Riley v. Jorgenson

• Decision Date: 22 January 1915
• Docket Number: 3657
• Citation: 35 S.D. 91,150 N.W. 771
• Parties: FRANK O. RILEY, Plaintiff and respondent, v. J. T. JORGENSON, Sheriff of Hamlin County, et al., Defendants and appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

35 S.D. 91, 150 N.W. 771 (1915)

FRANK O. RILEY, Plaintiff and respondent v J. T. JORGENSON, Sheriff of Hamlin County, et al Defendants and appellants South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Hamlin County, SD Hon. Carl G. Sherwood, Judge #3657--Affirmed Hall, Alexander & Purdy, W. N. Skinner Attorneys for Appellants. Hanten & Hanten, Perrett F. Gault Attorneys for Respondent. Opinion filed January 22, 1915

McCOY, P. J.

This action was instituted by respondent, as plaintiff, to perpetually enjoin and restrain appellants, as sheriff and trustee in bankruptcy of one Frank O. Riley, as defendants from selling a certain quarter section of land, claimed to be owned by respondent, at execution sale, as the property of said Frank O. Riley, the husband of respondent. The vital issue in the case was whether respondent or her husband was the owner of said tract of land in 1912, at the time of the entry of judgment and the levying thereunder of said execution. Findings and judgment were in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings and judgment. It appears that in 1891 respondent obtained title to said land by deed from one Upton, and that she and her husband at all times since have occupied said premises as their family home. A witness for defendants testified that in 1910 Frank O. Riley, the husband, showed to him (said witness) a deed of said lands purporting to have been executed and acknowledged by respondent as grantor to said Frank O. Riley as grantee. Both respondent and her husband denied that any such deed was ever signed, executed, or delivered by respondent to her husband. The trial court found that from the time of the execution of the deed by Upton to the time of the trial respondent had been the owner in fee and in possession and entitled to possession of the whole of said premises as her separate property and estate, and that said Frank O. Riley had not at any time any right, title, interest; or estate in or to said premises subject to levy and sale under execution or other process. We are of the view that the evidence was amply sufficient to sustain this finding.

It is also contended by appellants that the findings are not sufficient to support the judgment and that the court did not make findings upon material issues. We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. We are of the view'...