Riley v. Conn. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1943
• Citation: Riley v. Conn. Co., 29 A.2d 759, 129 Conn. 554 (Conn. 1943)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RILEY v. CONNECTICUT CO.

29 A.2d 759

129 Conn. 554

RILEY

v. CONNECTICUT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 8, 1943.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; King, Judge.

Action by Catherine Riley against the Connecticut Company to recover for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's trolley car and alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Action tried to the jury and verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Error and new trial ordered.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

Cyril Coleman, of Hartford, for defendant-appellant.

Dennis P. O'Connor, and Edward J. Lonergan, both of Hartford, for plaintiff-appellee.

BROWN, Judge.

The only errors assigned upon this appeal are the court's failure to charge the jury, first, on the rule of due care resting upon the defendant's motorman when confronted by a sudden emergency, and second, on the rule of due care resting upon him as affected by his right to assume that the operators of other vehicles upon the highway would exercise reasonable care.

The following facts are undisputed. On January 4, 1941, the plaintiff was a passenger for hire on a trolley car of the defendant. As the car proceeded south on Main Street in Hartford approaching the intersection of Buckingham Street, the plaintiff sounded the buzzer signal for the next stop, opposite the northwest corner of the two streets. She then arose from her seat, the motorman applied his brakes, bringing the car to a sudden stop, and she was thrown to the floor sustaining the injuries complained of. From the westerly rail of the track to the westerly curb of Main Street was approximately 21 feet.

The plaintiff made the following further claims: as she sounded the buzzer she looked out and saw no automobiles on the street; the trolley was going fast and swaying; it was 50 feet north of the intersection when she stepped into the aisle; the motorman looked back in her direction and then suddenly applied the brakes; and the trolley came to a stop in the center of the intersection. These were the defendant's further claims: the trolley was proceeding at 8 or 10 miles an hour; about 100 feet north of the intersection an automobile was parked near the west curb and on its left a large truck was "double parked"; as the trolley approached this truck, an automobile traveling at high speed overtook the trolley on its right from the rear; the motorman saw it flash by when the trolley was approximately 10 feet behind the truck; immediately in front of the trolley it swerved to the left onto the track to avoid the truck, and continued on; as it passed him the motorman threw on his brakes, brought the trolley to the sudden stop to avoid pinning the automobile against the truck, and so prevented a collision.

The plaintiff's complaint alleged a cause of action for her injuries resulting from the sudden stop due to the negligence of defendant's motorman. As the case was submitted to the jury under the charge, there were two specifications of negligence upon which she relied. One was the speed at which the trolley was being operated, and the other was bringing it to a sudden stop without warning the plaintiff. The court instructed the jury that the violation of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff as defined in the charge, in either or both of these respects, would constitute actionable negligence. It had earlier stated that this duty of the defendant to the plaintiff "was to exercise in the operation of its trolley car the highest degree of care and skill which may be reasonably expected of intelligent and prudent persons engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire on an established trolley line in view of the instrumentalities employed and the dangers reasonably to be apprehended." This definition of the defendant's duty, without modification or qualification in any particular, was the sole standard given the jury for determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was negligent. It was repeatedly referred to by the court in the course of the charge and was again repeated in the conclusion of its instructions upon liability.

The law is well established that a defendant in operating a vehicle upon the highway is entitled to assume that the driver of another vehicle thereon will use due care in his operation of it, until the defendant knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should know that the assumption has become unwarranted. Miller v. Connecticut Co., 112 Conn. 476, 477, 152 A. 879; Johnson v. Shattuck, 125 Conn. 60, 63, 3 A.2d 229; Hubbs v. Edmond, 121 Conn. 506, 509, 186 A. 496; Podziewski v. Gaumond, 124 Conn. 157, 159, 198 A. 569; Gross v. Boston, W. & N. Y. St. Ry. Co., 117 Conn. 589, 596, 169 A. 613; McDowell v. Federal Tea Co., Inc., 128 Conn. 437, 441, 23 A.2d 512. The defendant contends that, testing the charge by the claims of proof of the parties in the finding, as we must (Mavrides v. Lyon, 123 Conn. 173, 174, 193 A. 605), the court erred in defining the defendant's duty as it did without qualification giving the defendant the benefit of this principle. Under the defendant's claims of proof, a vital factor involved in the jury's application of the standard of duty of the defendant, in determining whether it was negligent, was such right as the motorman had to assume that no automobile would overtake and swing onto the track immediately ahead of the trolley as the defendant claims an automobile did. Accordingly, the rule just recited controlling and explaining this right did...