizing effect by their presence. They do not require specific training.

An ESA is not a working service dog under the Americans with disabilities [sic] Act of 1990 and is not granted unlimited access.

Id. at Exh. 1. Based on the card provided by Plaintiff, he was not permitted to enter the courthouse with his dog.³ Id. ¶ 7.

Plaintiff is an Army combat veteran who served in Operation Desert Storm. [DE 42-1 ¶ 1] According to Plaintiff, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") in 1991 by a Dr. Kolbecker at the VA Illiana Medical Center in Danville, Illinois. Id. Plaintiff's PTSD causes him to become agitated and experience anxiety in unfamiliar, tense, or stressful settings. Id. Despite additionally citing problems with his mobility and balance, id. ¶ 2, the only disability Plaintiff claims to suffer from is PTSD [DE 42-2 at 2], and there is no evidence in the record to support the allegation that his mobility and balance issues are in any way related to his PTSD. Plaintiff maintains that he was "classified as permanently and totally disabled due to his service-connected disabilities" in November 2014, several months after the incident at the courthouse. [DE 42-1 ¶ 1]

Plaintiff's medical records indicate that he was treated on occasion for major depressive disorder, mood disorder, family circumstances, and relational problems between June 2013 and March 2015. [DE 35-4] None of the medical records provided state that Plaintiff was either diagnosed with or treated for PTSD during that time, although those records do not necessarily exclude such a diagnosis. Id. However, a letter signed by Plaintiff's psychiatrist, while post-dating the courthouse incident by more than a year, states that Plaintiff "has been receiving treatment at the VA since 1998," has been seeing this particular psychiatrist since June 2012, and "continues to struggle with PTSD symptoms." [DE 42-4] (emphasis added).

Plaintiff acquired Bella in 2011 and had her enrolled in and complete "general private training" at PetSmart in August 2013, but there are no details in the record as to what that training entailed. [DE 42-1 ¶ 8; 35-4 at 3] Plaintiff then registered Bella as an ESA in early September 2013 [DE 35-1, Exh. 1], and personally began to train her to complete certain tasks. Id. ¶ 9. Specifically, Plaintiff trained Bella to: let him know when his clothes dryer had finishedits cycle; open and close doors; pull groceries home from the store; alert him when someone was at the door; turn lights on and off; provide balance support and mobility assistance; help him regain his footing if he fell; get help if required; and calm him during his PTSD episodes. [DE 42-1 ¶ 9; 35-4 at 12] Plaintiff maintains that Bella was fully trained to perform these tasks by July 14, 2014.⁴ Id.

It is against the backdrop of these facts that the Court conducts its analysis.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges in Counts I-IV that The Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County and the Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Department each committed violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by prohibiting Plaintiff from entering the courthouse with Bella. [DE 14 ¶¶ 25-54] Stemming from these allegations, Plaintiff requests reimbursement for the financial losses he suffered as a proximate result of not being able to provide his victim impact testimony, compensatory damages, and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants and their agents from banning service dogs from the courthouse in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.⁵ For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment on these claims.

I. The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

The ADA is a comprehensive civil rights law enacted "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals withdisabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1). Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

The standards under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Acts are the same, and so, in discussing whether the record supports summary judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA claims, the Court will be addressing his Rehabilitation Act claims as well. Gratzl v. Office of Chief Judges of 12th, 18th, 19th, & 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 678 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir.2001)).⁶

To bring a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she is a qualified individual who has a disability as defined by the statute; (2) he or she was excluded from a benefit provided by the public entity; and (3) the exclusion was "by reason of" the disability. Brown v. Dist. 299—Chicago Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083-84 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004) and 42 U.S.C. § 12132). While genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Plaintiff suffered from PTSDat the time of the courthouse incident, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bella was a service animal at that time within the meaning of the ADA.

A. A reasonable factfinder could determine that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability.

One is "disabled" under the ADA if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); see also Carothers v. County of Cook, 808 F.3d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir. 2015). The ADA defines "major life activities" as including, but not limited to, "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

As stated above, the only...