Riley v. South Carolina
| Decision Date | 25 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. C.A 9:99-728-20RB.,C.A 9:99-728-20RB. |
| Citation | 82 F.Supp.2d 474 |
| Parties | Nathaniel C. RILEY II, Petitioner, v. State of SOUTH CAROLINA; and Charles M. Condon, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Nathaniel C. Riley II, petitioner pro se.
Charles M. Condon, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, for defendant.
This matter is before the court for review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Wallace W. Dixon made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. Nathaniel C. Riley, II ("Riley"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dixon recommends that the respondents' motion for summary judgment be granted. For the reasons below, the court adopts the magistrate judge's recommendation, grants the respondents' motion for summary judgment, and dismisses Riley's petition.
On June 30, 1997, Riley was convicted on indictments for purchasing crack cocaine in violation of S.C.Code § 44-53-375, purchasing crack cocaine within one-half mile of an elementary school in violation of section 44-53-445, and assaulting a police officer. Riley was sentenced to fifteen years for purchasing crack cocaine, one year concurrent for purchasing crack cocaine within the proximity of a school, and one year concurrent for resisting arrest.1 He was represented by a public defender.
Riley appealed and was represented by the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense. His counsel filed a no-merit Anders brief, but the South Carolina Court of Appeals directed briefing on the issues of double jeopardy and conflict of interest. In addition to counsel's brief (which only addressed the double jeopardy and conflict issues), Riley submitted a supplemental brief that also addressed the issues of unlawful arrest and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On December 2, 1998, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The court's opinion examined the double jeopardy and conflict issues but ignored the unlawful arrest and subject matter jurisdiction issues. Riley petitioned for a writ of certiorari and raised the double jeopardy, conflict, unlawful arrest, and subject matter jurisdiction issues. The South Carolina Supreme Court denied the petition on May 14, 1999.
On March 19, 1999, Riley filed the instant petition, alleging four grounds for relief: (1) double jeopardy; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest; (3) unlawful arrest due to a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (4) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 1, 1999, the respondents moved for summary judgment. On August 2, 1999, Riley filed materials in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On November 22, 1999, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition. On December 10, 1999, Riley filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation.2
The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Riley's seventy-seven page filing objects to the magistrate judge's recommendations on all four grounds. Therefore, the court will review the petition de novo.
In order for Riley to prevail on a 2254 petition, he must demonstrate that the state court's "adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This provision "places at least three limitations upon the availability of federal habeas relief: the petitioner must demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his federal claim was (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of (2) clearly established federal law (3) as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 869 (4th Cir.1998). These requirements are essentially met "when the state courts have decided the question by interpreting or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable." Id. at 870.
Riley claims that the convictions and sentences for purchasing crack cocaine in violation of S.C.Code § 44-53-375(B) ("section 375(B)") and for purchasing crack cocaine in the proximity of a school in violation of S.C.Code § 44-53-445(B)(3) ("section 445(B)(3)") violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V (). "Double jeopardy, rather than being a single doctrine, is actually comprised of three separate though related rules, prohibiting (1) re-prosecution for the same offense following acquittal, (2) re-prosecution for the same offense following conviction, and (3) multiple punishment for the same offense." Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 643-44 (4th Cir.1967).
Riley has had only one trial, and therefore the third rule is at issue in the instant petition. Applying this rule, it initially must be determined whether the offenses at issue are the "same offense." If not, then the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply. The test for determining whether two offenses are the same is as follows: "The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under this test, the two statutory provisions are the same offense because all the elements necessary to convict Riley under section 375(B) — (1) purchase (2) of crack cocaine — are present in section 445(B)(3) — (1) purchase (2) of crack cocaine (3) in the proximity of a school.
However, there are times when failing the "same offense" test does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The assumption of the Blockburger rule is that the legislature does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). This presumption, however, can be overcome if there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). In essence, "[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Id.
In the instant case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Riley's double jeopardy claim, citing to (1) Blockburger; (2) Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1990), from which the court cited a parallel proposition to Missouri v. Hunter: "[T]he Blockburger rule is not controlling when legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history"; and (3) State v. Brown, 319 S.C. 400, 461 S.E.2d 828, 832 (1995), from which the court cited the following language: "We wish to emphasize that there is no prohibition against the contemporaneous prosecution by the State for both possession with intent to distribute and distribution of crack cocaine and the related school charges where, like this case, they arise out of the same conduct."
Although not explicitly stated, the South Carolina court clearly felt that the legislature's intent was for the two separate statutes, sections 375(B) and 445(B)(3), to punish the same offense. Indeed, evidence of this intent exists in the fact that section 375(B) imposes imprisonment for not more than fifteen years for a first offense, twenty-five years for a second offense, and thirty years for a third offense; whereas section 445(B)(3) imposes imprisonment for not more than one year. The existence of section 445(B)(3) would completely undermine section 375(B) unless the legislature intended them to be separate offenses that impose cumulative punishment. In addition, section 445 has since been changed to read "it is a separate criminal offense" rather than "it is unlawful" (as it said when Riley was indicted). This change further represents the intent for section 445 to impose punishment that is cumulative to punishment under section 375.
In conclusion, it cannot be said that the South Carolina court's "adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In fact, its decision was entirely consistent with a reasonable application of federal law. Thus, Riley cannot obtain relief under the first ground of his section 2254 petition.
Riley claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel...
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