Rinard v. State, No. 975S237
Docket Nº | No. 975S237 |
Citation | 351 N.E.2d 20, 265 Ind. 56 |
Case Date | July 06, 1976 |
Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
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v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
[265 Ind. 57]
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Robert S. Bechert, Deputy Public Defender of Allen County, Fort Wayne, for appellant.Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Charles M. Russell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, Justice.
The Appellant, Timothy Jasper Rinard, was convicted on February 7, 1975, of violating the Indiana Uniform Controlled Substances Act, delivery of cocaine. He was sentenced by the jury to imprisonment for a period of fifteen years. A motion to correct errors, with supporting memorandum, was filed by the Appellant on June 13, 1975. This motion was denied on June 27, 1975. This appeal has been kept viable since that date by appropriate extensions of time requested by the Appellant and granted by this court.
I.
We will first consider the contention of the Appellant that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. That evidence revealed that on April 29, 1974, Robert Jeffries Foster, a police informant, telephoned the Appellant to arrange a purchase of cocaine. He then called Officer Thomas E. Stoots of the Fort Wayne Police to report the arrangement. Stoots picked up Foster and drove to a gas station, where he was met by another police officer, Steven D. Schulien.
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The two policemen strip-searched their informant [265 Ind. 58] and then proceeded toward the home of the Appellant in separate vehicles.Foster had served as a police informant for a number of months and had assisted officers Stoots and Schulien in some twenty-five drug purchases. He rode with Officer Stoots, who parked his car approximately six houses, an estimated five hundred feet, from the Appellant's residence. Foster was given $90.00 and proceeded to enter the home. Stoots could not see who opened the door. When Foster exited, Stoots observed the Appellant. Foster returned to the car and handed a 'pink paper packet' to Stoots. He indicated it was cocaine.
In the meantime, Officer Schulien had parked his unmarked vehicle so that he could observe the rear entrance of the Appellant's residence. Approximately ten minutes after Foster had left the home, Schulien saw the Appellant walk to a Corvette parked about thirty or thirty-five feet from Schulien's car. While this occurred during the early evening, it was still light and Schulien watched the Appellant for some thirty seconds.
Foster testified that he had purchased the 'pink paper package' from the Appellant. A police chemist testified that the substance contained in this package was indeed cocaine. This package and its contents were also admitted into evidence.
In determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, this court does not judge the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence. We look at the evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. A verdict will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Young v. State, (1975) Ind., 332 N.E.2d 103; Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686; Jackson v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 477, 275 N.E.2d 538.
The evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Appellant presented an alibi defense at trial to [265 Ind. 59] establish that he was not at his home during the alleged illegal transaction. It was within the province of the jury, however, to reject this theory. The Appellant's argument submits that the chief prosecuting witness, police informant Foster, was an unreliable witness and that the corroboration provided by testimony of police officers placing the Appellant at the scene was 'minimal.' It is added that only one witness called by the Appellant was impeached. These assertions ask us to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence. This we cannot do.
II.
The Appellant also challenges the admission into evidence of the cocaine allegedly purchased from the Appellant. It is asserted that the State failed to conclusively demonstrate that the chain of custody of that evidence was unbroken.
Officer Stoots received the 'pink paper package' from Robert Foster at approximately 7:12 p.m. April 29, 1974. The officer put the package in an envelope, on which he wrote the date, time, location, the suspect and the alleged contents. The envelope was signed and sealed by Officer Stoots. When he returned to the police station, Stoots placed this envelope into another plastic envelope, and filled out a police department continuity slip. The evidence was then deposited in a locked security box in the property room of the Fort Wayne Police Department's Bureau of Vice and Narcotics.
Access to this security box, a used postal drop box with a slot opening, could only be had through a back panel which was padlocked at all times. Two police officers had keys. One was the custodian of evidence
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in the property room, George Lazoff. He removed the package...To continue reading
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Orr v. State, No. 2-283A56
...a chain of custody of the specimen to the lab where the testing was made and the conclusions drawn. Rinard v. State, (1976) 256 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20. However, it is not necessary to account for every minute or every hand through which the sample passes. A proper showing requires only the ......
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Rowan v. State, No. 380S76
...and the course to be followed when a separation order is violated are within the discretion of the trial court. Rinard v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20; Dudley v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 176, 263 N.E.2d 161. In this case, defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Officer Am......
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Hunter v. State, No. 1--976A168
...the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Rinard v. State (1976), Ind., 351 N.E.2d 20. It is the task of the trier of fact to sort the evidence and select those witnesses whom they chose to believe and reject the Page 605 conflic......
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Hughes v. State, No. 10A01-8605-CR-116
...and Hughes claims this was error. The permitting of surrebuttal testimony is a matter of trial court discretion. Rinard v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20. Such rulings will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion. Id. No offer to prove was made at tria......
-
Orr v. State, No. 2-283A56
...a chain of custody of the specimen to the lab where the testing was made and the conclusions drawn. Rinard v. State, (1976) 256 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20. However, it is not necessary to account for every minute or every hand through which the sample passes. A proper showing requires only the ......
-
Rowan v. State, No. 380S76
...and the course to be followed when a separation order is violated are within the discretion of the trial court. Rinard v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20; Dudley v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 176, 263 N.E.2d 161. In this case, defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Officer Am......
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Hunter v. State, No. 1--976A168
...the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Rinard v. State (1976), Ind., 351 N.E.2d 20. It is the task of the trier of fact to sort the evidence and select those witnesses whom they chose to believe and reject the Page 605 conflic......
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Hughes v. State, No. 10A01-8605-CR-116
...and Hughes claims this was error. The permitting of surrebuttal testimony is a matter of trial court discretion. Rinard v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 56, 351 N.E.2d 20. Such rulings will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of that discretion. Id. No offer to prove was made at tria......