Rimarcik v. Johansen

• Decision Date: 04 February 1970
• Docket Number: No. 4-69 Civil 216.,4-69 Civil 216.
• Citation: Rimarcik v. Johansen, 310 F.Supp. 61 (D. Minn. 1970)
• Parties: John V. RIMARCIK, Plaintiff, v. J. Richard JOHANSEN, as City Clerk of Minneapolis; Joseph L. Donovan, as Secretary of State of the State of Minnesota; Ben Allison, as Register of Deeds of Hennepin County, Defendants, and George C. Dodds, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

310 F. Supp. 61

John V. RIMARCIK, Plaintiff, v.J. Richard JOHANSEN, as City Clerk of Minneapolis; Joseph L. Donovan, as Secretary of State of the State of Minnesota; Ben Allison, as Register of Deeds of Hennepin County, Defendants and George C. Dodds, Intervenor.

No. 4-69 Civil 216.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

February 4, 1970.

Norman L. Newhall, Jr., Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Bruce W. Okney, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., George V. Johnson, John K. Harvey, Asst. City Attys., Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants.

Clay R. Moore, Minneapolis, Minn., for intervenor.

Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and LARSON and LORD, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MILES W. LORD, District Judge:

This case raises the issue of whether a provision in a state statute requiring a 55% favorable vote for adoption of an amendment to a home rule charter is unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.The statute in question is Chapter 1027, § 2,Laws of Minnesota 1969, which provides that any provisions in a home rule charter which prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor or wine in certain areas shall not be amended or removed unless a proposition to that effect received 55% of the votes cast.For reasons which follow, we have concluded in the affirmative.

I.

Home rule provisions under which a city may establish a charter for its own governing body were originally prescribed in Article 4, § 36, and added to the Minnesota constitution in 1896.This constitutional provision was repealed by L.1957, c. 809, adopted at a general election on November 4, 1958.¹It was replaced by the present Article XI of the state constitution, § 4 of which provides in part:

The legislature shall provide by law for charter commissions.* * * Home rule charter amendments may be proposed by a charter commission or by a petition of five percent of the voters of the local government unit as determined by law and shall not become effective until approved by the voters by the majority required by law.Amendments may be proposed and adopted in any other manner provided by law.

Pursuant to this grant of authority the statelegislature, in the 1959 regular session, enacted L.1959, c. 305, § 4, which amended 24 M.S.A. § 410.12, subd. 4.As amended, subd. 4 read that a majority of 55% of the votes cast was necessary to carry any amendment to a city charter.The law made no distinction with respect to whether or not the amendment affected established liquor patrol limits — that is, any amendment to a city charter required 55% voter approval for adoption.This provision remained unchanged until 1969 when the legislature enacted Chapter 1027.Chapter 1027, by its three sections, made the following changes:

1.Section 1: Amended 24 M.S.A. § 410.11 to provide that a new charter could be adopted if 51% of the votes cast on the proposition were in favor of the proposed charter.

2.Section 2: Added to 24 M.S.A. § 410.121 the provision that any amendment to the city charter which affected provisions prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor or wine in certain areas had to receive 55% of the votes cast to pass.

3.Section 3: Amended 24 M.S.A. § 410.12, subd. 4, to provide that an existing charter could be amended or replaced if 51% of the votes cast on the proposition were in favor of its adoption.

In substance, then, Chapter 1027 had the effect of requiring 51% voter approval for the adoption of a new city charter or the amendment of an existing charter with the exception that under § 2, if the amendment affected the established liquor patrol limits it needed 55% voter approval for adoption.It is the constitutionality of the 55% requirement which is in contention in this case.²

Plaintiff's constitutional claim originates from a proposition placed on the ballot for the general election held on June 10, 1969 in the City of Minneapolis.The proposition entitled Amendment 39, concerned an amendment to Chapter 4, Section 5, of the Charter of the City of Minneapolis relating to the granting of liquor licenses within a designated area.Section 5, subd. 1, establishes a geographical boundary, roughly equivalent to the area of the downtown loop, which comprises the so-called "liquor patrol limits".Under the City Charter, the Minneapolis City Council has the authority to grant on-sale and off-sale liquor licenses within the patrol limits.Outside the patrol limits, licenses may be issued on either one of the following two conditions: (1) The City Council may renew a license of an established business; or (2) a new license may be issued upon majority approval in a referendum vote of the residents within the ward and within the precincts located within 1500 feet of the proposed location of the liquor establishment.The proposed Amendment 39, if adopted, would have removed the liquor patrol limits and replaced it with a procedure for the issuance of liquor licenses anywhere within the City of Minneapolis by the City Council in accordance with certain prescribed procedures.

