Rimson v. Amazon Logistics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-00553-CV-RK |
| Parties | HOWARD RIMSON, Plaintiff, v. AMAZON LOGISTICS, INC., VENUS, LLC, AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant Venus, LLC's (“Venus”) motion for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff Howard Rimson's claims. (Doc. 137.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 138, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 160.) For the reasons below, (1) the motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's MHRA racial harassment and aiding and abetting racial harassment claims as contained in Count 1 and Plaintiff's § 1985 civil conspiracy claim as contained in Count 3; and (2) the motion is DENIED in all other respects.
Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on March 16, 2022 alleging, among other things, that Defendant Venus was one of the delivery service partners of Defendant Amazon, Inc., and Defendant Amazon Logistics, Inc. (collectively “Defendant Amazon”), and that Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought employment with Defendant Venus in March 2020. (Doc. 83 at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff, an African American, alleges he was prevented from gaining employment because of joint arrangements between Defendant Amazon and Defendant Venus with respect to (1) discriminatory hiring and training practices for Amazon drivers, (2) the discrimination in the on-boarding of drivers, and (3) discrimination in establishing the eligibility or ineligibility status of applicants that all delivery service partners must agree to use (and/or in practice do use) in employment hiring decisions for Amazon drivers. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.)
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant Venus' statement of uncontroverted material facts explains that Amazon hires third-party companies, known as Delivery Service Partners (“DSP”), to deliver Amazon packages.[1] (Doc. 138-1 at ¶ 1.) Amazon has delivery stations, called DMCs, where the packages go for the last mile before they arrive to the customer. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Amazon has a delivery station called DMC2 in a facility located at 3601 Enterprise Drive, Kansas City, Missouri, at which Defendant Venus and Precise Packaging (“Precise”) (a former codefendant in this case) are DSPs. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.)
Plaintiff worked for Defendant Amazon as a seasonal driver from July 2019 to January 2020. (Id. at ¶ 6.) As a seasonal driver, Plaintiff delivered packages to customers based on assigned routes. (Id. at ¶ 7.) During his seasonal employment with Defendant Amazon, Plaintiff reported incidents to Defendant Amazon's supervisors about customers who used racial slurs and displayed guns. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Following Plaintiff's seasonal employment, Plaintiff sought employment as a Delivery Associate. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
Defendant Venus conducts job fairs and advertises for drivers in a variety of forums, including Indeed.com, a job-posting/search website. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Once a viable candidate comes to Defendant Venus, it interviews the candidate. (Id. at ¶ 10.) If Defendant Venus determines the candidate is suitable to be a Delivery Associate, it uploads the candidate's driver's license, name, date of birth, and address into the Amazon portal. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Candidates are required to consent to a background check, which is conducted by a third party. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Candidates are also required to consent to a drug test, which is arranged by Defendant Venus, and the results are provided to Defendant Amazon. (Id. at ¶ 13.) When the background check results are provided to Defendant Amazon, Defendant Amazon then informs Defendant Venus whether or not the driver is cleared to proceed with the hiring process. (Id. at ¶ 14.) If a candidate is cleared by Defendant Amazon to proceed with the hiring process, Defendant Venus rosters the candidate for in-person training. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Completion of the in-person training is a requirement to work for Defendant Amazon or the Delivery Service Partners as a Delivery Associate because without it, Delivery Associates cannot perform their positions. (Id. at ¶ 16-17.) The in-person training is taught by Amazon employees at an Amazon Delivery Station. (Id. at ¶ 18.) After a candidate completes training, Defendant Amazon issues the candidate a badge, then Defendant Venus puts the Delivery Associate on the road with another Delivery Associate until he or she satisfactorily completes on-the-job training for picking up and delivering packages with the other Delivery Associate. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.) After the Delivery Associate satisfactorily completes on-the-job training, he or she is assigned a route. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Around January to February 2020, Plaintiff applied for a Delivery Associate position at the DMC2 delivery station with both of Amazon's DSPs, Defendant Venus and Precise. (Id. at ¶ 22.) While Defendant Venus was waiting for the results of Plaintiff's background check, Precise offered Plaintiff employment. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Rather than wait for Defendant Venus to complete the hiring process, Plaintiff decided to work for Precise. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Defendant Venus did not hire Plaintiff in Spring 2020. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff went through the on-boarding process with Precise in February 2020. (Id. at ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff was scheduled by Precise to attend in-person training at DMC2 on March 3-4, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff only attended about an hour of the two-day training. (Id. at ¶ 28.) During the training, Stevie Swan, an Amazon driver trainer, instructed Plaintiff to put his cellphone away. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Later, Ms. Swan informed the class that they could use their cellphones to take pictures of certain slides. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff questioned why he had been instructed to put away his cellphone but the class could otherwise use their cell phones. (Id. at ¶ 31.) The situation escalated, and Ms. Swan asked Plaintiff to leave the classroom. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
There is a dispute between the parties as to whether Plaintiff had shoved or physically assaulted Ms. Swan when leaving the training room or whether Ms. Swan opened the door herself while Plaintiff left without touching her. In addition, as set forth more fully below, Plaintiff presented evidence at summary judgment that Ms. Swan acts in a discriminatory manner towards non-Caucasians, from the deposition testimony of Lena Brooks, who at the relevant time was Operations Manager for Defendant Venus. Ms. Brooks testified that she observed that Ms. Swan treated African American trainees more harshly than Caucasian trainees and was biased against non-Caucasians.
In September 2020, Plaintiff applied for employment with Defendant Venus. (Id. at ¶ 33.) On occasion, Defendant Amazon informs Defendant Venus that it may not hire certain applicants because of their behavior. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Ms. Swan requested that Plaintiff (1) not be allowed back at DMC2, the Amazon station where he attended training, and (2) not be allowed to work for Defendant Amazon or any of the DSPs who performed services out of DMC2. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Ms. Swan did not make that request at the urging of Defendant Venus, Precise, or any other DSP. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Ms. Swan testified that when Plaintiff applied to work for Defendant Venus after the March 3, 2020 training, she spoke with Travis Tenschert, Amazon's acting Operations Manager, and informed him that she was not comfortable training Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 37.) According to Mr. Bandev Nawaz and Mr. Karl Chaney, Defendant Amazon informed Defendant Venus that Defendant Venus could not hire Plaintiff at DMC2 because of the March 3, 2020 training incident.[2](Id. at ¶ 38.) Mr. Nawaz and Mr. Chaney testified that Defendant Venus followed Defendant Amazon's directive regarding Plaintiff and did not hire him. (Id. at ¶ 39.) Defendant Venus informed Plaintiff that he could not work for Venus. (Id. at ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff filed his third amended complaint on March 16, 2022, which consists of four multi-part counts:
Further facts are set forth as necessary.
The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a). The Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giv[es] the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am. Ins Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment should be granted.” Smith-Bunge v. Wis. Cent., Ltd., 946 F.3d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the movant must “support” its motion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “‘showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); Rule 56(c)(1).
In resisting summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but must, by affidavit and other evidence, set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material...
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