Rinard v. Biczak

• Citation: 441 N.W.2d 441,177 Mich.App. 287
• Decision Date: 26 June 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 101702
• Parties: Gordon RINARD and Stephanie Rinard, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Christine Rinard, Plaintiff, v. Alan J. BICZAK, D.O., Defendant-Appellant. 177 Mich.App. 287, 441 N.W.2d 441, 58 U.S.L.W. 2056
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 441

441 N.W.2d 441

Gordon RINARD and Stephanie Rinard, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Christine Rinard, Plaintiff, v. Alan J. BICZAK, D.O., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 101702.

177 Mich.App. 287, 441 N.W.2d 441, 58 U.S.L.W. 2056

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 5, 1988.

Decided June 5, 1989.

Released for Publication June 26, 1989.

[177 MICHAPP 289] Landman, Latimer, Clink & Robb by Steven C. Kohl and Bennett C. Rosene, Muskegon, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Bremer, Wade, Nelson & Alt by Michael D. Wade and Phillip J. Nelson, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and HOOD and OLZARK, ^* JJ.

DANHOF, Chief Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from a Muskegon Circuit Court jury verdict which awarded damages to plaintiffs Gordon and Stephanie Rinard for the costs of raising their daughter Christine's child, which they adopted. We reverse.

In May of 1983, Stephanie Rinard took fifteen-year-old Christine to see defendant because she discovered that Christine was sexually active. Christine was not pregnant at this time. On December 5, 1983, Christine was again taken to defendant who examined her regarding her possible pregnancy. Christine replied negatively when defendant asked her if she had engaged in sexual intercourse since the last time that he saw her. Actually, she had been having sexual relations with her stepbrother. Defendant incorrectly concluded that Christine was not pregnant at this time. On July 9, 1984, Christine gave birth to a normal, healthy baby which Gordon and Stephanie Rinard adopted.

Plaintiffs Gordon, Stephanie and Christine Rinard brought this medical malpractice action against defendant based on his failure to diagnose Christine's pregnancy in December of 1983. Christine's claim was dismissed with prejudice on motion of her own counsel prior to trial. Plaintiffs testified that Christine probably would have had an abortion if defendant had informed them that [177 MICHAPP 290] she was pregnant in December of 1983. The jury awarded damages to Gordon and Stephanie Rinard for the costs of raising the child. The lower court denied defendant's post-trial motions.

We conclude that the child's mother was the only plaintiff who could have properly brought a cause of action based on defendant's failure to diagnose her pregnancy. She could have recovered the costs of pregnancy and birth, and related damages, but not the costs of raising the child. The mother's parents could not maintain this cause of action for the costs of raising their daughter's child, whom they adopted. Nobody, including natural and adoptive parents, can recover the costs of raising a normal, healthy child because those costs are outweighed by the benefits of that child's life.

We resolve the primary issues in this case by addressing three questions: (1) Can a cause of action be maintained in Michigan for failure to diagnose pregnancy? (2) What recovery is available based on this cause of action? and (3) Can the child's grandparents, who are also the adoptive parents in this case, bring this cause of action?

A cause of action can be maintained in Michigan for failure to diagnose pregnancy. In Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich.App. 35, 46-47, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987), lv. den. 430 Mich. 860 (1988), this Court stated that as long as abortion remains an option allowed by law, physicians owe a duty to furnish patients with adequate information for them to be able to decide whether to choose that course of action. Proffitt was a wrongful birth case. The term "wrongful birth" is a shorthand name given to actions brought by the parents of a child born with severe defects against a physician, or other responsible party, who negligently fails to inform them in a timely fashion of the risk that the mother will give birth to such a child, effectively [177 MICHAPP 291] precluding an informed decision as to whether the pregnancy should be avoided or terminated. 162 Mich.App. at 40, 412 N.W.2d 232. The instant case does not involve a wrongful birth cause of action. However, the claim asserted in this case is more analogous to that cause of action than to other causes of action such as wrongful life or wrongful pregnancy which Michigan courts have addressed. See Proffitt, supra, pp. 40-41, 412 N.W.2d 232. This Court impliedly recognized a cause of action for failure to diagnose pregnancy in Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich.App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980), lv. gtd. 412 Mich. 889, 313 N.W.2d 286 (1981), dis. by stipulation 412 Mich. 889, 313 N.W.2d 286 (1982). Our Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in that case and directed the parties to brief the issues of whether the defendant should be liable for damages for failure to diagnose pregnancy and, if so, how the damages should be measured. The appeal was dismissed upon stipulation by the parties.

