Riley v. Narragansett Pension Bd.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-272-Appeal.,WC 19-445 |
| Citation | 275 A.3d 545 |
| Parties | Kristin RILEY et al. v. The NARRAGANSETT PENSION BOARD. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq., for Plaintiffs.
Aaron L. Weisman, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
The Narragansett Pension Board (the Board) appeals from a September 28, 2020 judgment of the Washington County Superior Court permanently reinstating plaintiff Matthew Riley's pension.1 The Board contends on appeal that Code of Ordinances, Town of Narragansett, Rhode Island, Supp. No. 13, § 58-36 (Sept. 18, 2019) (),2 is not unconstitutionally vague; that "this matter should be remanded to the pension board for a rehearing with the newly enacted rules and procedures;" and that, if the issue of the award of attorneys’ fees is considered to be ripe for this Court's consideration, the Superior Court's award of attorneys’ fees should be vacated.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate in part the judgment of the Superior Court.3
According to the amended verified complaint filed on January 30, 2020 (the amended complaint), Matthew was a police officer with the Narragansett Police Department for twenty-eight years prior to his retirement in June of 2017. The amended complaint further provided that, on or about October 5, 2017, Matthew was indicted by a federal grand jury for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470, which criminalizes knowingly transferring "obscene matter to another individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, knowing that such other individual has not attained the age of 16 years * * *." On or about March 15, 2019, he pled guilty to that indictment.
The then-Acting Town Manager and Police Chief in the Town of Narragansett (the Town), Sean Corrigan, sent a letter to Matthew informing him that, at an upcoming meeting of the Board, the Town's solicitor would "present a request of the pension board to enact the provisions of Town Ordinance Sec. 58-36 entitled Benefits Forfeited * * *." In due course, the Board ultimately held a hearing on August 14, 2019 to determine whether or not to revoke Matthew's pension under the pension revocation ordinance. The pension revocation ordinance provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Any member who, at or after retirement, is found guilty by the pension board of misfeasance or malfeasance during service with the town and who, but for retirement, would have been discharged or removed from such service therefore shall not be entitled to a retirement allowance under this section." Section 58-36.
As discussed in more depth infra , the trial justice found that numerous procedural due process violations occurred during that August 14, 2019 hearing. The Board ultimately voted at the close of the hearing to revoke Matthew's pension benefits.4
On August 27, 2019, the Rileys filed a verified complaint (the initial complaint) in the Superior Court. In that complaint, they sought review, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 36-10.1-5,5 of the decision of the Board to revoke Matthew's pension and to "deny Kristin's right to all or a portion of Matthew's pension as an innocent spouse" (Count One). The initial complaint further included the following counts: (1) a count alleging violation of the Rileys’ due process rights (Count Two); (2) a count seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that the pension revocation ordinance required that any "misfeasance or malfeasance be in connection with the individual's job" and that Kristin was "entitled to all or a portion of Matthew's pension benefits as an innocent spouse" (Count Three); (3) a count seeking injunctive relief (Count Four); and (4) a count seeking an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 92 of title 42 (EAJA) (Count Five). In their initial complaint, the Rileys sought a temporary restraining order and further sought preliminary and permanent injunctions "enjoin[ing] the defendant from carrying forth its decision to revoke the Rileys’ pension benefits until such time that this court has an opportunity to review and decide the allegations set forth in [the] complaint."
A hearing with respect to the request for a preliminary injunction was held before the trial justice on September 18, 2019. At the outset of the hearing, plaintiffs suggested that, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,6 the hearing be consolidated with a trial on the merits. The trial justice agreed with that suggestion, although she indicated that the attorneys’ fees issue would be decided at a separate hearing, if necessary. It is also of note that at that hearing, the Board stated that, if there were any "procedural defects" in the proceeding before the Board, then the case should be remanded to the Board rather than having the trial justice simply reverse the Board's decision.
After that September 18 proceeding, on November 4, 2019, the trial justice issued an initial bench decision, in which she granted the preliminary injunction. She also directed both parties to provide her with supplemental memoranda regarding the constitutionality of the pension revocation ordinance.
In due course, the parties submitted memoranda addressing the constitutionality of the pension revocation ordinance; and, on January 30, 2020, the Rileys filed the amended complaint, which added a count contending that the pension revocation ordinance was unconstitutional and void for vagueness (Count Six).
On June 10, 2020, the trial justice issued a lengthy written decision, concluding that the Board had violated the Rileys’ due process rights in several respects and declaring the pension revocation ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, she reversed the decision of the Board and ordered the permanent reinstatement of Matthew's pension.
With respect to the issue of procedural due process—i.e., whether or not plaintiffs had been provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard—the trial justice began by holding that Matthew had a protected property interest in his pension. See Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 348, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) () (internal quotation marks omitted). She then held that the letter sent to Matthew from the then-Acting Town Manager and Police Chief was constitutionally insufficient notice because it was not sent by the Board but by the then-Acting Town Manager and Police Chief, who eventually appeared before the Board as a witness at the hearing concerning the possible revocation of Matthew's pension. The trial justice noted that the letter also failed to advise Matthew of the basis of the Town's potential action or indeed what the Town intended to do—viz ., to seek to have his pension revoked. She added that the letter did not specify what would be the burden of proof at the hearing, which would enable the Rileys "to prepare an adequate defense."
The trial justice then turned to whether or not plaintiffs had been given an opportunity to be heard. See Mathews , 424 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 893. She stated that the Board "was required to provide Plaintiffs with an impartial evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to present their case and confront adverse witnesses before making its determination;" and she then held that the Board had failed to do so. She stated that, at the hearing before the Board, there was a "complete lack of procedure and protocol" and that the record was "riddled with statements by Pension Board members indicating their lack of knowledge of the nature and legal purpose of the hearing and its protocol." The trial justice also noted that the Board "denied Mrs. Riley her opportunity to present evidence in support of her position" to the effect that she was entitled to some portion of her husband's pension as an innocent spouse.
The trial justice went on to state that the due process violations at the hearing before the Board also consisted of the following: (1) Board members "were provided potentially relevant documents for their review and consideration before the pension revocation hearing;" (2) the Town failed to present its case at the hearing; (3) the Assistant Solicitor performed conflicting roles, acting as both an advisor to the Board and as the presenter of the Town's case to the Board; (4) certain Board members and the Assistant Solicitor made remarks indicating their bias against Mr. Riley; (5) the "pension revocation hearing was tainted from the start" with a statement by a member of the Town Council (which body appoints members of the Board), in which that member told the Board that the Town Council had "already weighed in" and that the Board could not "supersede the Town Council;" (6) plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to cross-examine that member of the Town Council; and (7) the Board's decision revoking Matthew's pension was "not supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law."
The trial justice also specifically referenced the evidence before the Board, stating that the Board relied upon inadmissible hearsay evidence in reaching its decision. According to the trial justice's decision, three exhibits were entered at the hearing before the Board—"a memorandum by Major Fleming of the Rhode Island [State] Police Department to Colonel Manni detailing the federal case against Mr. Riley; a memorandum from Acting Town Manager and Police Chief Sean Corrigan to the Pension Board regarding Mr. Riley's conviction; and a printout from the federal PACER website offered as proof of Mr. Riley's conviction." She noted that Major Fleming's...
To continue reading
Request your trial