Riley v. State Emp. Retirement Commission

• Decision Date: 17 July 1979
• Citation: 423 A.2d 87,178 Conn. 438
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mae C. RILEY v. STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

Page 87

423 A.2d 87

178 Conn. 438

Mae C. RILEY v. STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 10, 1979.

Decided July 17, 1979.

David A. Piskorski, New Britain, for appellant (plaintiff).

Stanley K. Peck, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

COTTER, Chief Justice.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 5-169(b), the plaintiff filed an application for service-connected disability retirement with the state employees' retirement commission on April 21, 1972, after she had accidentally struck her leg against a chair while working at the Connecticut Valley Hospital. Following a medical examination and a review of her medical history, the medical examining board; see § 5-169(c); concluded that there was "insufficient evidence of current disability to warrant disability retirement." On June 8, 1972, the commission denied the plaintiff's application for benefits. No appeal was taken by the plaintiff from that decision.

In 1974, the plaintiff requested the commission to reconsider its denial of her application for retirement benefits. The matter was again referred to the medical examining board whose members examined the plaintiff and reviewed two new medical reports submitted on the plaintiff's behalf. The board also considered the entire contents of the plaintiff's health services and workmen's compensation files. The majority of the board reiterated its earlier determination that the plaintiff had "not presented sufficient evidence of current disability to warrant disbility retirement" although it concluded that "she has sustained a service-connected injury which was complicated by congenital sickle cell trait." The commission adopted the findings of the board, and, on April 18, 1974, refused to reverse its previous decision denying the plaintiff's application for disability retirement. Thereupon, the plaintiff took an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.

Pending that appeal, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to present additional evidence before the board. After consideration of that evidence ¹ by the board, the commission again denied the plaintiff's application for a service-connected disability retirement. The court affirmed the decision of the commission and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

General Statutes § 5-169(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a member of the state employees' retirement system is eligible for disability retirement if he "becomes permanently disabled ... from continuing to render the service in which he has been employed as a result of any injury received while in the performance of his duty as a state employee." General Statutes § 5-169(c) requires a medical examining board composed of seven physicians to make a medical determination as to whether an applicant is eligible to receive retirement benefits, and to report that finding to the commission. Shea v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 170 Conn. 610, 614, 368 A.2d 159. The defendant commission, in turn, has the duty to administer the state employees' retirement system; it may adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the State Employees' Retirement Act; and it ultimately approves or disapproves applications for retirement benefits. General Statutes § 5-155; Shea v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, supra, 614, 368 A.2d 159. In sum, the commission, an agency responsible for the overall administration of the retirement system, is assisted in this task by the specialized knowledge of the medical examining board.

In an appeal of this nature, it is neither our function nor that of the Court of Common Pleas to retry the case or to substitute our or its judgment for that of the defendant commission. Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 177 Conn. 588, 590, 419 A.2d 333; Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 707-708, 372 A.2d 110, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2930, 53 L.Ed.2d 1066. The commissioners, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, must weigh the evidence in rendering a decision and the conclusion which they reach must be legally supported by that evidence. Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra; Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747.

The duties of an administrative agency, the defendant commission in this case, necessarily include the right to exercise discretion, and the essence of such discretionary power is that the agency or commission may choose which of several permissive courses will be followed. In exercising that discretion, the factors to be taken into consideration "are not mechanical or self-defining standards," and, thus, wide areas of judgment are implied. Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Co., 338 U.S. 604, 611, 70 S.Ct. 403, 407, 94 L.Ed. 381. Such discretion is the "lifeblood" of the administrative process. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207.

In the present case, the defendant commission had before it medical evidence indicating that the plaintiff is both obese and suffers...