Riner v. State
| Decision Date | 03 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 871S225,871S225 |
| Parties | Jack RINER and Wayne Evans, Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
William C. Erbecker, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Mark Peden, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Wayne Evans and his nephew Jack Riner (a juvenile) were charged by indictment with first degree murder in the death of Edward M. Gibson on August 10, 1970, in Hendricks County, Indiana, during the course of a burglary at Gibson's Trading Post. Defendants-Appellants were found guilty and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life. The case is before this court on an appeal from the Morgan County Circuit Court's denial of appellant's motion to correct errors.
The evidence giving rise to this prosecution is as follows. Edward Gibson and his brother Harold were owners of Gibson's Trading Post in Belleville, Indiana. Harold's home was about one mile southwest of the store and his brother, Edward, lived about a quarter mile due north. They both had burglar alarm monitors connected to the headboards of their beds. At three a.m. on the morning of August 10, 1970, Harold Gibson testified that he heard a loud noise over his monitor. He got out of bed and drove to the Trading Post after instructing his wife to call the Indiana State Police. He arrived on the west end of the store driveway, while his brother parked on the east end.
Harold was shot in the leg as he started walking toward the store. He testified that he saw someone going over a fence and shot at the fleeing figure. He then proceeded to the front of the building and found his brother holding his gun and yelling that he had been hit. Harold then testified that he saw a man or boy running across the neighbor's yard and fired a few shots at him. He then saw a figure running across Road 40, got back into his car, drove across the road and got another glimpse of the man running behind a house. Harold Gibson testified that he could not identify the persons at the Trading Post that morning.
Ronald Riner (brother of defendant Jack Riner and nephew of defendant Wayne Evans) testified as a state's witness. According to this witness, he had been riding around with Wayne Evans and his brother Jack Riner in Wayne Evans' car on the evening of the killing. Sometime in the early morning, they approached a little town outside Terre Haute. Ronald Riner testified that he was asleep in the back seat when the car stopped and defendant-Evans got out. According to Ronald Riner, Evans went back to the trunk and removed a plastic bag. Evans then came by the car and asked Jack Riner if he would go with him. Ronald Riner stated that he then laid back down in the back seat. He heard some shooting and observed several cars pulling up at a building to his right. Ronald Riner got out of the car and noticed someone, who he believed to be Wayne Evans, running toward the car, who then turned east and went toward Plainfield. Ronald Riner testified that he was scared and ran into a field.
Jack and Ronald Riner and their uncle, Wayne Evans, were thereafter apprehended by police officials making separate arrests in the general vicinity of the Trading Post within a few hours of the shooting.
Ronald Riner further testified that Wayne Evans had related an account of the incident to him while they were confined in the Hendricks County Jail. The substance of that conversation, according to Ronald Riner, is that Wayne Evans stated that he had instructed Jack Riner to serve as a lookout while he attempted to force the door to the building. The cars of the Gibson brothers arrived at approximately the same time and that was when the shooting began. According to Ronald Riner, Wayne Evans related that he was shot at and returned the fire. He ran east and was confronted by another man (presumably Edward Gibson) who began firing at him. By this account, Wayne Evans then shot the man.
For the purpose of brevity, we are combining some of appellants' contentions.
Appellants' first contention is that 'an adult with a criminal record cannot be afforded the sanctuary of the Indiana Immunity Statute in testifying against a juvenile co-defendant for any reason and because of the failure of the State to comply with the Immunity Statute.' In essence, this contention is that Ronald Riner's testimony was incompetent because he was not offered or granted immunity. The record is blank on this point. Appellants' contention is that since the record is barren as to compliance with the Indiana Immunity Statute, Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno., § 9--1609 (1956 Repl.), IC 1971, 35--1--31--7, Ronald Riner should not have been permitted to testify. Appellants have no rights under the Immunity Statute. The benefits of immunity are personal to the party who furnishes state's evidence. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum (D.C.1948), 81 F.Supp. 418. We fail to understand how appellants can complain about the incompetency or credibility of this witness because no immunity was apparently given him for his testimony. Actually, credibility is weakened by offers of immunity and evidence of such an offer is competent to go to the jury. See 3 A Wigmore, Evidence § 967 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). As we said previously, this is a personal privilege of the witness, of which the appellants have no right to complain.
Appellants next urge that they were not furnished a copy of the statement of Ronald Riner until the morning of the trial. Appellants make no showing that they ever asked for such a copy or that they were surprised upon finding that there was such a statement. A party seeking discovery must move for such production. In this case the appellants did not do so. If the appellants were surprised (and there is no evidence that appellants were) they should have asked for a reasonable time or continuance to examine and study the statement. We find no error presented to us in the respect under which complaint is made.
Appellants likewise complain that they were not furnished a list of the witnesses. The record shows, as a matter of fact, that appellants were furnished a list promptly upon defendants' motion and the granting of the motion by the court. We also point out that appellants failed to make this specific claim of error in their motion to correct errors and thus waived the matter.
Appellants next claim error because the prescriptions of In re Gault (1966), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, and Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, were not followed in this case. Appellants' contention is promptly disposed of upon the reflection that this was not a juvenile trial in a juvenile court. Instead, the original jurisdiction was in the Circuit Court. Jurisdiction in the juvenile court exists only in cases where a juvenile 'commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment.' (our emphasis). Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. § 9--3204(1) (1971 Supp.), IC 1971, 31--5--7--4(1).
In State ex rel. Imel v. Municipal Court (1946), 225 Ind. 23, 72 N.E.2d 357, we stated in a similar situation, that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction and juvenile procedure would not apply. It necessarily follows that no hearing to determine the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction was necessary in this case. For the same reason, appellants'...
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