Ring v. Harry

• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:12-CV-14654
• Parties: DANIEL RING, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEE HARRY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

DANIEL RING, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEE HARRY, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 2:12-CV-14654

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: July 24, 2014

Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff

OPINION & ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING PERMISSION TO PROCEED ONAPPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's request for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Livingston Circuit Court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f). As a result of his conviction, Petitioner is serving a sentence of 35 months-to-20 years imprisonment. The petition raises three claims: (1) the state courts erroneously failed to conduct an in camera review of the complaint's psychiatric records and therefore could not reasonably adjudicate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing and rebuttal arguments; and (3) Petitioner's trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court will deny the petition because Petitioner's claims do not merit habeas relief. The Court will also deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.

Background

This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v.Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

Defendant, who was 26, returned to live with his parents after having completed his service with the United States Army. In June 2008, he went to a local restaurant and bar. At the bar, defendant began to interact with JK, who was the mother of a girl that he had known from high school. While talking with defendant, JK recalled that her daughter had expressed an interest in him. JK offered to give her daughter's phone number to him and he called her and spoke with her. At some point, defendant asked JK if she wanted a shot of liquor and she agreed, but left to use the bathroom. When she returned, she saw the shot on the bar and drank it. She testified that she did not feel right after the drink and another witness testified that, although she was not intoxicated, JK seemed "off."

JK left the bar shortly before two in the morning. She testified that she fell as she was leaving and her knees and ankles were bleeding. At this point, defendant asked her if she would like a ride home and she agreed. Defendant drove JK to her home. He pulled into the garage and JK got out and opened the door that led into the house. She said that defendant suddenly appeared behind her. He pushed her down, took her clothes off, and eventually raped her. After she warned him that her children would be home soon, defendant dressed and prepared to leave. JK testified that, as he was leaving, he taunted her: "well I guess this means I can't date your daughter."

Defendant testified that he was drunk on the night in question. He stated that, after he drove JK home, she gave him a tour of her home. He said he made advances and she was receptive. They had sex and then he left. He denied that he pushed her or forced her to have sex. And, although he admitted that he had asked JK to set him up with her daughter at the bar, he denied that he said anything to her about dating her daughter while at JK's home.

The jury rejected defendant's contention that the sexual encounter was consensual and found him guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.

People v. Ring, No. 298074, 2011 WL 4104959 at *1, (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2011).

Following his conviction and sentence, Petitioner's trial lawyer subpoenaed JK's disability insurance company and personal psychologist to obtain her medical and psychological records for a restitution hearing and an anticipated motion for a new trial. The insurance company refused to provide the records. JK's psychologist, however, provided the records. During the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered Petitioner's lawyer to return the records.

Then, in September 2010, Petitioner filed a sealed motion for a new trial and a release of the psychological records or, alternatively, for an in camera review of the records under Michigan Court Rule 6.201. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and afterwards it issued an opinion and order denying Petitioner's request for an in camera review of the records. The trial court stated that the requested materials violated the Health Insurance and Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Michigan Public Health Code, and the Michigan court rules. The trial court ordered the records to be returned to the complainant as a sanction under Michigan Court Rule 6.201(J). The court also denied the request for an in camera review of the records. The court noted that under Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987), a defendant does not have a confrontation right to pre-trial discovery. The court concluded that a defendant also does not have a post-trial right to discovery for the purpose of filing a motion for a new trial.

Petitioner's appellate counsel then filed a claim of appeal and a motion to remand the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the materials. Counsel also filed a brief on appeal raising the three claims raised in the instant petition. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the motion for remand and affirmed Petitioner's convictions in an unpublished opinion. Id.

Petitioner obtained new appellate counsel who filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims as in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the Court. People v. Ring, 491 Mich. 854 (2012) (table).

Petitioner then obtained a third appellate counsel who filed the current habeas petition.

Standard of Review Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Pursuant to the AEDPA, Petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)(quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. "[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979))(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id., at 786-787.

Discussion

A. Complainant's Psychiatric Records

Petitio...