Riley v. Webb
| Decision Date | 20 April 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 10632.,10632. |
| Citation | 272 Ill. 537,112 N.E. 340 |
| Parties | RILEY v. WEBB et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Will County; Arthur W. De Selm, Judge.
Suit by John Riley against John J. Webb and others to set aside an instrument purporting to be the last will of Thomas H. Riley, deceased. From a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity and denying a motion to vacate the verdict of the jury and the decree of the court, the complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Thomas H. Riley and Brickwood & Brickwood, all of Chicago, for appellant.
John W. Downey and Corlett & Clare, all of Joliet, for appellees.
On November 5, 1914, the appellant, John Riley, filed his bill in the circuit court of Will county to set aside an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of Thomas H. Riley, deceased. It is alleged that Thomas H. Riley died November 5, 1913, without issue, leaving appellant, and Mary Riley, his widow, James Riley, William Riley, Maria Riley, and Teresa Riley Poor as his only heirs at law. By his purported will the testator devised and bequeathed the whole of his estate to his widow, Mary Riley, and Edward Riley, John J. Webb, Permelia Stoddard, and Ella Barry, all of whom were made defendants to the bill. Summons issued against all the defendants on the day the bill was filed, and was returned December 2, 1914, with an indorsement showing that the defendant William Riley, a brother of the testator, had not been served. Mary Riley, John J. Webb, Permelia Stoddard, and Ella Barry answered the bill. On April 21, 1915, when the cause was set for a hearing, appellant filed a motion for a continuance, alleging the absence of a material witness and other grounds. The court denied the motion and directed that a jury be impaneled to try the cause. Counsel for appellant declined to participate in the trial. A jury was impaneled, and proponents made a prima facie case, whereupon the jury returned a verdict finding the instrument in question to be the last will and testament of Thomas H. Riley, and upon that same day the court entered a decree reciting the denial of the motion for a continuance, the impaneling of the jury, the offering of evidence on the part of the proponents, and the return of the verdict finding that the instrument in question was the last will and testament of Thomas H. Riley, deceased, and dismissing the bill for want of equity. Thereafter appellant filed his motion to vacate and set aside the verdict of the jury and the decree of the court upon the ground that the cause was not at issue, as William Riley, one of the necessary parties defendant named in the bill, had not been served with summons, and had not entered his appearance in the cause, that appellant's motion for a continuance should have been allowed, and that the court wrongfully denied leave to appellant, prior to the trial of the cause, to amend his bill and make an additional party defendant. The court denied this motion and granted an appeal.
We will consider but one of the grounds urged for reversal of the decree. William Riley, one of the defendants in the bill, was a brother of the testator and had a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the suit. He was not only a proper but a necessary party. It is a rule in equity that all persons who have any substantial legal or beneficial interest in the subject-matter in litigation and who will be materially affected by the decree must be made parties. Gilham v. Cairns, Breese, 164; Moore v. Munn, 69 Ill. 591;Atkins v. Billings, 72 Ill. 597;Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill. 560;Knopf v. Chicago Real Estate Board, 173 Ill. 196, 50 N. E. 658;Nolan v. Barnes, 268 Ill. 515, 109 N. E. 316;Sellers v. Rike (No. 10360) 111 N. E. 1006. Brown v. Riggin, supra, was a suit to contest a will where necessary parties were not made defendants, and it was there held that it is the necessary practice that all parties in interest should be before the court. Knopf v. Chicago Real Estate Board, supra, was a bill for injunction where a necessary party defendant had been omitted, and it was there held that, whenever it appears that a necessary party has been omitted, the court should of its own motion, without waiting for action by ...
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People v. Lang
...to dispose of the whole controversy. (Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank (1944), 385 Ill. 414, 423, 52 N.E.2d 1000; Riley v. Webb (1916), 272 Ill. 537, 538-39, 112 N.E. 340; Nolan v. Barnes (1915), 268 Ill. 515, 523, 109 N.E. 316.) In a proceeding for mandamus, when a party is shown by the ......
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Feen v. Ray
...dispose of the entire controversy. (Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank (1944), 385 Ill. 414, 422-23, 52 N.E.2d 1000; Riley v. Webb (1916), 272 Ill. 537, 538-39, 112 N.E. 340.) It is generally accepted that, under fundamental principles of due process, a court is without jurisdiction to ente......
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Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank
...of the litigation, and who will be affected by the decree, so as to enable the court to dispose of the whole controversy. Riley v. Webb, 272 Ill. 537, 112 N.E. 340. If the lack of parties is brought to the attention of the court, be it one of original or appellate jurisdiction, the court sh......
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...and who would be materially affected by a decree entered in a suit to contest that will. Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill. 560; Riley v. Webb, 272 Ill. 537, 112 N.E. 340. Appellant was a necessary party, and if the original complainant had failed to name him as a defendant, it would have been the du......