Riley v. People 

• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Citation: Riley v. People , 266 P.3d 1089 (Colo. 2011)
• Decision Date: 19 December 2011
• Docket Number: 09SC1054
• Parties: Anthony Douglas RILEY, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

266 P.3d 1089

Anthony Douglas RILEY, Petitioner

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 09SC1054.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Dec. 19, 2011.

Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Stephen C. Arvin, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Riley, 240 P.3d 334 (Colo.App.2009), affirming petitioner Anthony Douglas Riley's convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter, reckless second degree assault, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer. The court of appeals, relying on its interpretation of this Court's opinion in People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo.1984), concluded that the trial court erred when it declined to submit Riley's suggested multiple assailants instruction to the jury. The court of appeals determined, however, that the error was harmless. It thus affirmed Riley's convictions.

We conclude that the trial court did not err when it rejected Riley's multiple assailants instruction because Jones does not require the instruction in this instance. We thus affirm the court of appeals' judgment upholding Riley's convictions, but reject the court of appeals' holding that the trial court erred in refusing to submit Riley's multiple assailants instruction to the jury.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Riley testified that he was shopping at an EZ Market in Aurora in January 2006. He became involved in a verbal confrontation with a female shopper, Nisa Peelman, after Peelman allegedly touched Riley in an inappropriate way. Riley then left the store. Shortly thereafter, Peelman and her brother, Gabriel Velasquez, walked out of the store. Velasquez and Riley exchanged words and a verbal altercation resulted. The two men began physically wrestling when the argument became more hostile. During the tussle, Velasquez told Peelman to “grab the heat from the truck.” Riley believed that the term “heat” meant a gun. Riley then pulled out a small knife from his pocket and “swung it” at Velasquez, hitting Velasquez in the neck, but failing to damage any vital structures.

Velasquez told Peelman to “[r]un for [her] life,” but she instead walked toward Riley, yelling at him to leave Velasquez alone and come get her instead. Riley tried to stab Peelman with the knife, but only grazed her neck. Peelman testified that Riley also punched her several times in the head and face until she ran away. Riley testified that he fled the scene when he heard Velasquez again tell Peelman “to grab the heat from the truck.”

The prosecution charged Riley with attempted second degree murder as to Velasquez, first degree assault as to Velasquez, menacing as to Peelman, attempted second degree assault as to Peelman, and a crime of violence. Riley argued at trial that his actions were justified because he acted in self-defense to fend off both Velasquez and Peelman. He also tendered a jury instruction to the trial court describing self-defense in the context of a multiple assailants situation. The instruction read:

The totality of the circumstances, including the number of person[s] reasonably appearing to be threatening the defendant, must be considered by the jury in evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the necessity of defensive action, and the reasonableness of the force used by him to defend against the apparent danger.

The trial court rejected the instruction. It found that the multiple assailants instruction was unnecessary because the trial court already “told the jury that the defendant has the right to act on appearances” when it gave an instruction regarding apparent necessity. The apparent necessity instruction, Instruction 21, stated:

When a person has reasonable grounds for believing, and does in fact actually believe, that danger of his being killed or receiving great bodily injury is imminent, he may act on such appearances and defend himself. A person may act on such appearances, even to the extent of taking a human life when necessary, although it may turn out that the appearances were false, or although he may have been mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger.

Apparent necessity, if well-grounded and of such character as to appeal to a reasonable person under similar conditions and circumstances, as being sufficient to require action, justifies the application of self-defense to the same extent as actual or real danger.

The trial court also instructed the jury on the law of self-defense. The first self-defense instruction related to self-defense as an affirmative defense and is not relevant to our analysis. The second, Instruction 20, provided the pattern law of self-defense in Colorado. It read:

It is an affirmative defense to the crimes of Attempted Second Degree Murder, First Degree Assault, Second Degree Assault Causing Bodily Injury, Menacing, Attempted Second Degree Assault and Attempted Third Degree Assault that the defendant used physical force upon another person

1. In order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believed to be the imminent use of unlawful physical force by the victim, and

2. the defendant used the degree of force which he reasonably believed to be necessary for that purpose.

Self-defense is not an affirmative defense to the crimes of Attempted Manslaughter–Reckless, Attempted Second Degree Assault–Reckless or Third Degree Assault done negligently. However, you may consider the evidence presented on this issue as it relates to the question of whether the defendant acted “recklessly” or with “criminal negligence,” as required for the commission of those crimes.

The jury convicted Riley of the lesser included charges of attempted reckless manslaughter against Velasquez, of reckless second degree assault against Velasquez, and of the crime of violence sentence enhancer. It acquitted Riley of all other charges. Riley appealed the convictions to the court of appeals. He argued that the trial court failed to accurately instruct the jury on the law of self-defense in a multiple assailant situation when it rejected Riley's tendered multiple assailants instruction.¹

The court of appeals held that the trial court erred when it rejected the multiple assailants instruction. Riley, 240 P.3d at 339–40. It determined that the pattern jury instruction on self-defense, standing alone, did not accurately state the law of self-defense against multiple assailants because the instruction's phrase “by the victim” limits the jury's self-defense analysis to a single assailant. Id. at 339.

The court of appeals went on to conclude, however, that the trial court's perceived error was harmless. Id. at 341. It reasoned that the instructions taken as a whole directed the jury to consider the totality of the circumstances, including the multiple assailants. Id. at 340. It also held that the apparent necessity instruction appropriately directed the jurors to focus not solely on the actions of a single alleged victim, but rather on whether Riley had reasonable grounds for believing that he was facing imminent danger of death or injury. Id. That instruction, the court of appeals found, did not specifically limit the jury to considering only the danger posed by Velasquez. Id.

The court of appeals also distinguished this case from Jones during its harmless error analysis. Id. at 341. It reasoned that “[u]nlike in Jones, neither the prosecutor nor the court suggested to the jury that it could not properly take into account defendant's evidence that he had to defend himself against multiple assailants and was entitled to use a degree of force he reasonably believed necessary for that purpose.” Id.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court did not commit reversible error by rejecting the defendant's tendered instruction concerning multiple assailants.

II. Standard of Review

The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on all matters of law applicable to the case. People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 343 (Colo.2001) (citing Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 957 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo.1998)). An appellate court will review jury instructions de novo to determine whether the instructions accurately informed the jury of the governing law. People v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883, 893 (Colo.App.2009), aff'd, 255 P.3d 1032 (Colo.2011); People v. Lucas, 232 P.3d 155, 162 (Colo.App.2009). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense. People v. Tippett, 733 P.2d 1183, 1195 (Colo.1987). It is not error, however, for a trial court to refuse to give a defense theory instruction when the contents of that instruction are embodied in other instructions given by the trial court. Id. We consider all of the instructions given by the trial court together to determine whether they properly informed the jury. People v. Trujillo, 83 P.3d 642, 645 (Colo.2004); Tippett, 733 P.2d at 1195.

III. Analysis

We hold that the court of appeals properly affirmed Riley's convictions. We also hold that the court of appeals was incorrect when it found that the trial court erred by rejecting Riley's tendered multiple assailants instruction because the instructions given by the trial court accurately instructed the jury on the law of self-defense in this multiple assailants situation. We first briefly describe the law of self-defense in the multiple assailants context, and then discuss why the jury instructions here were sufficient.

A. Self–Defense Against Multiple Assailants

In general, a person is justified in using physical force to defend himself or a third person from what he “reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force” against him by another person. § 18–1–704(1), C.R.S. (2011). The person exercising the right to self-defense “may...