Riley v. State, 6 Div. 873

CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals
Citation501 So.2d 551
Docket Number6 Div. 873
PartiesJason William RILEY, Jr. v. STATE.
Decision Date14 October 1986

G. Thomas Sullivan, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Rivard Melson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

Appellant, Jason William Riley, Jr., was convicted of the murder of Deborah Jo Beason, as proscribed by § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. The court sentenced appellant to a term of life imprisonment in the State penitentiary.

On the afternoon of August 5, 1980, the body of Deborah Jo Beason was found in her Birmingham apartment. She had been stabbed and strangled. An electrical extension cord was wrapped around her neck several times and tied to a refrigerator in the apartment. The cause of death was determined to be the stab wounds and/or strangulation.

A police investigation led to appellant's arrest on August 6, 1980. Appellant made several statements to police authorities following his arrest and wrote a letter to Circuit Judge Charles Nice in which he admitted killing Beason and another female, Tina Nagy, in Jacksonville, Florida. On appeal appellant contests the introduction into evidence of his second and third statements and the letter to Judge Nice.

Appellant's first statement, which is not challenged, was made on August 6, following his arrest and after proper Miranda warnings. This statement was tape recorded and later transcribed. In this statement, appellant admitted being with Beason the night of August 4 and he admitted being with her in her apartment at approximately 6:10 a.m. on the morning of August 5. According to appellant, Beason had been having problems with a man called "Truck," who was to return to Beason's apartment that morning. Beason asked appellant to depart in order that he not get involved in "a hassle" with Truck; and Beason requested that appellant return "in about an hour or so" to check on her. Appellant stated that he departed and did not return because he could not locate her apartment thereafter.

I

On August 8, 1980, following proper Miranda warnings, appellant was shown a green satchel that appellant's wife had obtained from the motel room where appellant was staying when he was arrested. This satchel contained items of jewelry, which appellant stated belonged to himself and his wife. At trial, it was established that certain items found in the satchel belonged to Beason. Appellant also stated that he was born in California, that his parents were deceased, that he had no brother or sister, and that he was raised by an aunt who sexually abused him. (At trial, appellant's mother testified that all of this was untrue.) Appellant was further questioned regarding Beason's murder and he was requested to make a taped statement. Appellant agreed to make a taped statement, but then he decided he would prefer to write a statement. This handwritten statement was as follows:

"8-8-80

2:35 p.m.

"I was read my rights and fully understand them.

"I left the Blazer Grill with Truck and Debby and then went to Debby's apt. On the way we stopped and Truck forced Debby into intercourse. Then we went on to her apt. where Truck dropped Debby and me off.

"I went in with her and she put her hand on my crotch. I walked to the couch and sat down, then Debby sat beside me and grabbed me again. I got up to leave and she grabbed my arm insisting that I stay and "FUCK" her. The voice I heard was that of the Aunt who raised me. I swung around and hit her with my right arm and knocked her down. I remember speaking to a man in front of her house and then being a block away from Mama's kitchen.

"Jason W. Riley, Jr."

Prior to writing this statement, appellant requested that the police officers allow him to "speak to a district attorney." Birmingham Police Sergeant George T. Grubbs testified that when appellant made the request, Grubbs stated, "Do you want a district attorney or do you want to talk to an attorney?" Appellant replied, "I want to talk to a district attorney." Grubbs then contacted assistant district attorneys Bob Cahill and Ken Gomany. The assistant district attorneys arrived as appellant was writing his statement.

Appellant argues that his request for a district attorney was, in fact, a request for a public defender, and, therefore, that the statement was obtained in contravention of his right to counsel, guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1960), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). We find absolutely no support for this contention in the record. Appellant was clearly asked whether he wanted an attorney or a district attorney, to which he reaffirmed his desire for a district attorney. Appellant did not testify for the limited purpose of suppressing the statement, nor is there any other testimony which contradicts the testimony of Grubbs. We find, from the record, that appellant at no time attempted to invoke his right to counsel, and, therefore, that the statement was properly admitted into evidence.

II

On August 22, 1980, Officer Don Warren, of the Jacksonville, Florida, Police Department, arrived in Birmingham to interview appellant. Warren suspected that appellant was an individual known to him as John Edward Traylor (appellant's given name) and Elton Levon Fairchild (an alias used by appellant), who was wanted in Florida for the murder of Tina Nagy.

