Rinehart v. Dir., TDCJ-CID

• Decision Date: 15 March 2022
• Docket Number: 3:19-cv-00940-S (BT)
• Parties: BRIAN LEE RINEHART, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

BRIAN LEE RINEHART, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.

No. 3:19-cv-00940-S (BT)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

March 15, 2022

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REBECCA RUTHERFORD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Brian Lee Rinehart, a Texas prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court referred the petition to the United States magistrate judge for findings and a recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. For the following reasons, the District Court should DISMISS in part and DENY in part Rinehart's petition.

I.

In October 2012, Rinehart was charged by information with possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver between one and four grams in Johnson County, Texas. See The State of Texas v. Brian Lee Rinehart, Case No F46964. He later pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and entered his voluntary waivers and judicial confession. On December 11, 2012, the district court judge deferred adjudicating guilt and placed Rinehart on ten years' community supervision.

On January 17, 2017, the State filed a motion to revoke Rinehart's community supervision based, in part, on a subsequent theft conviction. On August 3, 2017, the district court revoked his supervision and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.

On July 21, 2018, Rinehart filed an application for a state writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) denied the application without a written order on September 19, 2018.

On October 2, 2018, Rinehart filed his § 2254 petition in this court.^[1] Pet. (ECF No. 1). He later moved to add supplemental facts. Mot. (ECF No. 9). On May 15, 2019, the Court allowed him to supplement his claims with additional facts. Ord. (ECF No. 10). In his petition, as supplemented Rinehart raises six general claims. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims relate to the proceedings leading to his placement on community supervision, while the first claim relates to the subsequent revocation and adjudication of guilt. Specifically, Rinehart claims:

1. He received ineffective assistance of counsel during his community supervision revocation proceeding because his attorney, Brian Bufkin, was employed by the Johnson County District Attorney's Office at the time he pleaded guilty;

2. His trial attorney, Kimberly Baker, provided ineffective assistance of counsel when she:

a. failed to investigate;

b. told him to plead guilty or he would receive a 50-year sentence;

c. failed to object to the information;

d. failed to challenge the fact that the drugs were in a vehicle he did not occupy or own, and his fingerprints were not on the drugs;

e. failed to file a motion for discovery;

3. He is actually innocent because there is no link between him and the crime, and he was charged because of his past;

4. He was denied due process where:

a. He was arraigned on a lesser charge than the one he was ultimately convicted of;

b. The information was legally deficient because it failed to contain all of the elements of the offense of conviction;

c. He pleaded guilty to a charge he was not aware of;

d. A presentence investigation was not conducted before he was given probation;

e. The police report states that he possessed cocaine, but the information states he possessed methamphetamine;

f. The police affidavit states he possessed less than one gram, but he was charged with possessing over one gram;

5. His guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because:

a. He was not informed of the "true charge" against him;

b. He was advised that he would receive a 50-year sentence if he refused to plead guilty;

c. Baker failed to investigate;

6. He was maliciously prosecuted because:

a. The State amended the information;

b. The information did not contain all of the elements of the offense;

c. He did not receive notice of the amended information;

d. The police report stated that he had cocaine, but the information alleged he had methamphetamine;

e. The State acted vindictively toward him because of a prior lawsuit; and

f. He was not arraigned on the intent to deliver charge.

Respondent filed an answer (ECF No. 17), and Rinehart filed a reply. The issues are fully briefed, and Rinehart's claims are ripe for adjudication.

II.

A. Rinehart's second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims are time-barred.

In Rinehart's petition, the second through sixth claims relate to his guilty plea on the 2012 drug charge and the suspended sentence. These claims were filed after his federal limitations period expired, and they are therefore untimely.

1. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas proceedings. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

In most cases, the limitations period begins to run when the judgment becomes final after direct appeal or the time for seeking such review has expired. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, the state court entered judgment in Rinehart's drug case on December 11, 2012. He did not file a direct appeal, and his conviction became final on January 10, 2013, thirty days after the date of his judgment and sentence. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1) (including the time limits for properly filing a notice of appeal). Rinehart then had one year, until January 10, 2014, to file his federal petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). He did not file his petition in this Court until October 2, 2018, more than four years after the deadline expired. Rinehart's petition is therefore untimely.

Rinehart filed a state habeas application on July 21, 2018, which would generally toll the limitations period. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a state habeas application tolls the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2)); Broussard v. Thaler, 414 Fed.Appx. 686, 687-88 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("AEDPA provides that '[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). In this case, however, Rinehart's filing of a state habeas application did not toll the limitations period. He filed his application on July 21, 2018, over four years after the limitations period had expired. Therefore, his state habeas application did not toll the limitations period. See Flores v. Quarterman, 467 F.3d 484, 485 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) ("While the filing of a state habeas application ordinarily tolls the federal one-year statute of limitations, [the petitioner] did not file his state application until... more than one year after his sentence became final, and almost two months after the statute of limitations expired.") (citing Scott, 227 F.3d at 263) (holding that state habeas applications filed after the expiration of the limitations period do not toll the limitations period).

2. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period is subject to equitable tolling in "rare and exceptional cases." Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must "examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling") (quoting Davis, 158 F.3d at 811). The Fifth Circuit has held that "[e]quitable tolling applies principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights." Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605-06 (5th Cir. 2006). A petitioner bears the burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).

Here, Rinehart's § 2254 petition includes the following direction: "If your judgment of conviction, parole revocation or disciplinary proceeding became final over one year ago, you must explain why the one-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not bar your petition." Pet. 9 (ECF No. 1). Rinehart responded that his case was not a "final conviction" until August 3, 2012, and he was "probated on 12-11-12. Therefore[, ] it is within the limitations of statute." Id. Rinehart is mistaken that his conviction became final on August 3, 2012. As discussed, his conviction became final on January 10, 2013, and his explanation is insufficient to demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Moreover, if his conviction became final on August 3, 2021, his petition would be even more untimely. For these reasons, he fails to meet his burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to equitable tolling. See Phillips, 216 F.3d at 511.

3. Actual Innocence

The Supreme Court has held that "actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations."^[2] McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). A petitioner who claims actual innocence, however, "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Id.

Rinehart argues that he is actually innocent. See Pet. 6 (ECF No. 1) ("At no time was I guilty of poss w/intent to deliver."); Reply 1, 5 (ECF...