Ring v. Lawless

Decision Date19 June 1901
PartiesRING et al. v. LAWLESS et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from circuit court, Scott county; O. P. Thompson, Judge.

Bill by Bridget Lawless and others against Jeremiah Ring and others. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Reversed in part and remanded.H. G. Whitlock and James A. Warren, for appellants.

Mark Meyerstein and J. M. Riggs, for appellees.

Jeremiah Ring, Sr., died March 17, 1894, leaving, him surviving, Ann Ring, his wife, three sons, jeremiah, Jr., James, and William, and two daughters, Bridget Lawless and Ellen Woodall. A writing purporting to be the last will and testament of said deceased was presented to the county court of Scott county, and admitted to probate. The will bequeathed to each of said daughters of the testator the sum of $5, and bequeathed and devised all his real property and the remainder of the personal property owned by him to said Ann Ring, his wife, for and during her natural life, with power to make absolutedisposition of it, with remainder over of all undisposed property to the said three sons of said testator. The will was dated May 21, 1890. After the testator had signed the will, he and Ann, his wife, in the year 1893, executed three deeds, purporting to convey all the real estate of which the deceased was the owner. One of these deeds purported to convey a tract of land to said James Ring for a stated consideration of $600. Another purported to convey two lots in the city of Winchester to said William Ring and James Ring for a stated consideration of $800. The other of said deeds purported to convey certain tracts of land to Jeremiah, Jr., and William Ring, in consideration of one dollar and natural love and affection. In May, 1894, a conservator was appointed for said Ann Ring. She died in 1896, during the pendency of this proceeding, and without having disposed of any real estate after the death of her husband.

This was a bill in chancery in the circuit court of Scott county, to the October term, 1895, by the said widow, Ann Ring, by her conservator, and the said two daughters, Bridget Lawless and Ellen Woodall, against the three sons of said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., deceased, to contest the will of said deceased, and to set aside and vacate the three deeds executed after the making and signing of the will, and also to set aside and vacate five other deeds previously executed by the said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., and Ann Ring, his wife, on the ground the said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., was lacking in mental capacity to execute the said will and each and every of said deeds, and for the further alleged reason the execution of the said will and each of said deeds was procured by the undue influence exercised by the said sons of said Jeremiah, Sr., who, respectively, were the beneficiaries under said instruments. The said five deeds referred to in the bill as having been made prior to the making of the will were certain deeds signed by said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., and Ann Ring, his wife, as follows: One dated March 20, 1867, purporting to convey certain lands to said William for the stated consideration of $500; one dated March 20, 1867, purporting to convey certain lands to Jeremiah, Jr. (and, in case of his death without ‘heirs,’ to James and William Ring), for a stated consideration of $500; one dated February 20, 1873, purporting to convey certain other tracts of land to Jeremiah, Jr., for a stated consideration of $500; one of the same date, acknowledged July 28, 1873, purporting to convey certain other tracts to James for a stated consideration of $500; and one dated March 4, 1875, purporting to convey still other lands to James for a stated consideration of $1,000. All of said five deeds reserved the possession and use of the lands to the grantors for and during their natural lives, except the deed dated March 4, 1875. The bill alleged no valuable or money consideration was paid by any of the grantees in any of the deeds sought to be avoided by the bill, and that said Jeremiah, Sr., at and before the date of the first of said conveyances, to wit, March 20, 1867, and from thenceforth, continuously, during the remainder of his life, was of unsound mind, and mentally incapable of executing a valid deed or will.