Sergeant James E. Gay, of the Birmingham Police Department, accompanied Warren when appellant was questioned. Appellant was questioned at the district attorney's office rather than at the city jail. According to Gay, appellant was informed that he would be questioned about both the Beason and Nagy murders during the interview. Warren read appellant his Miranda rights, and appellant then signed a waiver of rights form. Appellant admitted that he killed Nagy, and then wrote a statement for Warren concerning the Nagy homicide. Warren then asked appellant about the Beason homicide, and appellant stated that, "he killed Debbie also." According to Gay, appellant stated that he and Beason were engaged in sexual activity when Beason began "moaning and groaning," and the sound reminded him of Nagy, at which point he obtained a knife and stabbed her in the chest and back. Following this disclosure, Grubbs was called in and appellant reaffirmed his confession to the two murders.

Gay testified that, around this time period, they took a lunch break. Appellant requested that he be allowed to contact his wife, who was then a patient at University Hospital in the psychiatric unit. Appellant gave Gay the phone number, and Gay contacted the hospital. Gay left a message for Mrs. Riley, who returned the call several minutes later. Appellant and his wife engaged in a lengthy conversation, lasting approximately one hour, in which appellant told his wife that his real name was John Edward Traylor, and that while serving time in prison, he had changed his name to Elton Levon Fairchild. Appellant also told his wife about the Nagy and Beason homicides. Gay dictated the substance of appellant's conversation, and these notes were used at the suppression hearing to relate what appellant had stated.

After the lunch break ended and appellant had talked with his wife, Gay requested that appellant make a taped statement. Appellant declined to make a taped statement, but agreed to write one. Appellant's attorney, Pete Johnson, arrived before appellant put his statement in writing. After appellant conferred with Johnson, no further statement was made, and appellant did not reduce his prior statement to written form.

(a)

Appellant raises three issues regarding the admissibility of his oral statements made on August 22, 1980. Appellant first contends that he received no Miranda warnings regarding the Beason homicide. This factual contention is without merit. Appellant was clearly informed of his Miranda rights prior to being questioned about the Nagy and Beason homicides. Gay recited the warnings given to appellant by Warren, and those rights were in full compliance with Miranda. According to Gay, appellant signed a written waiver form provided by Warren; however, this form was not introduced into evidence.

Appellant also contends that he was not informed that the Beason homicide would be discussed, and that he should, therefore, have been given a second set of Miranda warnings. We find no merit to this contention. Gay testified that appellant was informed at the beginning of the interview that he would be questioned about both homicides. There is nothing in the record to substantiate appellant's claim that he was not so informed.

(b)

Appellant next contends that the statements made on August 22 should have been excluded because police authorities were aware that appellant was represented by counsel, and yet proceeded to question him without contacting his counsel. It is argued that the interview was conducted in violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

In Jackson v. State, [Ms. 6 Div. 767, April 9, 1985] (Ala.Cr.App.1985), we recognized that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel may apply in different contexts, and have different purposes. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1976); Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him--'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' " Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398, 97 S.Ct. at 1239. Once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, the Sixth...

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5 cases
  • Traylor v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1992
    ...murder and orally to the Alabama murder. He was tried and convicted of second-degree murder for the Alabama crime, Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), and was temporarily returned to Florida in March 1983 and charged by indictment with first-degree murder for the Nagy Prior t......
  • State v. Reese
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1990
    ...in addition to this warning. Boggs, 634 S.W.2d at 452-53; State v. Chandler, 605 S.W.2d 100, 111-17 (Mo. banc 1980); Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551, 554-57 (1986); People v. Tackett, [150 Ill.App.3d 406, 103 Ill.Dec. 574, 580-81], 501 N.E.2d 891, 897-98 (1986); Tinsley v. Purvis, 731 F.2d 79......
  • Carr v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 4, 1994
    ...of death penalty because accused made incriminating statements before interrogator made comment about electric chair); Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551, 557 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (rejecting argument that accused was induced to confess by giving him non-jail food and by allowing him to telephone hi......
  • State v. Galli
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1998
    ...to speak to an attorney he knew to be the prosecutor was not even an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel); Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551, 553 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (request to speak to district attorney not an assertion of right to counsel); United States v. Brown, 27 M.J. 614, 617 (......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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