We turn to the question of what recovery is available based on a cause of action for wrongful failure to diagnose pregnancy. The lower court instructed the jury to determine damages by applying the "benefits rule" which was set forth in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), lv. den. 385 Mich. 753 (1971). Michigan courts have applied the benefits rule on numerous occasions. However, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the benefits rule should not be used to determine damages in this type of case.

Under the benefits rule, the trier of fact determines the amount of damages to be awarded by evaluating the benefits of having the child according to the circumstances of the case and subtracting the dollar value of those benefits from the dollar value of the injury to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's tortious conduct. Troppi, supra, pp. 254-257, 187 N.W.2d 511. In Troppi, the defendant pharmacist negligently[177 MICHAPP 292] failed to fill a woman's prescription for birth control pills, resulting in the birth of a normal, healthy child. Under Troppi, the costs of raising a normal, healthy, but unwanted, child, is an element of gross damages. 31 Mich.App. at 261, 187 N.W.2d 511. See also Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich.App. 545, 547, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978), lv. den. 403 Mich. 855 (1978). The Troppi Court noted that, in the great majority of cases, the birth of a healthy child confers so substantial a benefit as to outweigh the expenses of his or her birth and support. However, the Court felt that it could not say, as a matter of law, that a healthy child always confers such an overriding benefit. Troppi, supra, 31 Mich.App. p. 254, 187 N.W.2d 511.

Michigan is among the minority of states which allow the recovery of the costs of raising a child as an element of damages, offset by the benefits received by the parents from the parent-child relationship. In a substantially greater number of jurisdictions, courts have denied the recovery of child-rearing costs. See Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 186-187 (Okla.1987); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 197, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385, 387-388 (1983), cert. den. 464 U.S. 846, 104 S.Ct. 149, 78 L.Ed.2d 139 (1983), and cases cited therein.

Courts have not allowed the recovery of the costs of raising a normal, healthy child as an element of damages for many reasons. Morris, supra, pp. 187-188; Cockrum, supra, pp. 198-199, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385. We consider the best reason to be that the costs of raising such a child are outweighed by the value of that child's life. In Rohm v. Stroud, 386 Mich. 693, 696, 194 N.W.2d 307 (1972), our Supreme Court stated that the value of a minor child's services to a parent is at least as great as the amount expended by the parent on the child's support, maintenance and education. In that wrongful death case, our Supreme Court further stated that parents[177 MICHAPP 293] are at least entitled to the presumption that a child is worth his keep, and the negligent act which snuffs out their child's life deprives them of services at least equal to the amount of their pecuniary outlay. 386 Mich. at 697, 194 N.W.2d 307.

The instant case does not involve a wrongful death claim. However, allowing the costs of raising a child as an element of damages logically requires the conclusion that the nonexistence of that child would be a benefit. Morris, supra, p. 188. We agree with the reasoning of the Illinois Court of Appeals which stated:

The existence of a normal, healthy life is an esteemed right under our laws, rather than a compensable wrong. [Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.App.3d 51, 62, 29 Ill.Dec. 216, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979) ].

In a proper hierarchy of values, the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it. Cockrum, supra, p. 201, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385. A court " 'has no business declaring that among the living are people who never should have been born.' " Proffitt, supra, p. 51, 412 N.W.2d 232, quoting Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 249, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (1986).

Another reason for not allowing the recovery of child-rearing costs as an element of damages is that, to maximize their recovery under the benefits rule, parents must demonstrate that they did not want their child and that the child is of minimal value to them. Michigan should not allow " 'the unseemly spectacle of parents disparaging the "value" of their children or the degree of their affection for them in open court.' " Cockrum, supra, p. 202, 69 Ill.Dec. 168, 447 N.E.2d 385, quoting Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084, 1086, n. 4 (Fla.App.1980). A related concern is for the child who may learn [177 MICHAPP 294] that his parents did not want him to exist and sued to have the person who made his existence possible provide for his support. Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 242-244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570-571 (1982).

We do not dispute the fact that child rearing is a costly enterprise. We simply believe that the benefits of raising a normal, healthy child must be conclusively presumed to be greater than the costs of raising that child. As a matter...