Rinehart v. Saint Luke's South Hosp. Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-2209-SAC,10-2209-SAC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | JAMES B. RINEHART, Plaintiff, v. SAINT LUKE'S SOUTH HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a/, SAINT LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, and SAINT LUKE'S HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., Defendants. |
The case comes before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment: the plaintiff, James B. Rinehart ("Rinehart") moves for summary judgment on his claim for tortious interference with contract (DK. 32), and the defendants, Saint Luke's South Hospital, Inc. and Saint Luke's Health System, Inc. (collectively referred to as "St. Luke's") move for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's remaining claims: Kansas Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA") violation, tortious interference with a contract, and injunctive relief (Dk. 33). Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for decision.
The plaintiff has filed a class action petition on behalf of all individuals who received any healthcare treatment from any entity located in Kansas that is owned or affiliated with St. Luke's and "whose healthinsurance claim resulting from treatment was not submitted to their health insurance carrier for potential payment." (Dk. 1, ¶ 30). It is alleged that the defendants filed hospital liens pursuant to the statutes of Kansas and Missouri instead of submitting health insurance claims and that the plaintiff suffered financial hardship because his health insurance company did not pay the bills. The plaintiff claims the defendants' billing practices violate the Kansas Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA"), K.S.A. 50-623, et seq., and tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's contract with his health insurance carrier. The plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief on his claims.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Rule 56 authorizes judgment without trial "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Substantive law governs the elements of a given claim or defense and reveals what issues are to be determined and what facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is one which would affect the outcome of the claim or defense under the governing law. Id. If the movant would not have the burden of proof at trial on the particular claim or defense, then the motion must point to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Instead of disproving a claim or defense, the movantneed only show "a lack of evidence" on an essential element. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). To counter a "properly made" motion, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts based on admissible evidence. Id. The non-movant must show more than some "metaphysical doubt" based on "evidence" and not "speculation, conjecture or surmise." Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Bones v. Honeywell Intern., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). "[T]he dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' . . ., if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005). At this stage, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . . " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. See Pinkerton v.Colorado Dept. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir.2009).
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dk. 33)
Injured in a car accident, Rinehart was taken to the emergency room at St. Luke's South Hospital on December 2, 2005. He received treatment both in the emergency room and on an outpatient basis through July 14, 2006. St. Luke's established the following four patient accounts for Rinehart's different visits for care and treatment:
When he was initially admitted to St. Luke's in December of 2005, Rinehart signed a consent and agreement that assigned to St. Luke's his interest and right to benefits under his health insurance, and it further affirmed that he understood "that the acceptance of insurance assignments does not relieve me from any responsibility concerning payment for said services and that I am financially responsible to the entity and physicians for the charges not covered by the policy of the insurance or self-insured plan." (Dk. 34, Att. A, Ex. 2). By a check issued December 15, 2005, Rinehart's automobile insurer paid St. Luke's for Rinehart's charges on Account 1 under his Personal Injury Protection and Medpay benefits.
On or about December 15, 2005, Rinehart received St. Luke's billing for services provided on December 9, 2005, ("Account 2"), and it wasaccompanied by a letter identifying Rinehart's health insurance carrier and indicating that St. Luke's would be seeking payment first from the carrier. The plaintiff's complaint cites this letter as support for his allegation that "St. Luke's initially informed Plaintiff that his medical bills would be submitted to his health insurance carrier for payment, but then refused to do so." (Dk. 1, ¶ 25). According to St. Luke's patient account system, Rinehart was sent on or about January 5, 2006, an updated final bill as to his charges for Account 2. This bill would have indicated that St. Luke's no longer planned to bill Rinehart's health insurance carrier but intended to bill his automobile insurer. Rinehart's automobile insurer paid off Account 2 by a check issued January 20, 2006.
On or about August 8, 2006, St. Luke's sent Rinehart a copy of a lien notice for $3,724 for the charges for his outpatient visits in June and July of 2006 ("Account 4"). The lien notice identifies a lien for services furnished to Rinehart in the care of injuries happening in December of 2005 "for which injuries Samuel A. Mason is alleged to be liable." The notice was addressed to Mason's automobile insurance carrier. The notice does not identify any property of Rinehart or assert any encumbrance upon the same. Rinehart testified that upon receiving the lien notice he was displeased with St. Luke's for seeking payment in this way for the medical services. By check dated March 2, 2007, Rinehart's automobile insurer paid $1,948.20 ofthe total charges of Account 4.
On or around February 18, 2007, the plaintiff received a copy of another St. Luke's hospital lien notice that stated again it was for services furnished to Rinehart for the care of injuries occurring in December of 2005 "for which injuries Samuel A. Mason is alleged to be liable." The notice was addressed to Mason's automobile insurance carrier. The lien was in the amount of Account 3.
Rinehart received a letter dated October 11, 2007, from Venture Financial Services that identified itself as a debt collector for the creditor St. Luke's. The letter referenced the balances owing for Rinehart's Accounts 3 and 4 and stated in relevant part:
(Dk. 34, Rinehart Dep. Ex. 12). In his deposition, the plaintiff testified to the
following about his impression from receiving this letter:
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