Riley v. Berry Bros. Paint Co.

Decision Date03 June 1940
Docket NumberNo. 58.,58.
Citation292 N.W. 469,293 Mich. 500
PartiesRILEY v. BERRY BROS. PAINT CO. et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Earl Riley, employee, opposed by Berry Bros. Paint Company, employer, and the Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurance carrier. From an award of the Compensation Commission denying compensation, employee appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

I. W. Ruskin, of Detroit, for appellant.

L. J. Carey and Geo. J. Cooper, both of Detroit, for appellees.

NORTH, Justice.

Plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant paint company suffered an inguinal hernia. Admittedly it arsoe out of and in the course of his employment. He petitioned for an award of compensation under the occupational disease amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act, i. e., Act No. 61, Pub.Acts 1937, p. 77. On review before the commission compensation was denied and plaintiff has appealed.

The above cited amendment contains the following:

Sec. 1. * * * (a) The word ‘disability’ means the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employe was last employed;

(b) The word ‘disablement’ means the event of becoming so disabled as defined in sub-paragraph (a) * * *.

Sec. 2. The disablement of an employe resulting from an occupational disease or condition described in the following schedule shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury by accident within the meaning of this act and the procedure and practice provided in this act shall apply to all proceedings under this part [VII], except where specifically otherwise provided herein.'

The schedule in which is set forth 31 disabilities which are compensable contains as the 28th item the following: ‘Hernia . . . Clearly recent in origin and resulting from a strain, arising out of and in the course of employment and promptly reported to the employer.'

Compensation was denied on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the last above quoted portion of the statute in that he did not promptly report to his employer the fact that he had suffered a hernia.

On the date of the inception of plaintiff's affliction, November 4, 1937, he was engaged in lifting buckets of paint, each weighing approximately 40 pounds. That evening he noticed a lump in his groin. The following day he observed a swelling which he suspected might be a rupture. On November 6th plintiff consulted a physician and was advised that he had a hernia. At the suggestion of his physician, about a week later he procured and began wearing a truss. In December he procured a second truss. During this period and until January 5, 1938 plaintiff continued his regular work ‘with the exception of stacking the buckets and anything that might be extra heavy.’ On January 5, 1938, he was laid off from work, and the following day he notified his employer of his disablement. This notice given on January 6th was the first notice to the employer that plaintiff had suffered a hernia on the previous November 4th; notwithstanding plaintiff had been aware of the fact for more than 60 days. The controlling question is whether plaintiff complied with the statutory provision which requires prompt report to the employer.

Plaintiff contends that the statutory words ‘promptly reported to the employer’ refer to the disablement of the employee who suffers a hernia, and that under the above quoted portion of section 1 of part VII of the amended act disablement occurs when the employee is ‘disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employe was last employed.’ On the other hand, defendants urge that the requirement of promptly reporting to the employer refers to the known occurrence of the hernia; that an employee knowing he has such a hernia must promptly report the fact to his employer notwithstanding the employee is able to continue and does continue in his employment; and that in...

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8 cases
  • Amamotto v. J. Kozloff Fish Co.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 17, 1947
    ...record. I cannot escape the conclusion that decision in the instant case is controlled by our former decisions in Riley v. Berry Brothers Paint Co., 293 Mich. 500, 292 N.W. 469;Barclay v. General Motors Corporation, 309 Mich. 534, 16 N.W.2d 64; and Caufield v. Ford Motor Co., 310 Mich. 555,......
  • Barclay v. Pontiac Motor Div., Gen. Motors Corp.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 11, 1944
    ...the hernia was not of recent origin, and denied compensation. On review, the department considered that, although Riley v. Berry Brothers Paint Co., 293 Mich. 500, 292 N.W. 469, involved the question of whether the claimant promptly reported a hernia, this authority was directly in point an......
  • Kasarewski v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 19.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1946
    ...because of the restrictive provision in the statute plaintiff is not entitled to compensation. Our decision in Riley v. Berry Bors. Paint Co., 293 Mich. 500, 292 N.W. 469, 470, was made under the workmen's compensation law as amended in 1937, but the pertinent provisions of the act are in e......
  • Baughman v. Vicker's, Inc.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1949
    ...reported to the employer.’ The interpretation of the clause last quoted was considered by the court in Riley v. Berry Brothers Paint Co., 293 Mich. 500, 503, 292 N.W. 469. See also Finch v. Ford Motor Company, 321 Mich. 469, 32 N.W.2d 712, in which the interpretation of the term ‘disability......
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