Thus, Amendment 39 was placed on the ballot pursuant to the provisions of state law regarding adoption of home rule charters and amendments thereto enacted by the statelegislature under a grant of authority in the Minnesota Constitution.Its purpose was to allow the voters in Minneapolis to determine whether the liquor patrol limits contained in the Minneapolis City Charter should be removed and replaced with a new procedure for the issuance of liquor licenses.Under Chapter 1027, § 2, it was necessary for the amendment to receive an affirmative vote of 55% of the votes cast in order to be adopted.The proposed amendment received 59,456 "Yes" votes compared to 53,272 "No" votes, or 52.7% of the votes cast were in favor of its adoption.This, of course, fell short of the 55% required under § 2.

Plaintiff, a taxpayer and voter in the City of Minneapolis, initiated this action, asserting federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343and42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1988 to redress the alleged deprivation of Federal constitutional rights.This action is brought by plaintiff on his own behalf as a voter who voted "Yes" on Amendment 39, and on behalf of the other 59,455 voters who voted in favor of the amendment.His claim is that Chapter 1027, § 2, by requiring more than 50% plus 1 vote to pass amendments to city charters, violates his rights, and the rights of all others voting "Yes" on the amendment.He contends the provision "debases the value of a `Yes' vote in relationship to the value of a `No' vote, in direct contravention of the principle of `one man, one vote' as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663(1962), and following cases."He asserts that the application of a 55% requirement for passage says, in effect: "45 men voting `No', equals 55 men voting `Yes'."

The defendants are the Minneapolis City Clerk, the Minnesota Secretary of State, and the Hennepin County Register of Deeds.Under §§ 410.11and410.12, subd. 4,24 M.S.A., they are responsible for filing the necessary certificates that an amendment to a city charter was dully adopted at an election.By way of affirmative relief, plaintiff asks that the Court declare that Amendment 39 was duly adopted at the election of June 10, 1969, and order the City Clerk to file the necessary certificates to that effect in his office and the offices of the above State and County officials.

On request of the plaintiff, and based on the allegations in the complaint, this three judge court was convened pursuant to the provisions of § 2284, Title 28 U. S.C.A. by the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit on June 30, 1969.Thereafter, by order dated July 28, 1969, with the consent of all the parties hereto, the Court granted the application of George C. Dodds for intervention.On the same date, intervenor made a motion that this action was not required to be heard by a three judge court under § 2281,Title 28 U.S.C.A.A hearing was held and the motion was denied on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim raised a substantial constitutional question concerning a statute of statewide application, coupled with a request for equitable relief, and thus is within the purview of § 2281.

The defense in this case has been presented primarily by the intervenor, a taxpayer and voter in the City of Minneapolis, who voted "No" on the proposed Amendment 39.³His position is that the issue presented in the plaintiff's complaint "is nonjusticiable and is essentially political and therefore beyond the proper exercise of the power of the federal court."If, however, the Court should reach the merits he asserts that the case must be decided in favor of the defendants.

II.

Intervenor's threshold contention that plaintiff's claim is non-justiciable because it is essentially political may be disposed of without extensive comment.In Baker v. Carr, supra, the Supreme Court held that a claim asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging impairment of a person's right to vote because of a dilution or debasement of its value in relation to other votes, presents a justiciable issue subject to adjudication by federal courts.Under Baker v. Carr, supra, it is clear that this court has jurisdiction, that plaintiff's complaint states a justiciable cause of action, and that plaintiff has standing to raise the constitutional issue.⁴

III.

We turn, then to plaintiff's claim that the 55% requirement is violative of the Equal Protection Clause because its effect is to substantially dilute and debase the weight of a "Yes" vote in relation to a "No" vote.

Our initial concern is to determine the standard we must apply in evaluating the classification made by § 2.In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506(1964), the Supreme Court said, "(S)ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of...