Rinehart v. Rinehart

Decision Date20 May 1957
Docket NumberGen. No. 10116
Citation14 Ill.App.2d 116,143 N.E.2d 398
PartiesMary RINEHART, by Elizabeth E. Huff, her Conservator, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry RINEHART, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Thomas Rinehart, deceased, Coy E. Sumpter, and Carlinville National Bank, a Banking Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Busch & Harrington, Earl C. Harrington, Champaign (Thomas E. Harrington, Champaign, of counsel), for appellant.

Alvin G. Whitehouse, Gillespie, for appellees.

CARROLL, Justice.

This action arises out of a dispute over the ownership of the proceeds of a contract for the sale of real estate.

On November 9, 1953, Thomas Rinehart and Mary Rinehart, his wife, the owners as tenants in common of 100 acres of farm land in Macoupin County, Illinois, entered into a contract to sell the same to Coy E. Sumpter.The selling price was $26,000 which the purchasers agreed to pay as follows: The sum of $4,000 in cash upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of $22,000 to be paid in annual installments of $2,000, the first of which was due January 1, 1955 and similar payments on the first of each succeeding January 1 until the total balance was paid in full.

The sale contract in addition to the customary covenants found in such instruments, contains the following provisions:

'The first parties have executed and deposited with the said Carlinville National Bank a warranty deed to second party and a copy of this contract and said bank shall deliver as herein required, less such closing costs as are by law required. * * *

'Payments as herein required of second party shall be paid to said bank and deposited in the name of Thomas R. Rinehart in a checking account in said bank. * * *'

A copy of said contract and the deed to Sumpter were deposited with the Carlinville National Bank.

On November 1, 1954, the parties executed an amendment to their contract by which the date of payment of the first annual installment of $2,000 was deferred to January 1, 1956.On November 9, 1953, the purchaser paid $880 as interest for which sum the Bank issues a certificate of deposit payable to Thomas Rinehart.This certificate was not delivered to the payee therein but was placed on a spindle in the Bank where it still remains.

On January 25, 1955, Thomas Rinehart died, leaving a last will and testament in which Harry Rinehart, son of the testator, was named as sole beneficiary.Mary Rinehart was adjudged incompetent on January 31, 1955 and Elizabeth E. Huff was appointed her Conservator on October 26, 1955.Subsequently, Mary Rinehart by her Conservator, renounced the will of Thomas Rinehart.

On December 9, 1955 Sumpter paid $2,000 on the principal of the contract and $880 interest.The Bank deposited this payment in a checking account in the name of Thomas Rinehart and this sum remains on deposit in said account.

The complaint filed herein on December 22, 1955 by the Conservator for Mary Rinehart alleges, in addition to the above facts, substantially that the death of Thomas Rinehart renders inoperative the directions in the contract as to the deposit of the purchase price in a checking account in his name; that the manner in which payments on the contract are to be deposited and carried by the Bank is not made clear by the terms of said contract; that the Executor of the Thomas Rinehart estate has failed to report to the County Court of Macoupin County the condition of the account with the Bank covering payments made under the contract; that the Executor has not inventoried or reported to the County Court that Mary Rinehart owns an interest in the real estate covered by the contract or in the proceeds of said contract; that Thomas Rinehart, in whose account the proceeds of the contract were to be deposited, is a trustee of the monies under the contract and deposited in his checking account; that because of his death and to prevent a failure of the trust the Circuit Court should appoint a trustee of the contract payment account; that the plaintiff's ward is the owner as a tenant in common with Harry Rinehart of an undivided two-thirds interest in the real estate described in the contract of sale and in the proceeds of said contract; that the interest of plaintiff's ward should be segregated from that of the estate of Thomas Rinehart, deceased and administered under direction of the Circuit Court.Joined as partiesdefendant are Harry Rinehart, individually and as Executor of the estate of Thomas Rinehart, deceased, Coy E. Sumpter and Carlinville National Bank.The relief prayed in the complaint is a declaratory judgment determining the interests of all parties under the contract and in addition the appointment of a trustee to receive the purchase monies payable under the contract and to divide the same between plaintiff's ward and the Thomas Rinehart estate according to the respective interests of each therein as determined by the court.

Upon answer being filed, the court heard the evidence and entered a decree in favor of the defendants.In its decree the court found that under the contract, Mary Rinehart intended to and did actually assign, transfer and convey all of her interests therein, and all monies payable thereunder to her husband, Thomas Rinehart, and that as a result all monies due and to become due under said contract became and are the sole property of Thomas Rinehart; and that plaintiff having renounced the will of Thomas Rinehart, is entitled to a one-third interest in his estate including the proceeds of the contract deposited with the Carlinville National Bank.

Plaintiff appeals from the decree contending that the trial court erred in holding as it did that Mary Rinehart made a gift inter vivos to Thomas Rinehart of her interest in the contract.

Where is it sought to show that a transaction constituted a gift inter vivos, proof as to certain elements must be made.An essential fact which must be established is the delivery of the property by the donor to the donee with the intent to pass title.As stated by the court in In re Estate of Meyer, 317 Ill.App. 96, 45 N.E.2d 495, 498:

'To constitute a gift inter vivos there must be a delivery of the property and a parting with all persent and future domination over it, and it is essential to the validity of the gift that it be absolute and irrevocable.It is not essential that the delivery be made directly to the donee but a valid delivery may be made to a third party for the donee.The delivery, however, must be with the intention of vesting the title absolutely and irrevocable in the donee and the donor must relinquish all present and future dominion and power over the subject matter of the gift.If the gift is not completed during the lifetime of the donor his death revokes the part which has been performed.There must be the intention of making a gift, but intention alone, that the donee shall have the property, does not make a gift.The delivery of the subject of the gift into the possession of the donee or some third person for his benefit is essential, and the delivery must be with the intention of vesting the title and the immediate right of possession of the property in the donee or it will be insufficient....

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10 cases
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    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 2, 2007
    ...or obligee." Garvey v. Parrish, 84 Ill.App.3d 578, 584, 40 Ill.Dec. 13, 405 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (1980) (citing Rinehart v. Rinehart, 14 Ill.App.2d 116, 123, 143 N.E.2d 398 (1957)). "An escrow executed and deposited upon a valuable consideration is not revocable except according to the terms o......
  • Buhle v. Chicago Bd. Options Exchange, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 11, 1988
    ...support of their assertion that an escrow agreement was created between themselves and defendant, plaintiffs cite Rinehart v. Rinehart (1957), 14 Ill.App.2d 116, 143 N.E.2d 398. Rinehart defines an escrow as the " * * * a written instrument which by its terms imports a legal obligation, and......
  • Midwest Decks, Inc. v. Butler & Baretz Acquisitions, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 18, 1995
    ...or the happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee or obligee." (Rinehart v. Rinehart (1957), 14 Ill.App.2d 116, 123, 143 N.E.2d 398, 402; see also Black's Law Dictionary 545 (6th ed. 1990).) The cash hold back provision of the purchase agreement in t......
  • Simmons v. Simmons
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 13, 1980
    ...to her. (Bray v. Illinois National Bank of Springfield (1976), 37 Ill.App.3d 286, 289, 345 N.E.2d 503, 505; Rinehart v. Rinehart (1957), 14 Ill.App.2d 116, 121, 143 N.E.2d 398, 401.) This burden required the petitioner to show not only delivery, but also that the delivery of the bracelet wa......
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