Rinaldi v. Mohican Co.

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ANDREWS
• Citation: Rinaldi v. Mohican Co. , 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (N.Y. 1918)
• Decision Date: 10 December 1918
• Parties: ANNA M. RINALDI, Respondent, v. THE MOHICAN COMPANY, Appellant.

225 N.Y. 70

121 N.E. 471

RINALDI

v.MOHICAN CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 10, 1918.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by Anna Mary Rinaldi against the Mohican Company. From judgment of the Appellate Division (171 App. Div. 814,157 N. Y. Supp. 561), affirming a judgment of the Trial Term for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

L. B. McKelvey, of Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

Charles G. Fryer, of Schenectady, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

We have held, as to a sale of food for immediate consumption made before September 1, 1911, by a dealer who makes or prepares the articles sold, that there is an implied warranty of wholesomeness. Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 853. That is as far as any decision of ours has gone. In Maxwell v. Marsh, 173 App. Div. 1003,159 N. Y. Supp. 1128, affirmed without opinion 225 N. Y. --, 121 N. E. 878, where tainted meat was sold at a market in 1913, a charge to the jury that such a warranty was to be implied was made without objection. It became, therefore, the law for that case. Yet in Race v. Krum, in an opinion in which all the members of the court concurred, there was a full discussion of the rule in this state, and the conclusion was reached deliberately ‘that accompanying all sales by a retail dealer of articles of food for immediate use there is an implied warranty that the same is fit for human consumption.’ This was an exception to the general rule regarding the sale of other chattels based on grounds of public policy. The opinion, however, expressly refused to consider whether such a warranty existed in the case of hotel proprietors or those engaged in a similar business.

On September 1, 1911, section 96 of the Personal Property Law (Consol. Laws, c. 41, as added by Laws 1911, c. 571), took effect. It provided that there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods sold except, among other cases, ‘where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not).’ If, however, the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as regards defects which such an examination should have revealed.

[1][2] Article 5 of the Personal Property Law (as added by Laws 1911, c. 571) is not merely a codification of the existing rules regarding sales in this state. It was the design as far as possible to make our law uniform with the legislation and laws on this subject existing throughout the country. To this end changes were made in what had previously been here the law. In section 96 itself, for instance, the distinction between the liability of sellers who were growners and manufacturers and others was abrogated. A warranty may now be established by proof of the usage of trade. Although an express warranty of quality is given, one not inconsistent with it may also be implied. Having in view the purpose of the article and the fact that in some states no implied warranty based on grounds other than those which affect every sale of a chattel was enforced, we have no doubt that section 96, expressed as it is in general terms, applies to all sales, including sales of food, and that any rules hitherto applied inconsistent with this section are abolished.

[3][4] In a sale of food, therefore, there is no longer an implied warranty of fitness, unless the buyer expressly or by implication acquaints the seller with the purpose of the purchase, and unless it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment. Even then, if the buyer has examined the goods and should have discovered the defect, there is no warranty. The burden of showing that he has made known his purpose and that he has relied upon the seller is on him who claims the existence of an implied warranty. If either of these two essential facts does not appear, he fails in his claim. Whether they exist or not may often become a question of fact to be solved by the jury. But often also, where the facts are undisputed, and no differing inferences may be drawn from them, the question becomes one of law for the court; and we have to determine just what and how much evidence is necessary to show conclusively the existence of these essential elements.

[5][6][7] We think that the mere purchase by a customer from a retail dealer in foods of an article ordinarily used for human consumption does by implication make known to the vendor the purpose for which the article is required. Such a transaction standing by itself permits no contrary inferences. In this we agree with the courts of Massachusetts. Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co., ...