Rimnik Corp. v. Wallace, 8014.
| Decision Date | 12 July 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 8014.,8014. |
| Citation | 200 A. 765 |
| Parties | RIMNIK CORPORATION v. WALLACE. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alberic A. Archambault, Judge.
Action of trespass and ejectment by the Rimnik Corporation against John Wallace. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings exception.
Exception overruled.
Tillinghast, Collins & Tanner, Russell P. Jones, and Westcote H. Chesebrough, all of Providence, for plaintiff. Roger L. McCarthy, of Providence, for defendant.
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This is an action of trespass and ejectment for possession of a certain store in the city of Providence owned by the plaintiff and occupied by the defendant. The action was brought in a district court on December 7, 1937, and was later tried, de novo on appeal, in the superior court before a justice sitting without a jury. His decision was for the plaintiff for possession and costs, and the case is now before us on the defendant's bill of exceptions, in which the only exception relied on is to that decision.
The facts are not substantially in dispute. The defendant came into possession of the premises under a written lease from the plaintiff to him dated September 30, 1935, by which they were demised to him for the term of one year beginning October 1, 1935, and ending September 30, 1936, at a rent of $480, payable in monthly installments of $40 each, in advance. It contained an option to the lessee of renewal for the further term of one year, expiring September 30, 1937, at a rent of $540, payable in monthly installments of $45 in advance, and contained also the proviso that written notice of the exercise of the option must be given by the lessee to the lessor not less than sixty days prior to September 30, 1936.
No written notice of the lessee's exercise of this option was given, but the testimony on both sides showed clearly, and the trial justice found, that it was actually exercised by the lessee and that the requirement as to written notice was waived by the lessor. The lessee continued in possession of the premises for the renewal term; and the monthly rent at the rate of $45 per month was paid by him and accepted by the lessor.
It was clearly shown by the testimony on both sides that at least during the last few months of the renewal term of one year there were, from time to time between their agents, discussions as to the parties entering into a new lease for a longer term, to begin at the expiration of the existing renewal term. It was understood that one consideration for the making of such a new lease by the plaintiff would be the installing of new heating apparatus in the premises by the defendant. But no agreement was arrived at, and the matter was still pending on November 1, 1937.
Meantime, after the expiration of the renewal term on September 30, 1937, the defendant continued in possession of the premises and paid to the plaintiff, in advance for the month of October, the sum of $45, which was accepted by the plaintiff. On November 1, 1937, the latter gave to the defendant a written notice to quit and deliver up possession of the premises on November 30, 1937, and was paid by the defendant, and accepted, the sum of $45 as rent for that month. The defendant refused to quit the premises and has continued in possession, claiming to have become a tenant from year to year from October 1, 1937, at a rent of $540 a year, payable monthly in advance, by reason of his holding over and the payment of rent in advance at that date and its acceptance by the plaintiff.
The trial justice rejected this claim of the defendant and held, in substance, that the plaintiff was not required, on these facts, to treat the defendant as its tenant from year to year, but had the right to treat him as its tenant from month to month; and that it had treated him as such tenant from month to month and had given him a proper notice to quit, which terminated his tenancy on November 30, 1937. We are of the opinion that this decision was correct and supported by the facts and the law applicable thereto.
The defendant seems to admit that the general rule, supported by Rhode Island reported cases, is that if a tenant continues in possession of...
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Bibby's Refrigeration, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Salisbury
...holds over after the expiration of a lease. Rose v. Congdon, 72 R.I. 21, 25-27, 47 A.2d 857, 859-60 (1946); Rimnik Corp. v. Wallace, 61 R.I. 282, 284-85, 200 A. 765, 766 (1938). It is a covenant either express or implied in all leases that the leased premises be delivered to the landlord up......
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Regan v. Rogers
...a tenant from month to month. See McCrillis v. Benoit, 26 R.I. 421, 59 A. 108; Greene v. Walsh, 43 R.I. 416, 112 A. 801; Rimnik Corp. v. Wallace, 61 R.I. 282, 200 A. 765. The plaintiff maintains that he chose to treat the defendant as a tenant from month to month and, therefore, did not hav......
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Rose v. Congdon., 8779.
...that the landlord has the election as to how he would treat the occupant of the premises holding over his lease-see Rimnik Corp. v. Wallace, 61 R.I. 282, 200 A. 765-the evidence that the representative of the Tieman estate considered the defendant to be a tenant from month to month was not ......
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SHELL OIL COMPANY v. Addessi, 6708.
...during the specified period after receipt of the notice of termination." 6 Corbin, Contracts, § 1266 (1962). Cf. Rimnik Corp. v. Wallace, 1938, 61 R.I. 282, 200 A. 765, where the court observed that a notice to quit terminated the tenancy on the date specified to quit. We cannot accept the ......