Riley v. Gen. Motors, LLC

• Docket Number: Case No. 6:22-cv-499-RBD-EJK
• Decision Date: 28 March 2023
• Citation: Riley v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 664 F.Supp.3d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2023)
• Parties: Tom RILEY; Heather Shrum; Gary Ambrose; and Sherry Kilburn, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

664 F.Supp.3d 1336

Tom RILEY; Heather Shrum;Gary Ambrose; and Sherry Kilburn, Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 6:22-cv-499-RBD-EJK

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division

Signed March 28, 2023

Taylor C. Bartlett, Pro Hac Vice, Jeanie Sleadd, Pro Hac Vice, William Lewis Garrison, Jr., Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Steve Jackson, Pro Hac Vice, Jackson and Tucker, PC, Birmingham, AL, Jason Richard Fraxedas, Matthew S. Mokwa, The Maher Law Firm, P.A., Winter Park, FL, for Plaintiffs.

John Nadolenco, I, Pro Hac Vice, Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Archis Ashok Parasharami, Pro Hac Vice, Jonathan Samuel Klein, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Justin B. Weiner, Pro Hac Vice, Bush Seyferth PLLC, Troy, MI, for Defendant.

ORDER

ROY B. DALTON JR., United States District Judge

Before the Court are DefendantGeneral Motors, LLC's ("GM")motions to dismiss(Doc. 47) and compel arbitration (Doc. 35).

BACKGROUND¹

Between 2014 and 2017, Plaintiffs bought cars manufactured by GM.(Doc. 41, ¶¶ 19, 41, 58, 77.)Each car came with a standard three-year, 36,000-mile express limited warranty.(Id.¶¶ 21, 43, 59, 78.)Plaintiffs later noticed deterioration in their cars' paint.(Id.¶¶ 29, 49, 66, 87.)They brought their cars in for repair, but GM refused to fully pay to repair them under the warranty.(Id.¶¶ 30-32, 49-51, 67, 70-72, 87, 89.)

So Plaintiffs sued GM, alleging: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA");(3) equitable and injunctive relief; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) fraud; (6) violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA");(7) strict products liability for design defect; (8) violations of California's unfair competition law; (9) violations of Mississippi's consumer protection law; and (10) negligent misrepresentation.(Id.¶¶ 174-271.)They assert claims on behalf of a putative nationwide class and Florida (Tom Riley and Gary Ambrose), California (Heather Shrum), and Mississippi (Sherry Kilburn) subclasses.(Id.¶ 171.)GM now moves to dismiss on both jurisdictional and failure to state a claim grounds and to compel arbitration for one of the named Plaintiffs.(Docs. 35, 47.)With briefing complete (Docs. 46, 54, 62), the matter is ripe.

STANDARDS & ANALYSIS

I.Jurisdiction

A.Personal Jurisdiction

First, GM moves to dismiss the claims of one of the named Plaintiffs, Sherry Kilburn, for lack of personal jurisdiction.(Doc. 47, pp. 23-25.)The Court looks to the state long-arm statute to find a basis for personal jurisdiction.SeeSculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626(11th Cir.1996).Florida's long-arm statute provides specific² personal jurisdiction in several enumerated ways, such as committing a tort in this state, entering into a contract in this state, or injuring someone in this state.Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1).Here, Kilburn bought her car in Mississippi and lives in Tennessee, and she otherwise alleges no facts to bring her claim within the Florida long-arm statute.(Doc. 41, ¶¶ 11, 77, 87);SeeSmith v. Trans-Siberian Orchestra, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320(M.D. Fla.2010).So Kilburn fails to establish that the Court has personal jurisdiction.Her individual claims and those she raises on behalf of a putative Mississippi subclass (Counts I-V, IX, X) are due to be dismissed and Kilburn terminated as a party.³Counts I-V as brought individually by the other named Plaintiffs and on behalf of nationwide and California and Florida putative classes are addressed below.

B.Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Next, GM moves to dismiss the MMWA class claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the four (now down to three) named Plaintiffs do not meet the MMWA's numerosity requirement for class actions.(Doc. 47, p. 22.)Plaintiffs counter that the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), confers jurisdiction over all the claims.(Doc. 54, pp. 16-19.)

The MMWA allows a federal class action only if the number of named plaintiffs is over 100. 15 U.S.C § 2310(d)(3)(c).Yet CAFA permits a class action where the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars and any member of a class of plaintiffs is diverse from any defendant.28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).The Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on how CAFA, which was enacted after the MMWA, affects the MMWA's 100-plaintiff requirement.But several district courts in this circuit have concluded that allowing CAFA to provide a basis for jurisdiction where the 100-plaintiff rule was not met would impermissibly render parts of the MMWA redundant and override parts without explicit Congressional intent.See, e.g., Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1206-07(S.D. Fla.2021);Inouye v. Adidas Am., Inc., No. 8:22-cv-416, 2023 WL 2351654, at *8-9(M.D. Fla.Mar. 3, 2023);Monopoli v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-1353, 2022 WL 409484, at *6(N.D. Ga.Feb. 10, 2022).

