Rindlaub v. Travelers Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37925,37925
• Citation: 175 Ohio St. 303,194 N.E.2d 577,25 O.O.2d 177
• Parties: , 25 O.O.2d 177 RINDLAUB, Appellee, v. The TRAVELERS INS. CO.; Rindlaub, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 303

175 Ohio St. 303

194 N.E.2d 577, 25 O.O.2d 177

RINDLAUB, Appellee, v. The TRAVELERS INS. CO.; Rindlaub, Appellant.

No. 37925.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 4, 1963.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The provisions of a policy of 'old line' insurance regulating the mode and manner of effectuating a change of beneficiary are for the benefit of the insurance company only. (Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. [1926], 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N.E. 748, followed.)

2. Where an insured during his lifetime communicated to the insurer his clearly expressed intent to name certain new beneficiaries and the insurer has interpleaded and deposited the policy proceeds in court, such expressed intention of the insured will be determinative of the right of contesting claimants to the policy proceeds, notwithstanding the absence of the written approval by the insurer required by the provisions of the policy. (Stone v. Stephens [1951], 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E.2d 766, 25 A.L.R.2d 992, distinguished.)

In 1934, Bruce Douglas Rindlaub, who was in the military service and stationed in California, purchased and was issued two life insurance policies by the Travelers Insurance Company, which designated his then wife, Alice P. Rindlaub, as primary beneficiary and his daughter, Cornelia, as contingent beneficiary. Thereafter on June 4, 1946, the insured and the appellant were divorced by decree of the District Court of Osage County, Oklahoma, to become effective December 4, 1946.

On July 2, 1946, the insured, who was still in military service and stationed in Japan, wrote a letter to the company enclosing two witnessed statements directing that Miss Margaret Walker be substituted as primary beneficiary of the two policies. A photostatic copy of a carbon copy of a letter dated July 16, 1946, from the company and addressed to the insured, reads as follows:

'We have received your letter of July 2 accompanied by direction to pay the insurance under these contracts to Miss Margaret Walker, if living, otherwise to Miss Cornelia D. Rindlaub.

'We note Miss Cornelia D. Rindlaub is your daughter as previously designated, but the relationship of the newly proposed beneficiary, Miss Margaret Walker, is not given in your direction of July 2.

'As this contract was issued in California, it is subject to the Community Property laws of that state which give one's spouse a certain interest in all community property not removable except by release of the spouse unless by court action it has been disposed of in some other way.

'In order to enable us to give proper attention to your recent direction will you please consider the foregoing and supply us with any information as to Alice P. Rindlaub's position in this matter whether any action has taken place to divest her of her interest, the relationship of the new payee and any other facts that would be important for the record.'

There is no proof as to whether the insured ever received such letter from the company. Nothing further was done, either by the insured or by the company, with respect to the change of beneficiary.

The insured married the appellee on December 11, 1946, and had possession of the insurance policies showing appellant as named beneficiary when he died in 1959. Appellee is the lawful widow of insured.

After the death of the insured, appellee commenced an action against the insurance company for the proceeds of the two policies of life insurance. The insurer filed an interpleader and deposited the money in court, and appellant was substituted as a party defendant.

Key, Butler, Harrison & Carlile, Columbus, for appellee.

Knepper, White, Richards, Miller & Roberts, John M. Adams and William L. Clark, Columbus, for appellant.

GIBSON, Judge.

The appellant's claim to the proceeds of the two insurance policies is predicated upon the facts (1) that she was the named principal beneficiary on the date of insured's death and (2) that there had been no change of beneficiary in conformity with the pertinent contractual provisions of the policies. Both policies contain identical provisions respecting change of beneficiary, which read as follows:

'Subject to the right of an assignee, if any, the Insured may at any time and from time to time during the continuance of this contract change the Beneficiary, to take effect only when such change shall have been approved in writing by the Company, whereupon all rights of...