Riley v. Cuomo
| Decision Date | 16 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-cv-01631 (ADS)(AYS) |
| Parties | RUSSELL RILEY, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW CUOMO, in his official capacity as governor of the State of New York, NEW YORK STATE POLICE, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
Christopher Joseph Cassar
Attorney for the Plaintiff
13 East Carver Street
Huntington, NY 11743
By: Christopher J. Cassar, Esq., Of Counsel
Nassau Regional Office
200 Old Country Road
Suite 240
Mineola, NY 11501
By: Christina H. Bedell, Assistant Attorney General
The Plaintiff Russel Riley (the "Plaintiff") brought this federal civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against the Defendants Andrew Cuomo, in his official capacity of the Governor of the State of New York ("Governor Cuomo," the "Governor," or "Cuomo") and the New York State Police (the "NYSP") (collectively, the "Defendants").
Presently before the Court is a motion by the Defendants to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FED. R. CIV. P.") 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion is granted in its entirety.
The following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff's complaint, and for the purposes of the instant motion, are presumed to be true.
The Plaintiff owned and had a valid license for ten firearms. On January 9, 2017, members of the NYSP entered the Plaintiff's home without a warrant and seized ten firearms.
The firearms have not been returned to the Plaintiff, and there has been no hearing regarding the seizure of the firearms.
The Plaintiff makes broad references to the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (the "NY SAFE Act"), but does not explicitly state that his firearms were confiscated as a result of that statute.
On March 23, 2017, the Plaintiff filed his complaint. The complaint alleges that the NY SAFE Act is unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in that it fails to provide gun owners who have had their firearms seized with a hearing. However, the Plaintiff does not seek a declaratory judgment declaring that the NY SAFE Act is unconstitutional. Furthermore, as stated above, he does not explicitly state that his guns were seized because of that statute; or, if they were, how that statute caused his firearms to be seized.
The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the Defendants seized his firearms without a warrant; failed to provide him with a hearing; and illegally obtained statements from him. In those ways, the Defendants allegedly violated Section 1983.
The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of an order stating that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights. He asks that the Court order that the firearms be returned to him. Further, he seeks "a judgment . . . requiring the Defendants to conduct a prompt hearing following the seizure of the property in all cases at which time the Defendants must demonstrate probable cause for the seizure of the property and that it was necessary that the property remain in the custody of the Defendants." (Compl. Wherefore Clause ¶ 3).
The Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief; and a judgment requiring the Defendants to provide notice and a hearing to any future victims of seizures similar to the one experienced by the Plaintiff. The complaint does not explicitly seek damages, but only reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. While the Court notes that the Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss states that "the underlying complaint is not exclusively seeking an award of damages under § 1983," (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 4), a plaintiff is not permitted to amend his complaint by virtue of what is said in a memorandum of law, Uddoh v. United Healthcare, 254 F. Supp. 3d 424, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) . The complaint does not explicitly seek damages, and the Court cannot construe it otherwise.
On September 25, 2017, the Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
The Defendants have moved for dismissal based on sovereign immunity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
As an initial matter, the Court first observes that within the Second Circuit, the question of whether a motion to dismiss made on sovereign immunity grounds should be reviewed under Rule 12(b)(1) or under Rule 12(b)(6) remains unresolved. See Carver v. Nassau Cty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2013) )); see also Garcia v. Paylock, 13-CV-2868 KAM, 2014 WL 298593, at *2 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014) ().
This "distinction is significant," because State Employees Bargaining Agent Coal.v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). As such, in accordance with the approach taken by other district courts within this Circuit, the Court will apply the stricter standard set under Rule 12(b)(6) while analyzing Defendants' sovereign immunity arguments. See Tiraco v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 963 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) () (citations omitted); McMillan v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 10-CV-2502 (JG)(VVP), 2010 WL 4065434, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010) ().
1. The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); Bold Electric, Inc. v. City of New York, 53 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995); Reed v. Garden City Union Free School Dist., 987 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Under the now well-established Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit has explained that, after Twombly, the Court's inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two principles:
First, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for reliefsurvives a motion to dismiss and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
Thus, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and . . . determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Rowland, 494 F.3d at 95 ). The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims against states absent their consent to such a suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 90-100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); see also Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2004). Although the plaintiff generally bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, the entity claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden to prove such. See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2006).
Section 1983 imposes liability for "conduct...
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