Rilurcasa v. California
Decision Date | 14 April 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No.: 1:20-cv-01568-SAB (PC) |
Parties | TOM JON RILURCASA, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE TO THIS ACTION
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff Tom Jon Rilurcasa is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed February 10, 2021.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that "fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). ///
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff names seventeen Defendants, including the State of California, Warden Stu Sherman, medical doctors, registered nurses, and prison officials who reviewed his inmate grievances. Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied his adequate medical care, including surgery, low bunk/low tier chrono, medication for pain, and a right knee brace.
On October 8, 2014, Plaintiff was received at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, and State Prison, Corcoran for processing. After process, Plaintiff was sent to Facility A, Building 2 Pod 1, bunk 2 UP where he was housed for six years. Plaintiff was ultimately moved to other pods in the same building, and he is currently housed in Facility A, Building 4, Pod 4, bunk 4 LOW.
On May 4, 2019, Plaintiff injured his right knee. He made a twisting motion, and there was a painful pop and his right knee/leg collapsed. Plaintiff got up and tried to walk, but there was a painful grinding and his knee felt dislocated causing his leg to collapse. Plaintiff reported the incident to the medical department and an x-ray was scheduled.
On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff attempted to climb on the top bunk and his right knee popped, and he fell to the floor causing other inmates to yell man down.
On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff had an x-ray and during the medical interview he was advised that his right knee is normal. Plaintiff explained that he still in extreme pain, his right knee feels loose, and there is grinding.
On May 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a healthcare grievance, Log No. SATF-HC-19000749, raising his concerns about his basic medical care and requested surgery on his right knee. Plaintiff's grievance was denied at the institutional level on July 31, 2019. Plaintiff then submitted the grievance to the health care grievance office, and the grievance was denied at the headquarters level on November 7, 2019.
The headquarters' response stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
You saw your primary care provider on October 17, 2019, to discuss your MRI results. The imaging showed a ruptured anterior curiae ligament (ACL). You were encouraged to continue the home exercise program and avoid strenuous exercise. A request for services order for Orthopedic Surgery was completed and subsequently approved. If the appointment does not take place within the timeframes outlined in the Health Care Department Operations Manual, Health Care Definitions, you may discuss your concerns with health care staff by utilizing the approved processes to access health care services in accordance with California Correctional Health Care Services policy.
(Am. Compl. at 48-49.) Plaintiff contends it has been about a year from the time that medical ordered his surgery which demonstrates deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
On September 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed inmate grievance, Log No. SATF-HC-20001447, and requested surgery on his right shoulder. Plaintiff injured his right shoulder on September 8, 2020, and an MRI revealed a tear. The doctor ordered a change in exercise and physical therapy for three months. Plaintiff contends he already had a rotator cuff tear in his right shoulder and suffered asignificant amount of pain. Plaintiff does not need to go to physical therapy and instead needs to see a doctor.
On September 23, 2020, Log No. SATF-HC-20001447 was cancelled at the headquarters' level because it did not comply with the applicable regulations. Plaintiff contends it has been about five years since his surgery was ordered.
"The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state." Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). This jurisdictional bar includes "suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants," and it applies whether plaintiffs "seek damages or injunctive relief." Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Pennhurst State School, 465 U.S. at 102. "[A]n entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983." Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990). Here, Plaintiff has named state agencies as Defendants, which are immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
However, with regard to state officials sued in their official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes state officials sued in their official capacity from retrospective claims for relief (including monetary damage claims), but does not immunize them from claims for prospective relief (such as forward-looking injunctive relief). Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123(1908).
Plaintiff sues all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. "Suits against state officials in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against the State." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Holley v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 599 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) ( ). An official capacity suit "represent[s] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citationomitted). Such a suit "is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity." Id. at 166.
"The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities." Aholelei v. Dep't of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against all of the named Defendants in their official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
However, a claim for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or her official capacity is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment provided the official has authority to implement the requested relief. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 92 (1989). Moreover, "[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a named official's personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional violation." Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ( ). Instead, Plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional violation and name the official or officials within the entity who is or are alleged to have a "fairly direct" connection with the enforcement of that policy, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908), and can appropriately respond to injunctive relief. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1127 (citation omitted); see also Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2012).
In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged that a law, policy, or custom caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed...
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