A demurrer, general and special, was presented to the bill. The grounds of demurrer were that the bill was multifarious, in that it presented distinct matters and causes, and that it should not be entertained as to the conveyances of 1867, 1872, 1873, and 1875, because of laches, and that the allegations as to the charges of the exercise of undue influence were insufficient. The demurrer was sustained on the latter of these grounds, and overruled as to the others. The bill was amended in respect of the charge of undue influence, and the defendants each made answer thereto. Replications were filed, and the court, without objection on the part of any of the parties, caused issues of fact out of chancery as to the validity of each of said eight deeds, and an issue at law under the statute whether the writing produced was the will of said deceased, Jeremiah Ring, Sr., to be submitted to the same jury for trial. These issues had been submitted twice before to juries. The jury by whom the cause was first heard were unable to agree. On the second hearing the findings were the said Jeremiah Ring was mentally incapable of making a valid deed or will. At the last hearing the jury returned special findings that said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., was lacking in mental capacity to execute each and every of the said deeds, and that he was unduly influenced in making each and every of them, and that the paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of the said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., was not the will of the alleged testator. The chancellor set aside the finding that the deeds were the result of undue influence exercised over the said grantor, but otherwise accepted the findings of the jury as to the deeds, and overruled a motion to grant a rehearing of the other issues, and entered a decree setting aside and vacating the deeds and the will, and declaring all of the property involved to be intestate property, and belonging to the parties complainant and defendant, as tenants in common (said Ann Ring, widow of said deceased, having departed this life during the pendency of the proceeding), and further entered a decree in partition accordingly. This is an appeal by the sons, Jeremiah, Jr., William, and James Ring, to reverse the decree.

BOGGS, J. (after stating the facts).

The theory of the bill is that said Jeremiah Ring, Sr., was, at and before the year 1867 (the date of the first conveyance sought to be avoided), and from thenceforth, continuously, during the remainder of his lifetime, lackingin mental power to make a valid disposition of his property, either by deed or will; that during that period of time the appellant Jeremiah, Jr., received two deeds for real estate from him, the appellant James three deeds, the appellants William and James one deed, the appellants Jeremiah, Jr., and William one deed, and the appellant William one deed; that all of said parties claim as devisees under the alleged will of said Jeremiah, Sr. The alleged ground of invalidity of each of the deeds and of the will is the same, viz. the lack of mental capacity of the grantor and testator. The appellants (defendants to the bill) were alike interested in the provisions of the will, and the ground of attack upon the validity of the will and upon the deeds was the same. The appellants William and James were jointly interested in the deeds of date January 10, 1893, and the appellants Jeremiah, Jr., and William had like joint interest in the deed of date June 8, 1893. The deed of March 20, 1867, to Jeremiah, Jr., was so conditioned as to create a possible reversionary interest in James Ring, and the deed of February 20, 1873, to Jeremiah, Jr., was so conditioned as to create a possible reversionary interest in James and William.

It cannot be urged in this court the bill is multifarious. The appellants did not abide by their demurrer, but filed answers to the bill upon its merits, and consented to the submission of the issues of fact so made by the bill and answers to a jury, and these issues have been three times heard by as many different juries. The objection the bill is multifarious must be regarded as waived.

Prior to the death of their father, the complainants below, appellees here, had no legal interest in his property, and could not have been heard in the courts to question the validity of instruments executed by him. They brought this bill in due season after his death, and laches cannot be imputed to them on the ground the deeds were executed many years before the death of their father. Laches is neglect or omission to assert a right. [190 Ill. 526]12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 533. Those persons who, in case a grantor shall die intestate, will inherit his lands have no present right during the life of the grantor, and cannot institute actions at law or suits in equity to avoid such deeds or cancel them while the grantor is living. Baldwin v. Golde, 88 Hun, 115, 34 N. Y. Supp. 587;Borders v. Hodges, 154 Ill. 498, 39 N. E. 597. Hence laches cannot be imputed to them until a legal right attaches in them to act.

The complaint that nonexpert witnesses, who, as appellants allege, had never seen the testator transact any business, and who, as is alleged, gave no facts to the jury touching his capacity to transact the ordinary business affairs of life, were permitted by the court to give opinions as to his capacity to transact such affairs is not well grounded. This objection referred to a number of witnesses who had resided for many years in the same neighborhood with the testator, were well acquainted with him, had seen him frequently during the period of acquaintanceship, and often talked with him, and observed his actions and conduct, and who...

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