Riley v. Delaware River and Bay Authority

• Citation: 457 F.Supp.2d 505
• Decision Date: 25 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. CIVA 05-746 KAJ.,CIVA 05-746 KAJ.
• Parties: Ronald S. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. The DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

457 F.Supp.2d 505

Ronald S. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. The DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

No. CIVA 05-746 KAJ.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

October 25, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James P. Hall, Esq., Phillips, Goldman & Spence, Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiff.

William W. Bowser, Esq., Adria B. Martinelli, Esq., Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JORDAN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before me is a Motion to Dismiss filed by The Delaware River and Bay Authority ("DRBA"), as well as James Johnson, James Walls, Trudy Spence-Parker, and Consuella Petty-Judkins (collectively "Defendants"), all of whom are employees of the DRBA.¹ (Docket Item ["D.I."] 7; the "Motion".) The plaintiff, Ronald S. Riley ("Riley"), alleges that the Defendants have discriminated against him on the basis of his race. (D.I. 1 at ¶ 13.) More particularly, Riley alleges that the Defendants have failed to compensate him adequately for work he has done; that the Defendants have failed to promote him despite his performing duties beyond the Defendants' expectations; and that the Defendants have created a hostile work environment because Riley is an African American. Id. Riley cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, in support of his claims. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 13. He also alleges that the Defendants intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on him by their intentional discrimination. Id. at ¶23. Jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4), and supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part the Defendants' Motion.

II. BACKGROUND²

Riley is an African-American male employed by DRBA as an Airport Operations Clerk. (D.I. 1 at ¶9.) He contends that at all relevant times his job performance and duties have exceeded the job requirements of an operations clerk. (Id. at ¶11.) Riley alleges that the Defendants have failed to provide him with an equal paygrade for the work he performs and have failed to promote him, despite his efforts to apply for promotions. (Id. at ¶ 13.) He also contends that no action has been taken by the Defendants to remedy the alleged inadequacy of his compensation. (Id. at ¶12.) In sum, Riley alleges that the Defendants have discriminated against him on the basis of his race by failing to adequately compensate him, failing to promote him, and by creating a hostile work environment. (Id. at ¶13.) Riley also alleges that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress as a result of their discrimination. (Id. at ¶23.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In analyzing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.1998). "A complaint should be dismissed only if, after accepting as true all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor, no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint." Id. The moving party has the burden of persuasion. See Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007 (1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Claims

1. Jurisdiction

The jurisdictional prerequisites to file a suit under Title VII require plaintiffs to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and receive notification from EEOC of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000(e)-5(f); Paci v. Rollins Leasing Corp., No. 96-295-SLR, 1997 WL 811553, at *5 (D.Del. Dec. 18, 1997). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Robinson v. Dalton, "[a] complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted unless it asserts the satisfaction of the precondition to suit specified by Title VII: prior submission of the claim to the EEOC... for conciliation or resolution." 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting Hornsby v. U.S. Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir.1986)).

Riley's complaint does not state that he satisfied the preconditions to file suit under Title VII. Nevertheless, Riley has submitted evidence that he did comply with those preconditions (D.I. 14 at Ex. A), and there is a "sound and established policy that procedural technicalities should not be used to prevent Title VII claims from being decided on the merits." Paci v. Rollins Leasing Corp., 1997 WL 811553 (D.Del. Dec. 18, 1997) (quoting Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354, 358-59 (3d Cir.1984)). Other courts have held that failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to the commencement of a suit is a curable defect. See, e.g., Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494 (8th Cir.1988) (holding that "receipt of a right-to-sue notice is a condition precedent to a filing of a Title VII claim, curable after the action has commenced").

In Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., supra, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging a racial discrimination violation under Title VII. 744 F.2d at 356. She received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, then filed suit in federal court. The complaint stated that the plaintiff had received the right-to-sue letter and set out in detail the basis for her discrimination claim. Id. The complaint also detailed the factual basis for a retaliatory discrimination claim, even though the EEOC had not yet issued a right-to-sue letter for that claim. Id. The EEOC later issued a rightto-sue letter on the plaintiffs retaliatory discrimination claim. Id. The defendant argued that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII lawsuit and that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required the plaintiff to allege that jurisdictional fact in her complaint. Id. at 356. The Third Circuit held that the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the plaintiffs retaliatory claim on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 355. It reasoned that the letter was not a jurisdictional requirement in the constitutional sense, but rather a statutory requirement that allowed the administrative process an opportunity to move forward before a lawsuit was filed. Id. at 358. The court stated that the statutory requirement was fulfilled when the second right-to-sue letter was issued. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs failure to state the issuance of that second letter did not render the complaint deficient under Rule 8, and the court at no time lacked jurisdiction over the retaliatory discrimination claim. Id.

Here, Defendants argue that the court "has no jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Title VII claim, or alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim" because Riley did not allege in his complaint that he received a right-to-sue letter before filing suit in federal court. (D.I. 8 at 5.) Because Riley now says that he received a right-tosue letter to satisfy the preconditions for filing suit in federal court, I conclude that there is no jurisdictional defect in Riley's claim, nor does Riley's belated submission of the right-to-sue letter constitute a failure to state a Title VII claim. Accordingly, I will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss on that ground.

2. Individual Employees

Title VII claims brought against the individual employees must be dismissed. Individual employees cannot be held liable for discrimination under Title VII. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996), cert denied 521 U.S. 1129, 117 S.Ct. 2532, 138 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1997). Accordingly, I will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Title VII claims brought against the individual employees of the DRBA.

3. Statute of Limitations

A claimant bringing a charge of discrimination under Title VII in Delaware has 300 days from the time of the alleged discriminatory act to file a complaint with the EEOC. Arasteh v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 146 F.Supp.2d 476, 490 (D.Del.2001).³ Dismissal of a Title VII complaint is warranted when the claimant fails to file the charge within this 300-day statute of limitations period. Andrews v. Abbott Lab., No. 00-901, 2002 WL 598458, at *6 (D.Del. April 12, 2002). Riley filed his charge with the EEOC on May 24, 2005. (D.I. 10 at A-8.) Thus, any incidents that occurred before July 29, 2004 may be barred by the 300-day statute of limitations.

In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, supra, the Supreme Court addressed the statute of limitations under Title VII with regard to both allegations of discrete acts of discrimination and allegations of a hostile work environment. 536 U.S. at 110-122, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Court held that "the statute precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period." Id. at 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061. In contrast, the Court also held that "consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability, so long as an act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period." Id. Therefore, an alleged discrete act of discrimination must have occurred within the 300-day statute of limitations period to be considered, while the actions that comprise a hostile environment claim do not have to fall entirely within the 300 days.

a. Discrete Acts of Discrimination

The Court in Morgan explained that, in the context of discrete acts, the term "unlawful employment practice"⁴ under Title VII does not mean a string of related events. Rather a discrete act is exactly what the word "discrete" connotes: a single act...