Riley v. Jordan

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: KEA W. RIGGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-00044-KWR-KK
• Decision Date: 18 December 2025
• Citation: Riley v. Jordan, 1:25-cv-00044-KWR-KK (D. N.M. Dec 18, 2025)
• Parties: SHANON S. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. HEATHER JORDAN in her individual and official capacities as the Director of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Administration, Defendant.

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SHANON S. RILEY, Plaintiff, v. HEATHER JORDAN in her individual and official capacities as the Director of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Administration, Defendant.

No. 1:25-cv-00044-KWR-KK

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

December 18, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEA W RIGGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc 36) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 45).

This case arises from a Workers' Compensation Judge's (“Plaintiff”) termination during a meeting with her supervisor (“Defendant”). Defendant terminated Plaintiff despite a formal pretermination hearing process provided by state law. After her termination Plaintiff did not receive a post-termination hearing, and she was ineligible for a hearing available to other career employees. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this current action, seeking legal and equitable relief.

Following the Court's preliminary injunctive order, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Having reviewed the parties' briefing, exhibits, and the relevant law, the Court finds that each motion is well-taken in part. Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on Count I but is entitled to qualified immunity on Count II. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count I. And, although Plaintiff's request for equitable relief is not moot, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate at this time. Therefore, Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions are both GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff challenges the termination of her employment as a Workers' Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) for the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Administration (“WCA”). Doc. 1. (Complaint). Plaintiff argues that she was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment for the WCA's failure to follow the pretermination procedures required under state law. Plaintiff asserted the following claims in her Complaint:

Count I: Procedural Due Process Violation Against Defendant in Individual Capacity

Count II: Substantive Due Process Violation Against Defendant in Individual Capacity

Count III: Request for Preliminary Injunction Against Defendant in Official Capacity

Count IV: Request for Permanent Injunction Against Defendant in Official Capacity

Id. In May 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction, ordering Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff to her pretermination status as a WCJ. Doc. 27. In June 2025, the Court modified the injunction by allowing Defendant to place Plaintiff on administrative leave. Doc. 42. Defendant has appealed the Court's injunctive order, which is pending before the Tenth Circuit. See Doc. 31 (Notice of Appeal). Therefore, only Counts I, II, and IV remain before the Court.

FACTS

Plaintiff Shanon S. Riley served as a WCJ from her appointment on August 20, 2011, to her termination by WCA Director Heather Jordan (“Defendant”) on November 13, 2024. Doc. 2 at 1-2. This action primarily arises from the events leading up to Plaintiff's employment termination.

On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff requested and received two hours of administrative leave for the purpose of voting on Election Day. Doc. 7-1 at 8 (Signed Leave Request Form). Although Plaintiff left work early to vote and arrived at the polling location, she ultimately did not vote. Doc. 19 at 19 (Joint Status Report Stipulations). According to Plaintiff, she mistakenly forgot to amend her timesheet before submitting it. Doc. 36 ¶ 9. As a result, Plaintiff submitted a timesheet with the voting leave. Doc. 50-1 ¶ 7; Doc. 7-1 at 9 (Timesheet). At the time, Plaintiff had accrued over 200 hours of annual leave and 240 hours of sick leave. Doc. 19 at 3.

On November 12, Defendant was informed that public records did not show that Plaintiff voted on Election Day. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 10 (Defendant's Declaration). The next day, Defendant and WCA General Counsel went to Plaintiff's office. Id. ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶ 5 (Plaintiff's Declaration). Although the parties disagree over the exact words said, the parties do not dispute the essential conversation points.

The relevant conversation was brief. See Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶ 6-10. Defendant asked Plaintiff a couple of questions about Plaintiff's voting on Election Day. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶ 6-8. Plaintiff told Defendant she had left to vote and asked if she could provide video footage of the polling location as proof. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶ 6. Defendant told Plaintiff that her employment would be terminated if she could not provide proof of a vote. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶ 7. When Plaintiff replied that she could not provide a voting record because she did not vote, Defendant handed Plaintiff a signed termination letter. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11; Doc. 50-1 ¶¶ 9-10. According to the letter, “[s]uch conduct is a violation of the code of judicial conduct, which requires you to promote integrity and to ‘avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.'” Doc. 35-1 (Termination Letter). The letter further stated that Plaintiff's termination was effective immediately. Id.

When Plaintiff asked if she could speak to someone, WCA General Counsel provided Plaintiff with the contact information of someone in the Governor's office. Doc. 50-1 ¶ 14; Doc. 53 at 3. The meeting ended shortly after, and Plaintiff left. Doc. 50-1 ¶ 16; Doc. 44-1 ¶ 11.

Although Plaintiff attempted to meet with the governor's office, she was unable to secure an inperson meeting. Doc. 50-1 ¶ 17; Doc. 53-1 ¶ 7.

Prior to terminating Plaintiff, Defendant did not submit a complaint to the State Personnel Board (“Board”), provide Plaintiff with a hearing, or otherwise comply with the pretermination procedures required by New Mexico law. Doc. 50 at 4; Doc. 53 at 3.

Plaintiff filed suit on January 14, 2025, seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for deprivation of her property interest in employment without due process of law. Doc. 1. On the date it was filed, Defendant had taken no action to provide Plaintiff with post-termination procedures. See Doc. 44-1 ¶ 14. In early February 2025, the WCA subsequently submitted a complaint to the State Personnel Board. Doc. 44-1 ¶ 15; Doc. 7-1 at 1. In March 2025, the Board dismissed the WCA's complaint for lack of jurisdiction since Plaintiff was no longer a judge. Doc. 14-1.

In February 2025, Defendant made Plaintiff two offers of reinstatement. Doc. 10-1; Doc. 18-1. Plaintiff rejected both offers, stating that they did not restore the status quo and violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Doc. 10-2; Doc. 18-2. After the Court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction, both parties moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment as to Counts I and IV. Doc. 36. Meanwhile, Defendant seeks summary judgment as to Counts I, II, and IV. Doc. 45.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A material fact is a fact that could affect the outcome of the suit. Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 538 (10th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute over a material fact exists if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).

Initially, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016). If the movant meets her initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “set forth specific facts from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” Id. (quoting Libertarian Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2007)). “For dispositive issues on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, he must ‘go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [his] case in order to survive summary judgment.'” Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).

Inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). The proffered evidence “must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.” Cardoso, 490 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006)). At the summary judgment stage, a court's function is to “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

In analyzing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court “must view each motion separately, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07 (10th Cir. 2016).

“Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another.” Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment as to her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 procedural due process claim (Count I) and her request for permanent injunctive relief (Count IV), arguing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and permanent,...