Though there is no binding case law, the Court agrees with the persuasive Lewis opinion that the plain text of the MMWA that requires 100 named plaintiffs for a class action to be brought in federal court is not overridden by CAFA.SeeLewis, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 1206-07.So the MMWA claim(Count II), on behalf of all putative classes, is due to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.⁴The Court will address Riley, Ambrose, and Shrum's individual MMWA claims below.

C.Standing

Rounding out their jurisdictional arguments, GM asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their common law claims on behalf of a putative national class (Counts I-V) because they did not suffer injuries in states other than those where they bought their cars.(Doc. 47, pp. 22-23.)The Court agrees.

Before certifying a class, "the district court must determine that at least one named class representative has Article III standing to raise each class subclaim."Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279-80(11th Cir.2000).Named plaintiffs in class actions are "prohibited from asserting claims under a state law other than that [from] which the plaintiff's own claim arises."Feldman v. BRP US, Inc., No. 17-61150, 2018 WL 8300534, at *6(S.D. Fla.Mar. 28, 2018);SeeWave Length Hair Salons of Fla., Inc. v. CBL & Assocs. Properties, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-206, 2017 WL 10604140, at *5-6(M.D. Fla.Apr. 11, 2017).

The parties agree that the law of the state of purchase governs.(Doc. 47, p. 4 n.3;Doc. 54, p. 19);SeeTershakovec v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1371(S.D. Fla.2021).The remaining named Plaintiffs bought their cars in Florida (Riley and Ambrose) and California (Shrum).(Doc. 41, ¶¶ 19, 41, 58.)So they have standing to bring claims on behalf of putative subclass members who bought cars in those states.Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1279-80.But this does not extend to consumers who bought their cars in other states.SeeWave, 2017 WL 10604140, at *5-6;Feldman, 2018 WL 8300534, at *6.So the claims on behalf of the putative nationwide class in Counts I-V are due to be dismissed.⁵Riley, Ambrose, and Shrum's individual claims and claims on behalf of California and Florida subclasses in those counts are addressed below.

II.Failure to State a Claim⁶

A.Express Warranty & MMWA

First, GM argues the breach of warranty (Count I) and individual MMWA(Count II) claims fail because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege they complied with the warranty terms, specifically, that they presented their cars for repair within the warranty's three-year period.(Doc. 47, pp. 4-6.)Plaintiffs counter that the durational limits on the warranties are unconscionable.(Doc. 54, pp. 5-6.)The Court agrees with GM.

A warranty may limit the remedies available to a buyer.SeeFla. Stat. § 672.316(4);Cal. Com. Code § 2719(1)(a).Such limitations may include a time requirement for making a warranty claim for repair.See, e.g., Brisson v. Ford Motor Co., 349 F. App'x 433, 434(11th Cir.2009)(applying Florida law);Lessin v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:19-cv-1082, 2021 WL 3810584, at *3(S.D. Cal.Aug. 25, 2021)(applying California law).As to unconscionability, a provision is unconscionable when it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.SeePendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1134(11th Cir.2010)(applying Florida law);Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1260(9th Cir.2017)(applying California law).

Here, to obtain repairs under the limited warranty Plaintiffs had to take their cars to an authorized dealer "within the warranty period [ ][to] request the needed repairs."(Doc. 36-1, p. 10;Doc. 36-2, p. 10;Doc. 36-3, p. 10.)But Riley and Shrum fail to allege they sought repairs within the warranty period.(SeeDoc. 41, ¶¶ 30, 49.)And while Ambrose alleges he noticed paint issues while the car was under warranty and the dealership failed to document his concerns, even he does not affirmatively allege that he brought his car to the dealership or requested repairs during the warranty period.⁷(Id.¶ 66.)So their only shot is arguing that the warranty is unconscionable.While Plaintiffs make this argument in their briefing (Doc. 54, pp. 5-6), the Complaint is silent on any allegations that the warranty is unconscionable (seeDoc. 41).To proceed on a claim of unconscionability, Plaintiffs"must plead facts that plausibly support such a claim," and they did not.Trudel v. Lifebit Biotech, No. 8:22-cv-1823, 2022 WL 16695171, at *4(M.D. Fla.Nov. 3, 2022).

So the remainder of Count I (Riley, Ambrose, and Shrum's individual claims and the Florida and California putative subclass claims) and Count II (Riley, Ambrose, and Shrum's individual MMWA claims)⁸ are due to be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.On repleader, Plaintiffs must allege facts to support a showing that the warranty time limits are unconscionable.⁹

B.Equitable and Injunctive Relief

Second, GM argues the claim for equitable and injunctive relief (Count II...