Riley v. Young, 27501.
Decision Date | 27 April 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 27501.,27501. |
Citation | 879 N.W.2d 108 |
Parties | James Duane RILEY, Applicant and Appellant, v. Darin YOUNG, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Respondent and Appellee. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Paul Eisenbraun, Grey and Eisenbraun Law, Prof. LLC, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for applicant and appellant.
Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Paul S. Swedlund, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for respondent and appellee.
[¶ 1.] We issued a certificate of probable cause to review whether the circuit court improperly dismissed James Riley's application for a writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] Riley was convicted of possession of child pornography. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Riley, 2013 S.D. 95, 841 N.W.2d 431. In November 2014, Riley submitted a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that his jury trial was impermissibly closed to the public in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and that his counsel's failure to object to the closure violated his right to effective assistance of counsel.1
[¶ 3.] The habeas court reviewed Riley's application together with a portion of the jury trial transcript. The transcript confirmed that during trial, the State moved to close the courtroom before it played a video that contained images of child pornography. However, the habeas court noted that the transcript also indicated the trial court declined to rule on the motion because no member of the public was present. The trial court permitted the only non-trial participant (a person associated with Riley's defense) to remain. The following is an excerpt of the exchange:
Based on this evidence, the habeas court concluded that the courtroom was not closed, and therefore, Riley's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to closure. The habeas court dismissed Riley's application without holding an evidentiary hearing. It found Riley's application to be vague and conclusory.
[¶ 4.] Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, we note a reoccurring problem in filing documents and processing habeas corpus actions. The only record of this habeas proceeding is found in Riley's criminal file. It appears that his application for habeas corpus was placed in his criminal file along with the order dismissing his application. There is also no indication in that record that the State was notified of the application. The State did not file a return or a motion to dismiss. We reiterate that “habeas proceedings are separate civil actions, they should be filed as separate civil actions[,]” and they should be processed as a civil case. State v. Pentecost, 2015 S.D. 71, ¶ 4 n. 1, 868 N.W.2d 590, 592 n. 1. These procedural irregularities should not continue.
[¶ 5.] The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed....” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Public trials are conducted “for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.” State v. Rolfe, 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 17, 825 N.W.2d 901, 906 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) ).2
[¶ 6.] Riley's claimed violation of his right to a public trial was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. To dismiss an application for a writ of habeas corpus without receiving evidence, the application must be unspecific, conclusory or speculative, setting forth no facts that could support a claim for relief: the application must fail to meet a minimum threshold of plausibility.
Steiner v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 5, 815 N.W.2d 549, 551 (quoting Jenner v. Dooley, 1999 S.D. 20, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 463, 469 ).
[¶ 7.] Ordinarily, “whether an applicant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be ascertained from the face of the application.” Jenner, 1999 S.D. 20, ¶ 14, 590 N.W.2d at 469. In this case, the habeas court also reviewed Riley's trial transcript. “In habeas actions a court may take judicial notice of an applicant's prior judicial proceedings.” Id. ¶ 15, 590 N.W.2d at 470. A habeas court may take judicial notice of prior judicial proceedings “whether requested or not.” Id. Because the habeas court looked beyond the application and considered the trial transcript, we must “examine the same materials to decide if the [habeas] court ruled correctly.” Id. ¶ 16, 590 N.W.2d at 470. Therefore, our question on appeal is whether the allegations in Riley's application, coupled with the facts disclosed in the trial transcript, could support a claim that his trial was improperly closed. Because the habeas court dismissed “as a matter of law, our review is de novo[.]” Steiner, 2011 S.D. 40, ¶ 4, 815 N.W.2d at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
[¶ 8.] Riley's application asserted no facts supporting his allegation. He did not allege that any person was excluded from his trial. He asserted nothing but a single legal conclusion that “his jury trial was impermissibly closed to the public in violation of his rights to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment.” That legal conclusion is “unspecific,...
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THE LIFE AND LEGAL LEGACY OF JUSTICE STEVEN L. ZINTER.
...(219.) Id. [paragraph][paragraph] 13-18, 862 N.W.2d at 118-19. (220.) Id. (221.) Riley v. Young, 2016 SD 39, [paragraph][paragraph] 2-3, 879 N.W.2d 108, 110-11. (222.) Id. [paragraph] 8, 879 N.W.2d at 112-13. In fact, the trial transcript demonstrated that given that no members of the publi......