Riley v. Riley

• Decision Date: 27 August 1952
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 94
• Parties: RILEY et al. v. RILEY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 432

60 So.2d 432

257 Ala. 636

RILEY et al. v. RILEY.

7 Div. 94.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 27, 1952.

A. L. Crumpton, Ashland, for appellants.

Dempsey & Hardegree, Ashland, for appellee.

The following charges were given at plaintiff's request:

'4. The Court charges the jury that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, H. D. Riley, was in possession of the real estate at the time of and prior to the time these defendants entered into possession of same, either by contract with this plaintiff, or as tenants at will or as tenants at sufferance, that in that event, your verdict must be for this plaintiff for the land involved in this suit.

'8. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that one W. M. Riley was the person in possession of the real estate sued for in this suit prior to the acquisition of same by the Town of Lineville, Alabama, and that immediately after the plaintiff acquired same from said Town of Lineville, Alabama, the said W. M. Riley surrendered possession of same to the said plaintiff, H. D. Riley, and further, that said plaintiff, H. D. Riley, has remained in the continuous possession of same since that time, then, in that event, your verdict must be for the plaintiff for the real estate sued for in this suit.'

LAWSON, Justice.

This is a proceeding in the nature of unlawful detainer under Title 31, Chapter 3, §§ 35-45, Code 1940, brought by H. D. Riley against his brother and sister, John T. and Ethel Riley.

From an adverse judgment in the justice court, the defendants there appealed to the circuit court, where the proceedings were transacted de novo. In the circuit court a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of H. D. Riley. Judgment was in accord with the verdict. Their motion for new trial having been overruled, John T. and Ethel Riley have appealed to this court.

In the justice of the peace court the defendants, John T. and Ethel Riley, admitted 'that they had been given legal notice to terminate their right of possession of the property sued for, and had been given legal notice for demand of possession of said property * * *' When the cause came on for trial in the circuit court the defendants admitted that the notice to terminate and demand for possessin were timely served on them, but they objected to their admission in evidence on the sole ground that H. D. Riley had signed the notice and demand as owner of the premises rather than as landlord. The action of the trial court in overruling their objections is assigned as error.

We have treated Chapter 3, Title 31, Code 1940, as relating to an action by a landlord against a tenant. Garrett v. Reid, 244 Ala. 254, 13 So.2d 97; Glenn v. Nixon, 248 Ala. 569, 28 So.2d 718; Cranford v. Lawrence, 252 Ala. 455, 41 So.2d 405. Yet, the word 'landlord' is not used in that chapter. The word 'owner' is used. We think the ground of objection interposed to the introduction in evidence of the notice and demand is hypercritical. The objection based on that ground were overruled without error.

The rule in respect to a motion by a defendant to exclude all the plaintiff's evidence is that the trial court will not be put in error for refusing the motion, nor will it be put in error for granting it if the evidence does not make a prima facie case. Hamilton v. Browning, Ala.Sup., 57 So.2d 530; Stevens v. Deaton Truck Line 256 Ala. 229, 54 So.2d 464; Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co., 245 Ala. 123, 16 So.2d 406; Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Mills v. Little, 222 Ala. 605, 133 So. 710.

Error is assigned because of the trial court's refusal to give the following written charge requested by the defendants: 'The court charges the jury that if you believe the evidence in this case your verdict must be in favor of the defendants.' This charge was properly refused if the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury as to either of the defendants. Yarbrough v. Armour & Co., 31 Ala.App. 287, 15 So.2d 281.

The property involved in this suit belonged to the father of these parties. He came into possession in about 1915. It consists of a home and several acres of tillable land. Plaintiff never lived on the property, as he had married and established his own home prior to the time his father acquired the suit property. On the other hand, the defendants lived in the home on the property as members of the family. The suit property was sold for taxes in 1931 and it seems that the Town of Lineville, Clay County, became the purchaser. In 1934 the plaintiff, H. D. Riley, obtained a deed to the property from the Town of Lineville.

There are tendencies of the evidence going to show that from 1934 until their deaths the father and mother occupied the home as tenants at will of plaintiff. Plaintiff paid the taxes on the property and made improvements on the house. As to the farm land, the evidence tends to show that it has been in possession of plaintiff through other tenants. The mother of these parties died in January, 1946, and the evidence tends to show that from that time until the notice to quit was served upon the defendants they occupied the home as tenants at will of plaintiff.

We have set out the tendencies of the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as under the rule we must do when insistence is made by defendants below that they were entitled to the affirmative charge. Duke v. Gaines, 224 Ala. 519, 140 So. 600; Hamilton v. Browning, supra.

We have said that the procedure provided by Chapter 3, Title 31, supra, is in the nature of an action in unlawful detainer and is intended to afford a more speedy remedy to a landlord to recover possession of his land after the expiration of the term of the lease or right of possession by the tenant. Williams v. Prather, 236 Ala. 652, 184 So. 473; Garrett v. Reid, supra; Glenn v. Nixon, supra. The general principles which relate to actions of unlawful detainer have application to actions brought under Chpater 3, Title 31, supra.

The fact that the evidence did not show a contract of rental for a definite term did...