Rincon v. Elizondo

• Decision Date: 24 August 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:21-CV-45
• Parties: ISMAEL RINCON, Plaintiff, v. ERNESTO ELIZONDO, III, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

ISMAEL RINCON, Plaintiff,
v.
ERNESTO ELIZONDO, III, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:21-CV-45

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Laredo Division

August 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Marina Garcia Marmolejo, United States District Judge.

In April 2019, Plaintiff Ismael Rincon had an encounter with the Laredo Police Department, in which officers handcuffed and searched him (Dkt. No. 38 at 5-13). Plaintiff then filed this pro se civil rights action against three officers-Ernesto Elizondo, III, Arturo Benavides, and Robert Fernandez, Jr.-and the City of Laredo (id. at 2-3). Construing the live pleading liberally, the Court understands Plaintiff is asserting seven claims against Defendants. See infra Section I.B.

Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement (Dkt. No. 18). Having reviewed the arguments, record, and applicable authorities, the motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 18) is GRANTED as to Counts 3, 5, and 7, but DENIED as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6. Nonetheless, Defendants' motion for a more definite statement (Dkt. No. 18) is GRANTED as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true.^[1]

Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff alleges the following: He and his family own two plots of land sitting along the Rio Grande shoreline (Dkt. No. 38 at 4). One parcel is an “unimproved” piece of land with no structures (id.). On two occasions, when Plaintiff parked his truck on the unimproved lot, unknown persons vandalized the vehicle (id.). In response, Plaintiff filed a report with Laredo PD and began patrolling the lot on certain nights (id. at 5). His patrols would occur anywhere between 10:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. (id.).

Just after midnight, in the early morning of April 27, 2019, as Plaintiff patrolled his unimproved lot, Plaintiff carried a rifle over his shoulder, with the muzzle pointed at the ground (id.). At some point, Elizondo arrived and questioned Plaintiff (id. at 6).^[2] Although Plaintiff explained he was patrolling his own property, Elizondo countered with his belief that the land actually belonged to the City (id.). Elizondo asked for Plaintiff's identification, and Plaintiff refused (id.). Elizondo then

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radioed for more police units (id. at 7). While waiting for additional officers to arrive, Elizondo pointed his gun at Plaintiff, and Plaintiff held his hands in the air (id.). Elizondo patted Plaintiff down and confiscated Plaintiff's rifle (id.).

After more police officers arrived, Elizondo began inspecting Plaintiff's weapon, and Plaintiff started filming the encounter on his cell phone (id. at 7-8). Plaintiff repeatedly asked Elizondo for his name, and Elizondo grabbed a hold of Plaintiff's cell phone (id. at 8-9). In an attempt to confiscate it, Elizondo “began to push the phone into [Plaintiff's] chest and throat, forcing [Plaintiff] back several feet” (id. at 8-9). Then, at Elizondo's direction, Fernandez handcuffed Plaintiff (id. at 9).

At this point, Fernandez twisted Plaintiff's wrist and arm, and Plaintiff told officers that this caused him pain (id. at 9). Then, Fernandez and Elizondo searched Plaintiff's pockets, with Fernandez continuing to twist Plaintiff's arm (id. at 9-10). Fernandez's twist caused Plaintiff's shoulder to “pop” and he exclaimed in “intense pain” (id. at 10). Fernandez continued this hold for “several moments” (id.). In all, Plaintiff was handcuffed for approximately 15 minutes while officers reviewed the contents of Plaintiff's wallet, confirmed his identification, and ran his name for outstanding warrants (id. at 11). While Plaintiff was handcuffed, officers told Plaintiff not to resist and informed him that, recently, someone reported a shooting in the area (id. at 10; Ex. No. 4 at 6:20-33).

After officers released Plaintiff from his handcuffs, Plaintiff started a second cell phone recording (Dkt. No. 38 at 11.). At this time, Elizondo held Plaintiff's rifle and spoke to him (Ex. No. 4 at 18:20). Benavides then directed his flashlight at

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Plaintiff and his cell phone (Dkt. No. 38 at 11; Ex. No. 4 at 18:22). Then, Elizondo took Plaintiff's phone again, stopped the recording, and handed the phone back to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 38 at 11). Elizondo told Plaintiff to put the phone in his pocket, but Plaintiff held the phone in his hand in a recording position (id.; Ex. No. 4 at 18:4955). Elizondo then returned Plaintiff's rifle to him, and officers left the scene (Ex. No. 4 at 18:49-55).

Plaintiff alleges the handcuffing caused wrist lacerations, temporary loss of hand sensation, and injury to his rotator cuff (Dkt. No. 38 at 12-13). He allegedly received medical attention for these handcuff-related injuries (id. at 12).

B. Procedural History

After the incident, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, which asserts 7 claims against Defendants:

1. A First Amendment claim against Elizondo for infringing on his right to film the police when he confiscated Plaintiff's cell phone twice

2. A Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Elizondo for confiscating Plaintiff's phone twice;

3. A Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Elizondo and Fernandez for handcuffing Plaintiff and searching him for, and seizing, his wallet;^[3]

4. A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Elizondo for pushing Plaintiff's throat and chest;

5. A Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Fernandez for twisting Plaintiff's shoulder while he was handcuffed;

6. A First Amendment claim against Benavides for infringing on

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Plaintiff's right to film the police when he directed his flashlight beam into Plaintiff's cellphone camera; and

7. An unconstitutional failure-to-train or supervise claim against the City, based on the presence of a police lieutenant who “failed to restrain the complained of officers.”

(id. at 13-19; Dkt. No. 36 at 14).^[4]

The Defendants filed a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), or in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) (Dkt. No. 18). The motion asserts that the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's claims and that Plaintiff's claim against the City was inadequately pled (id. at 3, 19). Plaintiff filed a response (Dkt. No. 36).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

“The standard for Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings is identical to the standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). This inquiry requires two steps. Id. First, the Court must “identify the complaint's well-pleaded factual content,” setting aside any unsupported legal conclusions. Id. Second, the

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Court assesses whether the allegations are plausible. Id.

If, after viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the district court finds the claim is implausible or cannot reasonably infer the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, dismissal is proper. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Assessing a complaint for plausibility is a “context-specific task,” and the court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Notably, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted).

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity “attempts to balance two competing societal interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.'” Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). As such, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Because qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” a district court should resolve the issue at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32.

To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show (1) the official's conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017). A court can begin its assessment with either prong, but both must be satisfied to deny

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immunity. Gibson v. Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 2014).

With respect to the second prong, a plaintiff must point to case law showing the federal right is “sufficiently clear to put a reasonable officer on notice that certain conduct violates that right.” Sanchez v. Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1998); see Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833, 849 (5th Cir. 2017) (“At [the motion to dismiss] stage, [the plaintiff] has the burden to demonstrate that the law was clearly established in this area on the date of the incident.”). That is, the right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Lincoln, 874 F.3d at 848 (quoting Lincoln v. Barnes, 855 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 2017)). “This inquiry does not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question...